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UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
STELLA GEORGIADOU, DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICS 
IS THE EU A NORMATIVE POWER IN THE FIELD OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION? 
THE CASES OF CYPRUS AND KOSOVO 
SUMMARY 
The main aim of this dissertation is to test the extent to which the EU is a normative power 
in the field of conflict transformation. Although much has been written on Normative 
Power Europe (NPE), the concept is still empirically under-explored. This dissertation, 
therefore, applies the NPE analytical framework to explore the EU’s role in Cyprus and 
Kosovo. Specifically, a three-part framework is used which analyses the EU’s goals, 
means and impact. 
The contribution of this thesis to the existing literature is twofold. Firstly, the application 
of the NPE framework offers a fresh theoretical perspective regarding the EU’s role in 
conflict transformation. Secondly, the empirical focus of this research allows for 
conclusions to be drawn for the ways norms can be spread in cases of ethnic conflict and 
for the ways local conditions can potentially hamper the internalisation of norms. The 
main argument of this thesis is that the EU’s normative power in the field of conflict 
transformation can be challenged by reference to dichotomies that are important within 
the NPE analytical framework like, for example, normative interests versus materialistic 
interests, persuasion versus coercion and genuine internalisation of norms versus 
instrumental behaviour on the part of local actors. 
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Following the introduction, the second 
chapter discusses the NPE concept and presents the theoretical framework of the thesis. 
The third chapter provides the historical context of the two conflict cases. Then, the next 
three chapters focus on applying the NPE framework to the two cases. Each chapter is 
concerned with one of the three dimensions of the analytical framework (goals, means 
and impact). Lastly, chapter seven summarises the main argument and reflects on its 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of constructivism has shifted the attention of some EU focused research 
towards considering the importance of norms and values in the Union’s policy making 
and their possible impact (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Tonra and Christiansen 2004; 
Rumelili 2003). Constructivism perceives an actor’s identity as socially built. For 
constructivists, principles and norms play an important role in the formation of 
preferences and interests (Wendt 1995, Ruggie 1998). In fact, they regard ideas as 
constitutive of an actor’s interests (Blyth 2004: 702). In this context, Ian Manners (2002) 
formed his argument that the EU is a normative power. The concept of ‘Normative Power 
Europe’ (NPE) has, since then, been widely discussed and become the target of extensive 
criticism.  
This thesis rests on a comparative analysis of two conflict cases, namely Kosovo and 
Cyprus. Its main aim is to test the applicability of the NPE concept in the field of conflict 
transformation. To this end, the two conflicts were studied in depth in order to increase 
understanding of whether and why the EU is interested in transforming conflicts, how it 
acts towards this end and what kind of impact it produces.  
This introductory chapter is divided into nine sections. The first places the research into 
context by discussing the relevant literature. The second outlines the main research 
questions and the central argument of this thesis. Section three provides some conceptual 
clarifications to avoid misinterpretation of key terms used in this thesis. The fourth and 
fifth are concerned with the research design. More specifically, methodological 
approaches, data sources and data management techniques are discussed. Section six 
outlines the strategies used to enhance and ensure trustworthiness while section seven 
explains the rationale for choosing a long timeframe. The eighth identifies the research 
14 
 
limitations and discusses the approaches used to overcome those. Lastly, section nine 
provides an outline of the thesis chapters.  
1.1 PLACING THE RESEARCH IN CONTEXT 
The study of the international role of the EU, and specifically its conceptualisation as a 
normative power, has been the subject of investigation for scholars in Political Science, 
EU Studies and International Relations. In addition, the focus of this research on conflict 
transformation brings into the discussion scholars in Conflict Studies. The literature on 
the NPE concept and on the EU’s role in cases of conflict will now be briefly examined 
with the aim of bringing these strands of literature together. In so doing, a gap in the 
existing body of literature will be identified; thereby establishing the rationale for the 
main research question of this thesis, namely whether the EU has been a normative power 
towards Cyprus and Kosovo in conflict transformation1.  
Normative Power Europe literature  
Since the publication of Manners’ (2002) seminal article, the NPE concept has been 
widely used in academic literature2. Specifically, three main trends emerged. The first 
encompasses work on NPE and specific sectors/policy areas. Some examples are 
Lightfoot and Burchell’s (2004, 2005) work on NPE and environmental policy, Lamy and 
Laïdi’s (2002) on the EU and global governance, Haukkala’s (2008) on European 
Neighbourhood Policy and Erickson’s (2011) on arms exports.  
                                                             
1 This literature search concentrated only on articles written in English. 
2 For details on the breadth and depth of academic research on NPE see: Manners, I. (2015) ‘Sociology of 
Knowledge and Production of Normative Power in the European Union’s External Actions’, Journal of 
European Integration, Special Issue: Making Europe: The Sociology of Knowledge Meets European 
Integration, 37 (2). 
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A second trend in the literature is concerned with comparing the normativity of different 
global actors. One example is Tocci’s (2008) edited volume on the normative foreign 
policy of the EU, Russia, India and China. One chapter of this volume is concerned with 
the EU’s policies towards Kosovo from 1999-2007. However, its main focus is not on 
conflict transformation in terms of improving the relationship between the parties of the 
conflict. Rather, the author focuses on the EU’s involvement in resolving the issue of 
Kosovo’s final status. More recently, Kavalski has carried out “a parallel assessment of 
the normative power of the EU, China and India in Central Asia” (Kavalski 2012: 148). 
The third trend in scholarship on NPE is more theoretical and is concerned with particular 
aspects of the NPE approach. Examples include Diez’s (2005) work on how the NPE 
discourse leads to the creation of a distinct EU identity by turning third parties into 
‘others’ and Bickerton’s (2011) on Normative Power Europe and the issue of legitimacy.  
The EU’s role in conflicts 
Many studies have been devoted to analysing, giving explanations for, and presenting 
different understandings of the EU’s role in conflicts3. One of the main focuses has been 
the examination of the different tools at the EU’s disposal. Such research mainly focused 
on the launch of peacekeeping missions and the extent to which these were effective in 
the reform of institutions, the process of democratisation and the protection of human and 
minority rights - all of which are considered as important aspects of peacebuilding (Paris 
2004: 39). 
Furthermore, a substantial part of the literature is concerned with the EU’s role in conflict 
resolution as part of its wider policies. In this respect, much research has been concerned 
                                                             




with the question of how the prospect of EU membership can assist the process towards 
conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Diez et al. (2006), for example, put 
forward a framework with four pathways (compulsory, enabling, connective and 
constructive) through which the EU could affect border conflicts in the process of 
integration. These pathways are sub-categorised with regards to the EU’s approach and 
the targeted actors in a given society. More specifically, the authors propose that the EU’s 
approach towards a conflict could be either actor-driven or structural and that the main 
target in a conflict society is either the political elites or the wider public. Tocci (2007) 
has proposed another, similar taxonomy of how the EU could have an impact on conflicts. 
She spells out three mechanisms, namely conditionality, social learning and passive 
enforcement. All three, however, do not diverge significantly from the Diez et al. four 
pathways, as the logic behind them is very similar.  
Moreover, Coppotiers et al. (2004) examined the usage of Europeanisation as an 
instrument of conflict resolution in four secessionist conflicts: Cyprus, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Georgia-Abkhazia and Moldova-Transnistria. They mainly discuss the 
ability of the EU to have an impact on conflicts through its multi-level framework and its 
foreign policy actions using the instruments of conditionality and socialisation.  
Directly related to the above discussion is the perception of the EU in many academic 
studies as an actor interested in transforming conflicts as opposed to simply managing 
them. Tocci (2008: 875), for example, argues that EU actors, “in stressing their 
commitment to peace, have meant conflict resolution and transformation, over and above 
conflict management and settlement”. Also, conflict transformation advocates argued that 
the integration of divided societies into the EU’s supranational political structures can 
help transform a conflict (Belloni 2009). In fact, some see European integration as the 
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only way to ensure the long-term resolution of ethnic conflicts (Delanty 1996, Kearney 
1997). 
Normative Power Europe and Conflict Transformation 
What is more important for the purposes of this research, however, is to identify the 
academic scholarship that directly associates ‘Normative Power Europe’ and conflict 
transformation. Firstly, it should be noted that very few academic publications have 
linked the NPE literature to the study of conflicts. One notable example is Michelle Pace 
(2007) who explored how the construction of the EU’s normative power may pose limits 
on the EU’s role as a global actor. To this end, she draws on the Israel-Palestine conflict.  
However, only two publications have attempted to link the NPE concept with conflict 
transformation. The first is an article by Steglich (2012) which examined how the EU’s 
normative power can lead to conflict transformation in the case of Moldova. However, 
this article does not utilise the three-dimensional approach proposed by Manners 
(explained on pp.52-62). Its focus is mostly on how the mechanisms of integration and 
association might transform the Moldova conflict. Therefore, no concrete conclusions can 
be reached on the EU’s normativity in conflict transformation. 
The second was Diez and Pace’s (2007) work on the NPE concept in conflict 
transformation in the cases of Cyprus and Israel-Palestine. However, the emphasis of that 
study is not on the question of whether the EU is a normative power in this field. Rather, 
their work is concerned with how the EU’s normative self-construction is conceived by 
the main actors involved in the conflicts. What still has not been done, therefore, is the 




Original Contribution and Importance of this Research 
The above review reveals a gap in the existing literature. This thesis seeks to fill this gap 
through a comprehensive application of the NPE framework in the field of conflict 
transformation. It will mainly investigate whether the attribution of the ‘Normative 
Power’ characteristic to the EU is accurate in relation to its role in this field.   
For Manners (2011: 244), the assertion that the EU is advancing and promoting certain 
principles “is still subject to confirmation”. Of the key principles that Manners (2011: 
244) suggested are at work, sustainable peace4 is seen as the “prime principle” that the 
EU should be advancing. For this reason, that principle is put at the centre of this 
particular research.  
This thesis aims to make a significant contribution to the empirical literature on NPE 
through the thorough investigation of Cyprus and Kosovo, two under-researched cases 
from an NPE perspective. Most importantly, however, substantive conclusions will be 
drawn on the analytical and practical significance of the ‘Normative Power Europe’ 
approach in the field of conflict transformation.  
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND CENTRAL ARGUMENT 
The central research question of this thesis is:  
Is the EU a normative power in the field of conflict transformation? 
This main question was divided into three sub-questions which reflect the three parts of 
the analytical framework used in this research, namely EU goals, means and impact (for 
                                                             
4 This thesis proposes that ‘sustainable peace’ can be achieved through conflict transformation 
initiatives. The link between the ‘sustainable peace’ norm and conflict transformation approaches will 
be discussed below.   
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a more detailed discussion on this framework, see Chapter Two). Specifically, the three 
sub-questions that are addressed in this dissertation are: 
- Has ‘sustainable peace’ become a prime objective of the EU?  
- Through what means does the EU diffuse the norms it stands for? 
- Has the EU been able to shape conceptions of what counts as normal in conflict cases? 
Taking into consideration NPE propositions as well as alternative explanations (see 
Chapter Two), this thesis argues that the EU’s normative power in the field of conflict 
transformation can be challenged by reference to dichotomies that are important within 
the NPE analytical framework. As the cross-case comparative analysis will reveal, the 
normativity of the EU can be challenged on several grounds. With regards to EU goals, 
problems arise from the prioritisation of material interests over norms and from the 
contested nature of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm and international law which made 
possible the development of well-grounded arguments against the EU’s approach. 
Regarding EU mechanisms, problems arise from the difficulty of drawing the line 
between persuasion on the one hand and imposition/coercion on the other. Lastly, 
regarding EU impact, the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm is hindered by 
deeply entrenched divisions and by the instrumental behaviour of local actors.  
1.3 CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS 
The first term that needs to be defined in order to avoid any misapprehension is ‘conflict’. 
The usage of this term in international politics has undergone significant changes. In 
contemporary research, conflict does not always consist of the use of physical violence 
(Diez et.al.2006: 6). Bercovitch and Jackson (2009: 20) define conflict as the “perception 
of incompatibility between actors and the range of behaviour associated with such 
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perceptions”. This definition is similar to the one provided by Diez et al. (2006). Their 
definition, however, goes deeper and associates conflict with identities. More specifically, 
they define conflict as “the incompatibility of subject positions”. According to them (Diez 
et al. 2006: 159), subject positions are “the specific interests and identity” of the conflict 
parties. This understanding of the term ‘conflict’ is the one adopted in this thesis. Based 
on this definition, conflict can be conceptualised as a social construction. Hence, this 
understanding of ‘conflict’ leads to the assumption that it is possible for the EU to shape 
social constructions of conflict by changing the conflict parties’ subject positions.  
Turning to conflict transformation, Diez et al. (2006: 584) perceive the EU as a 
transformative actor interested in the “re-articulation of subject positions so that they no 
longer seem incompatible in most respects”. Since subject positions are seen to represent 
the parties’ identity, transformation is about addressing the structural roots of the conflict 
(incompatible subject positions). Similar definitions of conflict transformation have also 
been put forward by other authors. Lederach (2003: 14), for example, noted, “conflict 
transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-
giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, 
increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life 
problems in human relationships”. Similarly, Miall (2004: 70) argued that conflict 
transformation is the “process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, 
interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the 
continuation of violent conflict”. Other authors went a step further and provided a 
narrower, more demanding definition of conflict transformation that involves the 
transformation of the identities of the parties involved in a conflict (Smithey 2011: 19, 
Simonsen 2005). In this research, Diez et al’s understanding of transformation (re-
articulation of subject positions) has been adopted. Given the definition of the term 
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‘conflict’ used in this thesis (incompatibility of subject positions), this definition of 
conflict transformation is best-suited for the subsequent analysis. 
In sharp contrast to conflict transformation approaches, ‘conflict management’ theorists 
perceive violent conflicts as the outcome of the existence of divergent interests within 
and between groups of people. For these theorists, transformation of such conflicts is 
unlikely to happen. Thus, the only thing left to be done is to manage them, and sometimes 
to find the middle ground in which confrontation will terminate and violence will be laid 
aside (Hansen 2012: 79-80, Wallensteen 2002: 53).  
Conflict management, therefore, in contrast to conflict transformation, deals only with 
the cessation of violence and containment of conflict but does not address the roots of the 
conflict. Conversely, conflict transformation aims at long-term, structural, relational and 
behavioural changes. In other words, conflict transformation is mostly concerned with 
altering perceptions of normality, thus altering identities. As a result of these differing 
starting points, conflict management advocates regard interests and identities of conflict 
parties as exogenously given and thus not susceptible to any alteration. In contrast, 
conflict transformation approaches are more aligned with the constructivist understanding 
of identities as socially built 5.  
Turning to the EU’s role in conflicts, Manners (2008a: 135) argues that it is interested in 
sustainable peace because it focuses on addressing “both the structural causes and the 
violent symptoms of conflict”. Elsewhere, he states that sustainable peace involves 
addressing the structural causes of conflicts and tackling “the roots of inequality” 
(Manners 2006: 26) in conflict situations. This definition leads to the assumption that a 
commitment to sustainable peace requires a long-term and deep approach towards 
                                                             
5 As will be discussed in Chapter Two, constructivism has formed the basis of the NPE approach.  
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conflicts as opposed to short-term approaches addressing only the immediate 
consequences of a conflict.  
This understanding of ‘sustainable peace’ is aligned with conflict transformation as 
opposed to conflict management approaches6. This thesis argues that sustainable peace 
can be achieved only when the relationship, identities and perceptions of the parties 
involved in the conflict are changed/transformed for the better (Lederach 1995:17, Miall 
2004: 4, Mitchell 2002: 20). It follows that the EU, in order to change perceptions of 
normality with regards to sustainable peace, should aim at transforming the conflicts and 
not at simply managing them. In this thesis, therefore, ‘sustainable peace’ is perceived as 
the end-product and conflict transformation as the path to achieve this end. 
1.3 ONTOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY 
It is important to clarify from the outset the ontological and epistemological perspectives 
adopted. In order to contribute to the understanding of how the EU interacts with key 
Cypriot and Kosovan7 actors, this thesis starts out from a relativist ontology and an 
interpretivist epistemology, focusing on norms as constitutive of the EU’s identity, the 
ways through which the EU diffuses its norms and an interpretation of the EU’s potential 
impact. Emphasis is therefore placed on historical and cultural aspects that help the 
development of a more detailed and informed understanding of each case.  
However, in addition to the interpretivist analysis, some positivist practices are also used 
to facilitate the empirical application of the NPE framework. These include the choice of 
the cases along the more- and less-likely spectrum – the two cases were chosen based on 
                                                             
6 Conflict management approaches are more aligned with Manners’ understanding of ‘stable peace’ 
(Appendix A: 36) which refers to addressing the consequences of a conflict but not its root causes. 
7 In this thesis, Kosovar refers to Kosovo-Albanians while Kosovan refers to all citizens of Kosovo. 
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the extent to which they were expected to be in line with the NPE argument - and the 
conduct of cross-case analysis. Therefore, this thesis rests upon different epistemologies 
in order to turn NPE into a practically applicable analytical tool (Shen 2015). 
Taking into consideration the ontological and epistemological positions described above, 
this research adopts a qualitative methodological approach. Qualitative research can be 
understood as a research strategy that “emphasizes words rather than quantification in the 
collection and analysis of the data” (Bryman 2012: 36). The main reason why the thesis 
employs qualitative methods for investigating the degree of normativity of the EU in 
conflict transformation is that they are mostly concerned with the meaning, and not the 
frequency, of phenomena (McNabb 2004:341). In what follows, the specific research 
methods and case selection criteria are discussed. 
The use of case studies to test a theoretical framework 
In order to fulfil the key theoretical aim of this research – to test the extent to which the 
EU is a normative power in the field of conflict transformation – the case study method 
is used. A case is defined as “an empirical enquiry that investigates contemporary 
phenomena within real life context especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 1994:13).  
As Eckstein (1975: 80) argued, “case studies are valuable at all stages of the theory-
building process, but most valuable at the stage of theory building process where least 
value is generally attached to them: the stage at which candidate theories are tested”. 
Taking the main purpose of this research into consideration, case studies have been 
deemed the most appropriate. Firstly, case studies are particularly suitable when 
attempting to answer the how and why questions that “deal with operational links that 
need to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies” (Yin 2009: 10). Since a central 
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question in this research is how and why NPE works or does not work, a case study 
approach is the most suitable. Secondly, the case study method was chosen because of its 
appropriateness in analysis investigating contemporary events in which “the relevant 
behaviours cannot be manipulated” (Yin 2009: 11). Thirdly, case studies are particularly 
suitable to explore a complex social phenomenon (normativity of an actor in conflict 
transformation) in its natural setting (societies ridden by ethno-national conflict) (Yin 
2009: 11).  
Eckstein also proposed certain methods of theory-based case selection. He noted that in 
testing a theory, it is useful to choose what he termed a ‘crucial case’, which is a case 
“that must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity, or, 
conversely, must not fit equally well any rule contrary to that proposed” (Eckstein 1975: 
118). However, he also stated “history seldom provides clear examples of cases that 
satisfy the demanding criteria of a crucial case” (Eckstein 1975: 118). As a result, more-
likely and less-likely case studies are usually employed in the social sciences because 
they are considered as the “more relaxed variants of the crucial case study” (Rohlfing 
2012: 84). Following Eckstein, the two cases used in this research were chosen on the 
basis of the extent to which they were expected to be in line with the NPE expectations 
(the rationale for choosing the particular cases of Cyprus and Kosovo will be explained 
in the following section). In other words, it is expected that the empirical findings from 
the more-likely case will be in line with the NPE argument to a great degree. In contrast, 
the empirical findings from the less-likely case are expected to either not be in line with 
the NPE expectations or to be in line with them to a much lesser extent than the findings 
from the more-likely case.  
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Another typological classification used in the process of selecting the cases for this 
research is the one proposed by Stake. Stake (2008: 123) described three types of case 
studies. ‘Intrinsic case studies’ are those that are undertaken because the specific case that 
is chosen is of interest in itself. The main goal of an intrinsic case study is neither to 
provide understandings of abstract concepts or general phenomena nor to build a theory. 
On the contrary, the ‘instrumental case study’ intends to provide further understandings 
of an issue or to refine a theory. In instrumental case studies, “the case is of secondary 
interest, it plays a supportive role and it facilitates our understanding of something else” 
(Stake 2005: 445). The third type, according to Stake (2008: 124), is the collective case 
study which is merely “an instrumental study extended to several cases”. The interest of 
the researcher is not on one or more cases, rather, they intend to investigate a phenomenon 
or a general condition. This research is an example of Stake’s ‘collective case study’. The 
two cases used in this research were chosen with a view of enhancing the understanding 
of the ‘Normative Power Europe’ concept.  
In this thesis, the two case studies of Cyprus and Kosovo are used to test the validity of 
‘Normative Power Europe’ in the field of conflict transformation. These cases will be 
studied in depth to see “whether events unfold in the manner predicted and whether actors 
speak and act as the theory predicts” (Van Evera 1997: 29). In other words, the analysis 
of the extent to which the EU is a normative power will be realised through an 
examination of each case across a three-part analytical framework (explained on pp.52-
62) to see if the EU objectives, actions and impact are in line with the NPE approach. The 
analysis, therefore, will be replicated across cases and the evidence will be more 
compelling. This makes possible a more systematic testing of the ‘Normative Power 
Europe’ concept in the field of conflict transformation. There is no agreement in the 
literature as to the number of cases that should be included in collective case studies. 
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However, Yin suggested that with a few cases, possibly two or three, we can still achieve 
replication (Yin 1984: 57-58) (for a discussion on the transferability of the findings of 
this research, see section 1.6).  
Selecting the cases 
Having decided to espouse a collective case study approach, it is necessary to choose the 
cases with great care (Stake 2008: 243). Collective casework requires the cases to be 
chosen out of a number of potential alternatives. Firstly, the selection of the two cases is 
based on Manners’ understanding of what the EU’s role should be in the promotion of 
sustainable peace. For him (Appendix A: 36), the norm of sustainable peace, just like all 
the norms promoted by the EU, derives from the UN framework and is, thus, a universal 
norm. The UN should, therefore, work with regional organisations to advance this norm. 
The EU, as a normative power, should support and promote ‘sustainable peace’ in its own 
region while the UN should undertake the responsibility of promoting it to other places. 
Based on this rationale, the cases were chosen based on their geographical location in the 
EU’s neighbourhood.   
Moreover, the cases were selected on the basis of the extent to which they are expected 
to conform to the NPE expectations, thus providing space for a rigorous test of the NPE 
framework. As explained earlier in this chapter, Kosovo was chosen as the case that is 
likely to meet NPE expectations to a much greater extent than the case of Cyprus. 
Preliminary empirical investigation showed that the level of EU engagement and effort 
towards Kosovo was significantly larger and deeper in comparison to Cyprus. This was 
later confirmed by the researcher’s fieldwork and in-depth research.  
At first sight, the Cyprus case should be expected to constitute a case that is likely to 
match the NPE expectations to a great extent. The Republic of Cyprus (RoC) joined the 
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EU in 2004 and, therefore, should have already espoused the EU’s understanding of 
‘sustainable peace’8, thus making it easier for the EU to transform the conflict. However, 
a preliminary empirical investigation revealed that both the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot 
communities show very little signs of internalisation9 of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm. 
The subsequent in-depth research confirmed this. Since Cyprus is already a member, the 
EU has lost the chance to encourage conflict transformation through enlargement-related 
initiatives, unlike with Kosovo. This means that the EU faces fewer obstacles in the 
process of diffusing its norms in Kosovo, thus making it easier to transform that particular 
conflict. For these reasons, Kosovo is considered as the case that is expected to conform 
to the NPE expectations to a much greater extent in comparison to Cyprus 
(George/Bennett 2005: 120-123). By choosing Cyprus as a less-likely case and Kosovo 
as the more-likely case, a vigorous test of the NPE concept is made possible. 
The use of structured, focused comparison and process tracing 
The main method used for cross-case analysis is structured, focused comparison. This 
method allows the researcher to perform a systematic comparison between two in-depth 
case studies, thus contributing to an “orderly, cumulative development of knowledge and 
theory about the phenomenon in question” (George and Bennet 2005: 70). This research 
explores three questions (see pp.54-64) that reflect the main objective and theoretical 
focus of this thesis. These three questions were asked of both the Cyprus and Kosovo 
cases.  
                                                             
8 A central proposition of the NPE approach is that the EU principles are also shared by the member 
states (Manners 2008: 68).  
9 According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 904), a norm is internalised when it achieves “a taken-for-
granted quality that makes conformance with the norm almost automatic”.  
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In addition, the within-case analysis benefited from the method of process tracing. George 
and Bennett (2005: 6) defined this as the method used to investigate intermediate steps to 
make inferences on how a process took place and whether and how it generated the 
outcome of interest. The main advantage is the fact that it allows the development of an 
understanding on “how and what happened” (King et al 1994: 226). Process tracing was 
firstly used to establish the sequential order of events, which contributed to a better and 
deeper understanding of the issue at hand. Secondly, in the context of this research and 
in line with Jacobs (2014: 65-69), it helped trace the origins and evolution of the EU’s 
principles and norms, establish the pathways of norm diffusion and identify the extent to 
which domestic change towards the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm came 
about as a result of EU policies. As Jacobs noted, “process-tracing methods are ideally 
suited to addressing the challenges of studying ideational causation” (Jacobs 2014: 48). 
1.5 SPECIFICATION OF DATA SOURCES AND DATA ANALYSIS 
TECHNIQUES 
Five different data sources were used in this thesis – official documentation, speeches, 
opinion polls, semi-structured interviews and secondary sources. The following 
paragraphs will expand on the rationale for their use.  
The first source of primary data was official documents. In analysing the EU’s approach 
and policies towards the Cyprus and Kosovo conflicts, the researcher relied on European 
Council documents (regulations, declarations, statements, Presidency conclusions and 
Annual Reports), Council of Ministers documents and European Commission 
communications and policy documents. Particular emphasis was put on projects funded 
by the Commission. Information on those projects’ objectives, timeframe, stage of 
implementation and results was obtained through the EC’s own evaluation reports as well 
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as through NGO reports and academic publications. Primary data was also obtained 
through European Parliament (EP) documents. The EP played an important role in both 
cases. Firstly, EP resolutions were examined with regards to both Cyprus and Kosovo. 
Secondly, EP reports on inter-parliamentary delegations were also examined. In addition, 
in certain instances, the EU has initiated and implemented projects in collaboration with 
other organisations like, for example, the United Nations (UN) and the Council of Europe 
(CoE). Some of these projects were relevant to the scope of this thesis. As a result, UN 
and CoE publications and reports on these particular projects were analysed. Also, 
relevant OSCE reports were examined. Such reports provided complementary 
information with regards to particular aspects of the Cypriot and Kosovan societies 
relevant to this research. For example, the OSCE reports on education in Kosovo helped 
the researcher to gain a more comprehensive view on how education policies and 
practices may affect the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm. 
Also, in discussing particular normative changes in the domestic Kosovan and Cypriot 
environments, data was obtained from documents produced in these two countries. More 
specifically, such sources included reports and strategic plans published by the Republic 
of Kosovo’s Ministry of Education, legal documents and reports on the state of play on 
the implementation of the Brussels agreement10, reports published by the Cyprus Ministry 
of Education as well as local NGO reports and publications. 
Apart from official documents, public speeches were also analysed. These were accessed 
through the websites of the Press and Information Office (PIO) of the RoC, the 
Presidential Press Office of the “TRNC” (‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’) and 
the President of the Republic of Kosovo. Additional data was obtained through the 
                                                             
10 ‘Brussels Agreement’ refers to the agreement facilitated by the EU and signed by Serbia and Kosovo 
on the normalisation of their relations on 19 April 2013. 
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websites of the foreign ministries of Kosovo, the RoC and the “TRNC”.  With particular 
reference to the Kosovo Serb community, quotations of politicians, as these appeared in 
the press, were also included in the analysis. Such quotations were accessed through the 
UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) media monitoring unit11. 
Also, opinion polls proved a valuable source of information when analysing the 
normativity of the EU’s impact. They enabled the researcher to juxtapose the results from 
the analysis of political elite rhetoric with the public views as portrayed in opinion polls 
in order to identify the general pattern that emerged in both the Cypriot and Kosovan 
societies. 
Another source of primary data were the 52 interviews conducted by the researcher (see 
Appendices A and B)12. The main purpose of interviewing is “to derive interpretations, 
not facts or laws, from respondent talk” (Warren 2001: 83).  The goal is not simply to get 
answers to questions; rather, it is an “interest to understanding the experience of other 
people and the meaning they make of their experience” (Shkedi 2005: 59). This method 
was chosen as it would enable triangulation13 of data.  
Semi-structured interviewing was adopted (Green 2005: 53) as this would allow 
flexibility on the part of the interviewer. The researcher was able to discuss issues that 
were not on the pre-prepared list of questions. Rather, the interviewer had the opportunity 
to investigate the issue more by asking follow-up questions based on the responses of the 
interviewee. Also, semi-structured interviewing allowed the researcher to vary the 
                                                             
11 All the quotes cited in this thesis are authentic and may therefore contain linguistic errors.  
12 Appendices A and B contain detailed information on the background of interviewees as well as on the 
time and place each interview took place. Appendix A includes information on interviewees that agreed 
to be directly quoted in this thesis. Appendix B contains information on interviewees that chose to 
remain anonymous.  
13 For a definition of the term ‘triangulation’, see p.34.  
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questions according to each interviewee’s position. Lastly, this type of interviewing 
helped address another issue, namely the unwillingness of elite interviewees “to be put in 
a straightjacket of closed-ended questions” (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 674). 
Interviewees were identified using a combination of sampling methods – 
positional/reputational and the snowballing system. More specifically, potential 
interviewees were initially identified by their position and involvement in the processes 
being examined in this thesis. Then, those of them who agreed to be interviewed were 
asked to suggest other possible interviewees to the researcher (Vogt et al 2012: 129). 
Lastly, it should be noted that telephone, Skype and email interviews were also used in 
this research. While these are not as ideal as face-to-face interviewing, they enabled the 
researcher to conduct a larger number of interviews, thus collecting a larger amount of 
data.  
Data was also retrieved from secondary sources. ‘Secondary data' refers to data that has 
already been collected and analysed by others. Such sources ranged from books, articles 
in academic journals and publications by research centres and institutions.  
The reason for collecting data from five different sources was three-fold. Firstly, the 
combination of data from the aforementioned sources was helpful in establishing the 
chain of events in both cases. Secondly, this strategy enabled triangulation of the data 
collected. Lastly, by presenting and analysing the differing views of politicians, EU 
officials, academics and civil society organisations (CSOs) on specific topics, the 
researcher avoided the trap of selective data collection in favour of, or against, NPE 
propositions.  
Data Management and Data Analysis  
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Having outlined the main data sources, this section will explain how the collected data 
was managed and analysed. Firstly, a literature review was conducted in order to give a 
detailed account of the different ways in which NPE is conceptualised and understood. It 
also outlines the criteria used to establish the extent to which the empirical evidence is in 
line with the NPE argument. Then, the literature review thoroughly discusses the main 
theoretical debates around the NPE concept to identify the main critiques against it. These 
critiques provide alternative explanations in the empirical parts of this research in cases 
where empirical findings do not conform to the NPE argument and criteria. In order to 
ensure a thorough review of the literature, a comprehensive list of books, book chapters, 
edited volumes and articles on NPE was created.  
Then, to better grasp the conditions in the domestic Cypriot and Kosovan environments 
with regards to ‘sustainable peace’, an account of the key historical and political 
developments of both conflicts is provided. Using secondary literature as well as EU 
documents, the impasses and breakthroughs in Cyprus and Kosovo concerning conflict 
transformation as well as the EU involvement are discussed.  
The data used in the process of applying the three-part analytical framework to the two 
cases was managed in several ways. In order to identify the main EU objectives, a content 
analysis14 of speeches of EU officials and of EU documents was conducted to see whether 
the norm of ‘sustainable peace’ has been central to the EU’s approach towards, and 
relations with, the two countries. This analysis was supplemented with data collected 
from interviews with EU officials and academic experts. Interviews, document analysis 
and secondary literature were also used to trace the interests and motives of the EU in 
                                                             
14 Content analysis refers to the process of identifying, extracting and analysing underlying themes 
(Bryman 2004: 392). 
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getting involved with the two conflicts as well as its commitment to international law 
principles.  
In assessing the normativity of EU actions, the researcher drew on European Commission 
reports, CoE and OSCE reports and EP communications with the aim of identifying the 
main EU projects and actions towards both cases which were then separated into five 
categories reflecting the five NPE mechanisms discussed in Chapter Two. Then, 
interviews and official evaluations of certain programmes were used to determine 
whether these EU policies and actions were in line with the NPE expectations. Interviews 
proved very valuable in this particular stage of the research as they allowed the researcher 
to extend the investigation beyond official accounts and narrative (see Tansey 2007: 767).  
For example, although the EU-brokered dialogue in Kosovo initially seemed to be a good 
example of how the EU engages in persuasion, interviews revealed that the way the EU 
implemented the dialogue leaned towards imposition (see Chapter Five). 
In assessing the normativity of EU impact, a content analysis of speeches and public 
addresses by Cypriot and Kosovan politicians was conducted with the aim of identifying 
whether the ‘sustainable peace’ norm has been internalised by elites. This analysis was 
supplemented by interviews and document analysis of official reports from Cypriot and 
Kosovan ministries. Also, the discourse of CSOs was reviewed to see whether any 
changes emerged from below. Lastly, public opinion polls were reviewed to determine 
whether any changes occurred within the wider society. In addition, drawing on 
interviews, NGO reports, publications from research centres and other secondary sources, 
the researcher traced the evolution of partnership bonds at the level of the elites as well 
as at the level of civil society and assessed the extent to which local ownership emerged.  
1.6 TRUSTWORTHINESS OF RESEARCH 
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‘Trustworthiness’ refers to the quality of the research and encompasses several different 
concepts (Given and Saumure 2008: 895). These include the concepts of credibility, 
transferability, confirmability and dependability. The remainder of this section will 
expand on the strategies used in this research to ensure trustworthiness.  
Firstly, every qualitative research must be credible in order for it to be taken seriously. 
The more traditional, positivist understanding of this term is based upon the premise that 
the findings of a research must accurately reflect the world studied. Another way of 
conceptualising credibility has been put forward through the constructivist epistemology 
which is the one adopted in this thesis. More specifically, from a constructivist point of 
view, credibility refers to “capturing multiple subjective realities than ensuring the 
portrayal of an objective social reality” (Rubin and Babbie 2010: 232). In this research, a 
number of strategies have been employed to enhance credibility. Firstly, in order to 
increase the reliability of data, this thesis uses triangulation (Burnham et al. 2008: 40, 
Grix 2010: 135-137). In this particular research, triangulation is defined as “capturing and 
respecting multiple perspectives” (Patton 2002: 546). In this respect, data obtained 
through official documents and speeches was validated against information provided by 
interviewees, media articles and secondary sources (books, articles and specialised 
reports published by NGOs and research centres). In addition, the second strategy used 
to enhance credibility relates to the use of well-established research methods (Jensen 
2008: 138). The researcher conducted a thorough investigation of methodological 
approaches and research methods that could be used in this research. This led to informed 
and well-justified decisions on which methods would be adopted and the reasons why 
they were considered as the most suitable. Also, the careful selection of interviewees was 
another strategy to enhance credibility. In this research, interviewees were chosen on the 
basis of their knowledge on the subject and are, thus, credible sources.  
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Transferability refers to the extent to which a study’s findings and results can be 
transferred to other settings (Jensen 2008c: 886). In this research, transferability has been 
enhanced through certain key strategies. The first one relates to the case selection. 
Selecting the cases along the more- and less-likely spectrum increases the scope for 
transferring the results to other conflict cases. If both cases conform to the NPE 
expectations to a great extent, this would provide significant grounds to support the 
argument that the EU is indeed a normative actor in conflict transformation. If the 
empirical evidence from the less-likely case are, to a large extent, in line with the NPE 
argument, this would provide a particularly strong support for NPE. In contrast, if neither 
of the cases conforms to the NPE expectations, then there is significant cause to doubt 
whether the EU is a normative power in the promotion of ‘sustainable peace’. In 
particular, if the empirical findings from the more-likely case are largely not compatible 
with the NPE argument, then serious doubts are raised as to whether the EU can be a 
normative power in any case. The other strategy used to enhance transferability is thick 
description (Jensen 2008: 886) which enables the transfer of the theoretical framework 
used in this research to other settings. A detailed description of the setting, participants 
and research design has been provided to enable other researchers to make “their own 
determinations about transferability” (Jensen 2008: 886).  
Confirmability is related to “the degree to which the results of the study are based on the 
research purpose and not altered due to researcher bias” (Jensen 2008: 112). One possible 
obstacle to confirmability is the possibility of the researcher having analysed the data 
according to his/her predispositions. To address this issue, this research was based on data 
obtained from a variety of different sources. In so doing, the researcher aimed to avoid 
the trap of selective data collection in favour of, or against, NPE concept. Secondly, 
formulating alternative explanations and determining whether these are supported by the 
36 
 
data is another way of enhancing confirmability. To this end, in every part of the tripartite 
NPE framework, possible alternative and/or rival explanations were considered when 
analysing the data. Thirdly, the provision of a large number of data extracts to support the 
thesis arguments, should also be stressed as a way of increasing confirmability. 
Lastly, dependability refers to the idea that if “similar conditions are applied, a similar 
explanation for the phenomenon should be found” (Given and Saumure 2008: 896). The 
main ways to achieve dependability are “triangulation and sequencing of methods and 
creating a well-articulated rationale for these choices” (Ravitch and Carl 2015: 189).  In 
the context of this particular research, the researcher has provided a detailed account of 
the theoretical framework and the methodological approaches used to enable others to 
replicate the research (Jensen 2008b: 209).  
1.7 RESEARCH TIMEFRAME 
The research for this thesis covers the years between 1993 and 2015. The departing point 
(1993) of this research is the implementation of the EU’s CFSP (Common Foreign and 
Security Policy), when the EU explicitly stated for the first time its foreign policy 
objectives (European Union 1992, Article J.1).  
Also, this research covers the period up to September 2015. Regarding the case of Cyprus, 
this cut-off point enabled the researcher to investigate whether any changes occurred with 
regards to conflict transformation after the election of Mustafa Akinci as the president of 
the “TRNC” in April 2015. Akinci is generally regarded as a pro-reconciliation politician 
and was expected to bring changes to the Cyprus conflict (Hazou 2015). Secondly, in 
relation to Kosovo, this cut-off point allowed the researcher to include more recent 
developments linked to the EU-brokered dialogue, such as the agreement on the creation 
of Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities.  
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Lastly, as Manners (2011: 244) suggested, the use of a “longitudinal interpretation” is 
more suitable to address the subject of alteration in the perception of normality. In the 
context of this research, the EU’s approach towards Cyprus and Kosovo presents several 
changes over the years. A longer timeframe, therefore, enabled the researcher to avoid 
falsification due to “momentary fluctuation” (Manners 2009b: 19). 
1.8 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The following chapters seek to provide a comprehensive and consistent assessment of the 
NPE concept. However, the research has some limitations that should be acknowledged. 
The first limitation is related to the usage of the term ‘EU’. The EU is not a single, unitary 
actor but, rather, consists of different institutions performing different tasks and having 
different decision-making powers. Consequently, the use of such terms like ‘EU goal’, 
‘EU policy’, ‘EU activity’ and ‘EU impact’ become somewhat problematic. In order to 
maintain coherence in the analysis, the term ‘EU’ in this project will refer to the European 
Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Council and the EU Parliament. 
The EP, although it has less formal decision-making powers in comparison to other EU 
institutions, played an important role in both case studies. Its activities should not, 
therefore, be neglected. In addition, the fact that this thesis concentrates on EU 
institutions, does not mean that member state politics are considered unimportant and are 
not being taken into consideration. For example, the impact of some member states 
decision not to recognise the statehood of Kosovo will be discussed later in this thesis.  
The second limitation concerns the difficulty of measuring an actor’s normativity. 
Although a comprehensive framework of analysis is developed and discussed in Chapter 
Two, it is still the case that normativity cannot be easily observed, traced and measured. 
To approximate as much as possible an accurate measurement of the normativity of the 
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EU, a longitudinal approach was adopted (see section 1.6). Also, all three parts of the 
NPE framework are divided into sub-parts, thus allowing the presentation of qualitative 
assessments in the empirical chapters of the thesis. 
1.9 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. This introductory chapter will be followed by 
Chapter Two which discusses the theoretical framework of the research. To this end, the 
chapter presents a literature review with the aim of presenting a detailed account of the 
main theoretical debates on NPE. In addition, the literature review presents and explains 
in detail the theoretical framework used in this thesis.  
Chapter Three consists of a brief discussion of the history of the selected conflict-cases. 
It concentrates on presenting the main historical events as well as the involvement of third 
actors and their attempts to resolve the conflicts. This chapter is also concerned with the 
evolution of EU-Cyprus and EU-Kosovo relations.  
Chapter Four is concerned with the EU's goals and intentions - the first part of the three-
part analysis of identifying a normative power - in the two cases of Cyprus and Kosovo. 
This chapter, therefore, deals with the question of whether, how and why the promotion 
of sustainable peace has become an objective of the EU.  
Chapter Five is concerned with the EU's norm diffusion mechanisms towards the cases 
chosen, examining whether they were of a normative nature. The criteria to test this will 
be the ones proposed by Manners (2009), Aggestam (2009) and Forsberg (2011) who 
suggested that a normative power should, in its external relations, make use of the 
instruments of persuasion, norm invocation, shaping the discourse of what is normal, 
model power and prestige/shaming. 
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Chapter Six considers the impact of EU goals and policies on the two conflict cases. The 
main question of this chapter is the extent to which a normative change occurred towards 
the norm of ‘sustainable peace’. To empirically trace the impact of EU principles, actions 
and policies, three criteria proposed by Manners (2009) will be used. This chapter, 
therefore, asks whether ‘sustainable peace’ was internalised by the conflict parties, 
whether partnership bonds were created between them and whether local ownership 
emerged.  
Chapter Seven is the concluding chapter of the thesis. It evaluates the significance of NPE 
as an analytical approach by discussing the potentials and limitations of the applicability 
of the NPE framework in the field of conflict transformation. In so doing, the findings 
from the case studies are compared and contrasted so as to reveal the importance of each 












CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will present and discuss the NPE concept around which the theoretical 
framework of this thesis has been developed. The first part of the chapter will present the 
main debates related to the conceptualisation of the EU’s role in world politics, thus 
setting the scene for introducing the NPE concept. It will proceed by discussing the role 
of ideational factors in constructivism. The third and fourth parts of this chapter will 
discuss the EU’s normative basis and main critiques of NPE.  In the last part, the 
discussion will shift from NPE as a theoretical concept to NPE as a tool for analysis. In 
this respect, it will present the analytical framework used in this thesis to assess the EU’s 
normativity in conflict transformation.  
 2.2 CONCEPTUALISING THE EU’S INTERNATIONAL ROLE 
The academic debate about the EU’s international role mainly began in the 1970s. One 
of the most influential conceptualisations of the then European Community (EC) was that 
of François Duchêne (1972) who stressed that the EC was a ‘Civilian Power’, “a special 
international actor whose strength lies in its ability to promote and encourage stability 
through economic and political means” (Duchêne 1972: 32). Duchêne (1972: 32) argued 
that, given the transformation in the nature of global politics and the diminishing value of 
hard power15 capabilities, the EC was likely to grow into a major international actor16. 
Johan Galtung (1973: 117-149), for his part, described the EC as a Pax Bruxellana. This 
term was later defined by Richard Whitman (2002: 5) as “an endeavour to construct a 
                                                             
15 Hard power refers to the use of military and/or economic means to influence the behaviour of other 
parties (Nye 2004: 5).  
16 It should be noted that Duchêne’s argument was formed at a time of détente (period of improved 
relations between the main rivals during the Cold War).  
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Eurocentric world centred in Europe and a unicentric Europe centred in the Western half 
of the continent”. Galtung’s assertion, however, contrasted with that of Duchêne since he 
characterised the EU as an emerging superpower that would impose Pax Bruxellana on 
the world (see Whitman 1997: 65-66).  
The debate continued with Hedley Bull’s (1982) critique. Bull, writing from a realist 
perspective, rejected the argument of ‘Civilian Power Europe’ which he characterised as 
a contradiction in terms because, in his view, there can be no power without military 
capabilities. Bull's main point was that without the development of military competencies, 
the EC could not become an effective actor in international politics (Bull 1982: 151). The 
fact, however, that Bull formed his arguments at one of the points of highest intensity of 
the Cold War might provide an explanation as to why he adopted this particular point of 
view.  
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, when the West no longer had to confront a 
common enemy, the debate on ‘Civilian Power Europe’ was sustained with the EU stating 
it would undertake the task of promoting peace and developing and consolidating 
democracy, rule of law and human rights (European Union 1992, article J.1). At the same 
time, the issue of the militarisation of the EU gained attention (Zielonka 1998: 229, 
Whitman 1998: 135) because of the Treaty on European Union signed in 1991. The 
reference to a defence policy in the CFSP, the launch of ESDP17 in June 1999 and its 
subsequent operationalisation have been considered by some scholars as important 
indicators for a major leaning away from civilian power EU towards military power EU 
(see for example Smith K. 2000 and 2005). This attention to the militarisation of the EU 
gained traction at the end of 1999 when a decision was taken for the creation of a 60,000-
                                                             
17 The Lisbon Treaty, implemented in 2009, renamed the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) 
as CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy). 
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person Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). Although the RRF never materialised, the idea of 
the EU acquiring military potency was criticised by advocates of Civilian Power Europe 
(Smith K. 2000: 27-28). Another criticism of the EU’s efforts to create a CFSP was put 
forward by Christopher Hill (1993) who argued that such attempts were severely 
undermined by a ‘Capability-Expectations Gap’ – a gap between what the EU asserted 
and what it was actually able to deliver18. This links into the realist critique of ‘Civilian 
Power Europe’ that rested on two main tenets. The first required the EU to develop its 
military capabilities if it was to become an effective international actor and the second, 
as had already been argued by Bull, referred to its lack of ability to do so. 
Manners’ article “Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?” in 2002, renewed 
the debate by claiming that the EU can usefully be conceived as a catalyst of 
‘normalisation’ through the spread of its underlying values. In spite of the way states 
behave, the EU, he argued, has a unique role in shaping what will pass as normal in 
international relations (Manners 2002: 238-240). Manners adopted an ideational point of 
view that comes into sharp contrast with the realist criticism described above.  
The debate on the international role of the EU continued with other authors getting 
involved. Joseph Nye’s ‘soft power’ referred to the idea of making other actors desiring 
the same outcomes as you (Nye 2004: 5). Although ‘soft power’ and ‘normative power’ 
seem to be conceptually similar, this thesis argues that there is one important difference. 
While an effective soft power will be able to persuade others to support its ideas, 
normative power goes deeper. While a soft power aims to persuade third actors to follow 
                                                             
18 Asle Toje (2008: 121-141) took Hill’s criticism a step further by arguing that the ‘Capabilities-
Expectations Gap’ has become a ‘Consensus-Expectations Gap’. For him, the EU acts only in those cases 
where consensus can be reached between the Member States. Those cases, however, do not necessarily 




its goals, a normative power aims to persuade third actors about the merit of its ideas and 
goals. As a result, third actors will perceive the normative power’s goals to be their own 
as well (Manners, Appendix A: 3619). Thus, an effective normative power will have the 
ability to persuade others to fully internalise the norms it stands for.  
At a later point, Nye acknowledged that ‘soft power’ was not enough for an effective 
foreign policy that will result in shaping others’ agendas. He, therefore, coined the term 
‘smart power’ which is described as the need to combine soft power and hard power to 
achieve the goal of effective foreign policy (Armitage & Nye 2008: 3). Mark Leonard 
(2005: 5), meanwhile, spoke of the ‘power of weakness’ according to which “each 
element of European weakness is in fact a facet of its extraordinary transformative 
power”. Lizbeth Aggestam (2008: 3-4), for her part, used the term ‘ethical power’ to 
describe the EU. Ethical power “looks to justify the decisions made, and actions taken, 
when exercising power, paying special attention to the intentions and purposes of external 
action” (Aggestam 2008: 3-4). 
As has become evident, a number of characterisations have been introduced to elucidate 
the EU’s international presence. This research concentrates on Manners’ notion of 
‘Normative Power Europe’. Since its inception in 2002, the NPE concept has sparked 
several debates among scholars and policy-makers. In 2007, the European Union Studies 
Association “voted Manners’ article ‘Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in 
terms?’ one of the five most significant and influential academic pieces published in the 
last ten years” (Forsberg 2011: 1).  
The development of the NPE concept can be traced to the desire “to move beyond the 
debate over state-like actorness through an understanding of the EU’s international 
                                                             
19 For a discussion on the difference between soft power and normative power, see Kavalski 2012: 4-5.  
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identity” (Manners 2001: 7). One of the main problems with the concepts of ‘Civilian 
Power Europe’ and ‘Military Power Europe’ was emphasised in the debates of the 1980s. 
The emphasis was placed on issues of agency in the international system and the abilities 
of the then EC to be an actor in world politics. Manners (2002: 239) argued that the 
problem with this emphasis on actorness, and on the debate of civilian versus military 
power, was their unhelpful preoccupation with “how much like a state the EU looked”.  
The addition of the notion of normative power to the discussion regarding the 
international role of the EU permitted a new dimension to the discussion over whether 
the EU is a civilian or military power. Manners proposed that by moving our focus away 
from the debate about either military or civilian power Europe, it is possible to consider 
the ideational impact of the EU as a normative power.  
Manners’ NPE argument fits well into the ‘social’ turn in IR since the 1990s which 
focused precisely on the role of norms in international politics. For him, a normative 
power is one that is able to define “what passes for 'normal' in world politics” (Manners 
2002: 236). The EU’s power is based on a general acceptance of its aims as ‘normal’. 
According to Manners, “the concept of normative power is an attempt to suggest that not 
only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly that this predisposes it 
to act in a normative way in world politics” (Manners 2002: 252). Thus, the concept of 
NPE refers to the actual essence of the Union. “It is built on the crucial, and usually 
overlooked observation, that the most important factor shaping the international role of 
the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is” (Manners 2002: 252). Hence, it 
is the values of peace, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law that the 
Union claims to put at the core of its relations with the world (European Union 1997, 
Article 6). In this respect, norms and values inherent in the Union’s identity, build its 
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power and reputation in world politics and allow it to execute normative power, that is 
the ability “to shape conceptions of ‘normal’” (Manners 2002: 239). 
The NPE concept has triggered substantial research. For many (Manners 2002), it has 
made a significant contribution to conceptualising the unique international role of the EU 
since it has shed light on previously neglected ideational dimensions of the EU’s role in 
world politics. However, the NPE concept has also been the subject of strong criticism, 
as will be discussed later in this chapter. 
2.3 THE ROLE OF IDEATIONAL FACTORS AND NORMS IN 
CONSTRUCTIVISM 
Political scientists have traditionally neglected the causal or constitutive role of norms 
and principles (Gofas and Hay 2010: 3) in the analysis of political phenomena. The 
emergence of the behavioural revolution20 and the strong interest in measurement that 
accompanied it played a catalytic role in this. Normative phenomena were not easily 
measurable and thus neglected for practical reasons (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 
889). This tendency to push aside the study of norms was strengthened by the growing 
focus of political scientists on quantitative methods. “Commitment to positivism in social 
sciences, scepticism about the epistemological status of value statements and the 
dominance of the realist paradigm in IR” (Frost 1994:110) were the main reasons for 
neglecting normative theory. Although, this turn towards rational choice did not 
                                                             
20 The positivist movement in political science stressed the supremacy of the methods used by the 
physical sciences. It therefore attempted to apply those methods to the discipline of political science. 
The ‘scientific methodology’ advanced by positivists refers to a procedure “which starts with the 
formulation of a hypothesis, followed by empirical verification or experimentation, which leads to 
falsification or verification of the initial hypothesis” (Barrow 2008: 312). By the 1950s the positivist 
movement had reached its peak with the ‘behavioural revolution’ which is regarded as a ‘scientific 
revolution’ because the discipline of political science began to emphasise the behavioural methods of 





necessarily mean a turn towards material ontology, its proponents (including Farber 1994, 
Woolcock 1999) did not have much interest in analysing normative phenomena.  
A reinvigoration of the study of ideational phenomena and normative issues took place 
in the 1980s (Frost 1994:110). It is important to note, however, that the behavioural 
revolution contributed to the different path that the study of norms took from this point 
onwards. It obliged scholars to take more serious consideration of issues like “research 
design, theoretical clarity, disciplinary cumulation and parsimony” (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998: 890). 
Constructivism, the approach that formed the basis of the NPE argument21 (see Tilley 
2012: 453 and Wiessala 2016: 30), has been based on sociological notions and theories 
in an attempt to better comprehend the changes of national interests and the perceived 
meaning of behaviour. For constructivists, norms are vital in forming the objectives and 
identities of actors, their perceptions of what their interests are and the means they use to 
accomplish those objectives. As a result, the constructivist approach does not 
conceptualise interests as externally given. “Their desires, preferences, and motivations 
are not a contextually given fact – a reflection of material or even social circumstance – 
but are irredeemably ideational, reflecting a normative (indeed moral, ethical, and 
political) orientation towards the context in which they will have to be realized” (Hay 
2006: 63-64).  
For constructivists (Wendt 1995, Checkel 1998), since the ability of actors “to take correct 
strategic decisions is constrained due to limited rationality and to great uncertainty, the 
                                                             
21 As Diez (2005: 616) argued, the normative power argument “focuses on the independent power of 
norms to influence actors’ behaviour. To the extent that normative power is used as an analytical 
category to distinguish a particular kind of actor (such as ‘Europe’), it relies on the possibility to trace 
empirically the impact of norms in contrast to other possible factors”.  
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behavioural guidance provided by norms is crucial as a cognitive energy-saver and as a 
clue to successful strategies” (Florini 1996: 366). The realm of plausible behaviour in a 
particular social structure is normatively determined and it is narrower than the realm of 
behaviour that is actually possible. This coincides with James March and Johan Olsen’s 
(2007) understanding of the logic of appropriateness as opposed to the logic of 
consequences. Actors operating under the logic of consequences demonstrate 
instrumental behaviour and make their decisions based on rational cost-benefit 
calculations. Actors operating under the logic of appropriateness, “seek to fulfil the 
obligations and duties encapsulated in a role, an identity, and a membership in a political 
community. Rules are followed because they are perceived to be adequate for the task at 
hand and to have normative validity” (March and Olsen 2007: 3). Empirical research 
(Tannenwald 1995, Nadelmann 1990) has shown that norms do modify the behaviour of 
states in ways not understandable merely on the grounds of short-term power 
maximisation. Such research suggests that material power alone does not explain 
everything. 
From a constructivist angle (Björkdahl 2002: 15), norms are considered as intersubjective 
understandings and collective expectations concerning the appropriate behaviour of states 
and other actors, given their identity and the social context. From this viewpoint, norms 
are “constitutive of actor identity and interests” (Shannon 2000: 294) and “help create 
new actors, interests, or categories of action” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). In this 
respect, Jeffrey Checkel described norms as “collective understandings that make 
behavioural claims on actors” (Checkel 1998: 327-328). A narrower definition was 
offered by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink who argued that a norm is “a standard 
of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 
891). Specifically, norms are standards maintaining the systematisation of the behaviour 
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of actors that have mutual values and principles by permitting certain behaviours and 
actions while forbidding others. Based on the definition of norms as “standards of 
appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 
891), it follows that the adjective ‘normative’ refers to an average or typical level of 
performance for a person or a group. Pertaining to particular norms is, therefore, the 
standard level of appropriateness in behaviour.  
Turning to the concept of power, it has traditionally been defined as “the ability to 
influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants” (Nye, 2004: 2). Power, 
thus, is defined as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a 
position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this 
probability rests” (Swedberg 2005 :205). This definition of power, however, contrasts 
with the NPE approach and the emphasis it places on local ownership and on socialisation 
processes. In this thesis, therefore, power is not defined as getting B to do what A wants. 
Rather, it is defined as making B realise that there is merit in internalising particular ideas 
and in behaving in certain ways that conform to these ideas, irrespective of A’s 
involvement (Manners, Appendix A: 36). Manners’ definition of power coincides with 
Stephen Lukes’ (2005: 27) third face of power. For him, there are different ways through 
which A may secure B’s compliance. A can exercise power over B through controlling 
processes of decision-making or through controlling the agenda-setting. However, A can 
also influence B through controlling interests and perceptions.  
These two definitions of norms and power should be conceptualised in a complementary 
way. A normative power, thus, is one able to make another actor realise the value of 
internalising a particular norm, in this case the ‘sustainable peace’ norm, regardless of the 
normative power’s involvement. In this way, “normative power is a power that is able to 
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shape conceptions of normal” (Manners 2002: 239). From this statement, it follows that 
normative power is the power of ideas and values. Consequently, the major aim of a 
normative power is to set the standards of appropriate behaviour through the spread of 
those norms. 
2.4 CRITIQUES OF NPE 
The NPE concept has raised a number of questions that subsequently produced several 
criticisms. Having conducted a comprehensive literature review, this thesis argues that 
these can be broadly categorised into theoretical critiques of the NPE concept and 
empirical critiques on the EU’s normativity.  
The concept of ‘Normative Power’ in general has been criticised by Hélène Sjursen 
(2006a: 172) who called it a contradiction in terms because it disregards the widely used 
definition of power, “which is to make others do what they would otherwise not do”. 
According to this understanding, power is a matter of incentive and coercion while 
normativity is a matter of legitimacy. Moreover, Sjursen noted that the concept of 
normative power lacks explicit criteria on what is normative. She (Sjursen 2006: 236) 
argued that the term ‘Normative Power Europe’ “lacks precision, particularly in terms of 
criteria and standards that can be applied for analysing the concept empirically”.  
Elisabeth De Zutter (2010) also criticised certain aspects of the NPE concept. She agreed 
with Manners that a normative power should have the ability to shape conceptions of 
normal in world politics but disagreed when stating “neither universal norms nor a 
particular set of instruments can be considered as ontological necessities for normative 
power” (De Zutter 2010: 1107). A normative power, therefore, may not necessarily rely 
on soft instruments but can also resort to coercive economic and military means (De 
Zutter 2010: 1107). For her, this view is reinforced by the diverse forms a normative 
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power can take. Cosmopolitan and despotic constitute the two polar extremes on a 
continuum. Soft imperialist power lies in-between the two (De Zutter 2010: 1118).   
Another issue that has sparked debate among academics and which is linked to the 
conceptual point made by De Zutter, is the issue of the EU’s development of military 
capabilities that was already underway by the time Manners initial NPE article was 
published. For Karen Smith, for example, the acquirement of military means constituted 
a threat to the EU’s civilian identity. Penetrating into the assumptions on which the EU's 
quest of a defence dimension is based, she argued that it is “giving up too much for too 
little” (Smith K. 2000: 28). Smith also draws upon David Mitrany whose earlier writings 
became important in the context of this argument. Mitrany argued that “if the problem of 
war is the existence of self-interested sovereign states, then effectively creating a larger 
version of a sovereign state, an armed superpower of sorts, is not the answer and it will 
only make the problem bigger” (Mitrany 1968 quoted in Smith K. 2005: 12).  
However, as Thomas Diez correctly pointed out, the concept of ‘Normative Power’ is not 
the opposite of ‘Military Power’. In other words, “the fact that an actor possesses and 
even uses military force does not contradict the idea of normative power if military power 
is subordinated to the more fundamental normative ethos” (Diez 2007: 187). For him, 
(Diez 2007: 180), it is plausible to use military means for backing up the diffusion of 
civilian norms. Other authors supported similar arguments. Stelios Stavridis (2001) 
argued that military means are a necessary part of an effective civilian power. Jennifer 
Mitzen (2006: 272) also argued that it is “habits and not capabilities that determine 
identity. Thus, a militarily powerful Europe will not undermine civilising power Europe 
because the collective aspirational identities of civilian and civilising are constituted not 
so much by their relationship to military power but by intra-European routines of multi-
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lateral security cooperation”. More recently, Isabel Ferreira-Nunes (2011: 13) argued that 
militarisation can be justified on both normative and functional grounds since it will 
“strengthen institutions of global governance and regional cooperation and expand the 
reach of international law”.  
Sjursen (2006: 239) went a step further and argued that the use of non-military means, 
like economic tools, does not automatically indicate that the actor is normative. Economic 
sanctions can also be considered a form of hard power, given the definition of hard power 
as the power to coerce, and they too can lead to unfavourable, disadvantageous results. 
Manners (2006: 182) stated that “militarization of the EU need not necessarily lead to the 
diminution of the EU’s normative power”. With reference to the ‘sustainable peace’ 
norm, he (2008: 49) noted that “the EU’s growing civilian and military operational 
capacities also have a sustainable peace mission with a focus on peace-keeping, conflict 
prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of 
the United Nations Charter”. The incorporation of the Petersberg Tasks22 in the 
Amsterdam Treaty can, thus, be understood as a part of the EU’s strategy towards 
sustainable peace.  
Adrian Hyde-Price (2006: 226-227), writing from a neorealist point of view, also 
critiqued NPE. He argued that the EU does not constitute a real normative power. Rather, 
it is manipulated by its member states who want to shape its foreign policy in a way that 
is favourable to them.  For example, in dealing with post-communist democracies of 
Central and Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the Cold War, “the EU was used by its 
more influential member states as an instrument for collectively exercising hegemonic 
power, shaping its ‘near abroad’ in ways amenable to the long-term strategic and 
                                                             
22 For a discussion on the Petersberg Tasks, see pp. 94-95. 
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economic interests of its member states” (Hyde-Price 2006:226-227)23. Similarly, for 
Michael Smith (2009: 602), “there is still a very substantial inter-governmental 
component to European foreign policy”. 
Likewise, Zielonka (2008: 471) argued that the EU, through the diffusion of its norms, is 
behaving like an imperial power since it is trying to enforce domestic constraints on other 
actors through several types of economic and political domination. For him, this can be 
best observed in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood like, for example, in Kosovo and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, the bottom-line of the neorealist critique is that the existence 
of strategic interests on the part of EU member states contradicts the concept of the EU 
as a pure normative power. 
The NPE concept has also been criticised from a constructivist angle. Diez (2005: 614) 
argued that the NPE discourse creates a specific identity for the EU by converting third 
parties to ‘others’ and demonstrating the EU as a positive force in the international arena. 
He asked for “more reflexivity in the representation of the EU as a normative power” 
(Diez 2005: 614). As a response to Diez’s critique, Manners (2006: 177-179) 
acknowledged that in ‘Normative Power Europe’ discourse, practices of ‘othering’ are 
part of the formation of the EU’s identity. He agreed with Diez on the need to study the 
power of normative power representations. He further added that there is not just one EU 
identity. In his view (Manners 2006: 178), “it is the fluid, complex, multiple and relational 
aspects of the self-other contestations which define the EU as a normative power, rather 
than the other way around”. 
Federica Bicchi (2006: 287) discussed the question of whether the EU is a ‘normative 
power’ “promoting universal principles or a ‘civilian power’ projecting its own 
                                                             
23 Similar arguments have also been put forward by Merlingen 2007: 437 and Wood 2009: 128.  
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understanding of norms on to the rest of the world”. In order to answer this question, she 
used two criteria for evaluating the normativity of the EU: inclusiveness and reflexivity 
(Bicchi 2006: 286-203). Inclusiveness refers to the extent to which EU foreign policy 
makers allow for the involvement of non-members in this process, while reflexivity refers 
to an anticipation of the effects of EU policies on non-members and to their subsequent 
alteration. Bicchi concluded that the EU is a civilian power but not a normative power. 
She argues that the EU tends to reproduce itself in its relations with other states. In the 
process, the EU projects internal solutions to external issues. EU foreign policy, therefore, 
follows an ‘our size fits all’ approach. Bicchi (2006: 287) concludes that the EU is 
frequently “unreflexively Eurocentric”.  
Some other scholars argued that the EU demonstrated inconsistency in terms of 
“discrimination between different external actors and of undermining certain norms from 
the inside” (Diez 2005:624). For instance, Karen Smith (2001) showed that the EU’s 
commitment to human rights is inconsistent. As Diez (2005: 624) argued, a probable 
explanation is that the EU’s policies are intended to realise certain strategic or economic 
interests. The strong version of the argument is that “interests are cloaked in the mantle 
of values and norms rhetoric” (Diez 2005: 624). The weaker and more sophisticated 
version is that normative concerns and strategic interests go together in the EU’s external 
relations. Richard Youngs (2004: 419-420), meanwhile, suggested that a combination of 
rationalism and constructivism, two rival approaches in European studies, is necessary in 
order to assess the respective impact of both of them. 
Another critique of NPE is the inconsistency between what the EU is and what it attempts 
to project. Kalypso Nicolaidis and Robert Howse pointed out that what is being projected 
by the Union is not “the EU as it is but an EU-topia” (Nicolaidis & Howse 2002: 769). 
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Lastly, another critique of NPE is the deficiency of normative impact (Noutcheva 2009). 
Directly related to this argument is Mark Langan’s (2012: 245) empirical findings that 
the EU has used norm-centred narratives and policy frameworks for commercial gain 
which produced negative material outcomes for its partners, especially in the Global 
South. More specifically, Langan (2012: 265) argued that the European Commission 
“appears to be utilising norms in the ‘development branding’ of EPAs24 which close down 
policy space for genuine economic development in ACP25 countries while simultaneously 
furthering EU commercial interests”.  
Overall, the NPE argument has been criticised from different theoretical angles. Where 
relevant, some of these NPE criticisms outlined above will be used in this thesis as 
alternative explanations. More specifically, when discussing the cases of Cyprus and 
Kosovo, the aforementioned criticisms will be considered in those sections where 
empirical findings do not conform to the NPE propositions.  
2.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND THE NPE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
This section will be concerned with the operationalisation of NPE. It will present the 
analytical framework that will be used in this thesis for the purposes of assessing the 
normativity of the EU. 
 ‘Normative Power Europe’ framework of analysis 
According to Manners, a normative power is ideational and not material or physical. The 
conceptualisation of this ideal type of normative power requires a tripartite analysis 
assessing normativity by associating principles, actions and impact (Manners 2002: 252). 
                                                             
24EPA refers to the Economic Partnership Agreements.  
25 ACP refers to the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states. 
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A similar three-part analysis associating goals, means and impact was also developed by 
Tocci (2008:17; See also Forsberg 2011). All three elements collectively constitute a 
normative foreign policy. As Vicki Birchfield (quoted in Manners 2011: 243) stated, the 
application of this tripartite framework to empirical cases will result in shifting the 
normative power approach “from concept to analytical framework to research 
programme”. 
As some scholars (Manners 2011: 244, Martin-Mazé 2015: 1285) observed, the literature 
on NPE is empirically underexplored. A more systematic empirical focus is therefore 
needed in order to reach conclusions on how and why normative power does or does not 
work. To this end, this thesis will apply the three-part framework to the cases of Cyprus 
and Kosovo in order to test the validity of NPE in the field of conflict transformation. 
Based on secondary literature and an interview with Ian Manners (Appendix A: 36), three 
sub-questions were formulated reflecting the NPE propositions. However, it should be 
noted that, within each part of the analytical framework, competing propositions and 
alternative explanations reflecting the conflicts between norms and interests, coercion and 
persuasion and other NPE debates were also taken into consideration in the process of 
analysing the data. 
Question A:  To what extent was the internalisation of the sustainable peace norm 
by Cypriot and Kosovan actors the main objective of the EU? 
The first variable that needs to be examined are the constitutive principles of the EU and 
how their promotion has become a goal for the EU. Manners considers the EU to be 
normative because of its sui generis nature. In other words, what the EU is has been 
considered as the main explanation of what it does. Manners, therefore, claims that its 
normative identity is what made the EU to place universal norms at the heart of its 
functions (Manners 2002: 241).  
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Three main conclusions can be reached from the above: 
Centrality of ‘sustainable peace’ norm in the EU’s relations with Cyprus and Kosovo: 
The NPE line of argument suggests that the origins of the EU’s normativity can be traced 
in the historical context of the EU and the nature of its international identity (Lerch and 
Schwellnus 2006: 305). With particular reference to ‘sustainable peace’, it is Europe’s 
experience of the Second World War, the emergence of the EU after this war, the 
evolution of EU law and the progressive increase of supranationalism that have prompted 
the EU to place such emphasis on this norm. It follows that the EU, as a normative power, 
must construct its policies and relations based on the premises of the ‘sustainable peace’ 
norm. This norm, therefore, must be central in the EU’s relations and rhetoric with both 
Cyprus and Kosovo if it truly is a normative power.  
Normative Interests: From a constructivist point of view, the EU’s normative identity 
forms the basis for its normative interests. As Asle Toje (2008: 127) argued, “the will to 
engage in foreign policy activities that are not means/ends oriented but rather a statement 
of values is a trait that distinguishes the EU from other foreign policy actors”. The EU 
should, therefore, promote ‘sustainable peace’ because it is a norm on which it places 
great value (Niemann & De Wekker 2010: 7) and not because it serves other instrumental 
interests. Diez (2005) and Manners (Appendix A: 36) however, argued that this 
distinction between norms and interests is not clear-cut. For them, norms are constitutive 
of interests and interests are constitutive of norms. Moreover, as Sjursen (2007: 71) 
argued, “strategic considerations do not topple the normative power argument, given that 
the norms diffused may very well be considered valid and legitimate even though the 
motives of the EU for diffusing such norms are self-regarding”. What can be concluded 
here is that, if the NPE argument is correct, then EU ‘interest’ must be closely linked to 
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norms. In the opposite scenario, however, norms would be outranked by materialistic 
considerations.   
Behaving according to norms: A real normative power is one that not only binds third 
parties to specific rules and standards, but also binds itself. Therefore, an EU foreign 
policy which is systematically based on the respect of international and fundamental 
rights law would indicate a sincere normative commitment (Tocci et al. 2008: 6). 
Likewise, Sjursen (2006: 245) and Diez (2005) have both argued that it is the EU’s self-
binding to international law that makes it a distinctive normative actor in world politics.  
Question B: To what extent, in the course of promoting the ‘sustainable peace’ 
norm, did the EU rely on persuasion, norm invocation, shaping the discourse of what 
is normal, model power and attributing prestige/shame? 
This second question is focused on the ways through which EU norms are being promoted 
and diffused. In other words, it is about the nature of the actions taken by the EU in order 
to promote its norms. The normative form of the diffusion mechanisms is central to the 
understanding of NPE. A review of the NPE literature suggests that persuasion (Manners 
2009: 12, Tocci 2008: 9, Kavalski 2012: 60), norm invocation (Forsberg 2011: 1197), 
shaping the discourse of what is normal (Aggestam 2009), model power (Forsberg 2011: 
1197) and attributing prestige/shaming (Manners 2009: 13), are considered as normative 
means. In other words, normative power should not be exercised through the wide-
ranging use of material incentives (e.g positive/negative conditionality and sanctions) or 
the use of military means. However, military and economic means are not completely 
discarded. Some scholars (Börzel & Risse 2009: 8, Sjursen 2006: 239, Diez 2005: 616) 
advocate their use in cases where they can be justified.  
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Persuasion: Persuasion is usually defined as being opposed to coercion or imposition. 
Persuasion is acknowledged in constructivist scholarship as a significant strategy for the 
diffusion of norms because it aims, by definition, to challenge and, ultimately, to alter 
existing understandings and preferences. “Argumentation and persuasion play the key 
role in norm setting” (Majone 1989: 28). Martha Finnemore (1996: 141), meanwhile, 
stated that “normative claims become powerful and prevail by being persuasive”.   
The instrument of persuasion refers to interaction and communication that will result in 
changed attitudes and, thus, changed preferences (Checkel 2001). Richard Perloff (1993: 
14) defined persuasion as “an activity or process in which a communicator attempts to 
induce a change in the belief, attitude, or behaviour of another person . . . through the 
transmission of a message in a context in which the persuadee has some degree of free 
choice”. It therefore follows that persuasion is a form of power since the persuader can 
make the persuadee(s) do something they would otherwise not do. However, persuasion 
does not operate through rewards or threats of punishment. Rather, it is directed at 
influencing an actor’s perceptions. Persuasion can also be linked to what Jürgen 
Habermas (1990: 163-64) termed as ‘arguing’, referring to situations when two parties 
engage in communication activities and each one is ready to be persuaded by the better 
argument. Checkel (2001), working in the field of social psychology and communication, 
illustrated how international institutions can produce an environment that encourages 
persuasion and may lead decision makers to alter their policies. He defined persuasion as 
“a process of convincing someone through argument and principled debate” (Checkel 
2001: 562). Manners (2009: 12), for his part, suggested that persuasion includes the 
“constructive engagement, institutionalisation of relations, and multi- and pluri-lateral 
dialogue between participants”. This thesis suggests that Manners’ proposed 
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operationalisation of persuasion is in line with the constructivist understanding of the term 
because of the emphasis he places on interaction, dialogue and debate.  
For the purposes of maintaining consistency in the analysis, ‘constructive engagement’ is 
defined here as “the opposite of confrontation, sanctions or hostility in international 
relations or, alternatively, as the opposite of refusing to deal with a country or regime” 
(Fouquet and Lim 2007: 129). ‘Institutionalisation of relations’ is understood as a process 
whereby relations are well-established and accepted by all parties. Lastly, encouragement 
of dialogue refers to EU attempts to encourage the parties of a conflict to reach an 
agreement through dialogue.  
Invocation of norms: This mechanism refers to the activation of commitments and to the 
invocation of international legal obligations (Forsberg 2011: 1197).  In other words, the 
EU can refer to reached and signed agreements each time a party does not fulfil its 
obligations that stem from such agreements.  
One notable example of this instrument being put into practice is the enlargement 
negotiations that take place between the EU and countries aspiring to become members 
of the Union (Manners 2002: 244). Activation of commitments that are included in an 
agreement made between the EU and an aspirant member can be “invoked by one party 
when they are violated by the other party” (Forsberg 2011: 1197). 
Shaping discourses of what is normal: For Manners (2002: 239) and Forsberg (2011: 
1197), a normative power has the ability to shape discourses. This mechanism is related 
to what Manners (2001: 14) terms the ‘cultural filter’ which refers to the espousal or 
denunciation of certain norms as a consequence of political learning by a country. 
Although shaping the discourse can be seen as a desired outcome, it is also essential to 
consider it as a means at the EU’s disposal. As an instrument, shaping the discourse is 
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intended to grasp discursive alterations via “learning, adaptation or rejection of norms as 
a result of international norms and political learning by third countries” (Kinnvall 1995: 
61-71, see also Manners 2002: 245). Pace’s (2007) discussion on Israel’s adoption of a 
Mediterranean identity has been identified by Forsberg (2011) as a notable example of 
how this mechanism works in the context of the NPE.  
Model Power: According to Manners (2006, 2008), model power is probably the most 
normative tool at the EU’s disposal since NPE is fundamentally about what the EU is 
rather than what it does. This means that normative power is the power of example 
through which the EU simply “stands as a model for others to follow” (Forsberg 2011: 
1197) without having to engage into specific policies. Manners (2002: 244) used the term 
‘contagion’ for this process. However, as Forsberg (2011:1198) discussed, the term 
‘contagion’ is quite vague and could refer to three different things: emulation, group 
pressure or “influence through structural (inter)dependence than to influence through 
example” (Drazen 1998 in Forsberg 2011: 1198).  
Forsberg (2011: 18) also argues that the EU’s attraction could be its economic power. 
However, behavioural alterations for material gains do not necessarily lead to norm 
internalisation. Given the focus of this thesis on conflict transformation, an approach that 
requires alterations in perception and identity, this thesis argues that, if the mechanism of 
model power is effective, then third actors should regard EU values as worthy of 
emulation and show a willingness to work towards their internalisation.  
Attribution of Prestige/Shaming: According to Manners (2011: 235), “the attribution of 
prestige may range from public declarations of support to membership of an international 
community, while the attribution of shame may involve public condemnation or the use 
of symbolic sanctioning”. The attribution of prestige/shaming is a significant form of 
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norm diffusion that is associated with the idea of being an insider or an outsider to a group 
of actors. This means that actors might comply with certain norms because they are afraid 
of being disapproved. Norms are therefore sustained due to the impact a state’s non-
compliance might have on its reputation. 
The strategy of shaming is regarded by some authors as a coercive form of persuasion 
(Simons 1976, Risse and Sikkink 1999: 13-14). From a strictly NPE point of view, 
coercion and imposition are not acceptable mechanisms. However, as discussed earlier, 
the use of controversial mechanisms like, for example, the use of military means, can be 
justified if these are “subjected to the most fundamental normative ethos” (Diez 2007: 
187). Hence, when discussing this mechanism in relation to the two case studies, attention 
will be paid to the normative or material EU interests behind making the decision to 
attribute shaming.   
Question C: To what extent did EU impact on Cyprus and Kosovo include the 
internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm by local actors, the creation of 
partnership bonds and local ownership? 
The third part of the analysis is about examining the impact of EU principles and actions. 
What needs to be investigated here is the extent to which a normative change occurred 
towards the norms promoted by the Union. According to Manners (2009:3), the normative 
impact produced from the promotion of principles should include “socialisation, 
partnership and ownership”. Therefore, if the EU was successful in promoting its norms 
and in implementing a normative agenda, then these three outcomes should emerge in 
both Cyprus and Kosovo. 
Socialisation:  For constructivists (Risse et al 1999: 11, Johnston 2001: 494) socialisation 
is a process through which actors develop an understanding of what is the most 
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appropriate behaviour which will, ultimately, lead to identity modifications. Socialisation 
as a form of normative impact translates into an altered perception of normality and, thus, 
altered standards of appropriateness. 
In practical terms, the degree of internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace norm’ is explored 
at three distinct levels. Firstly, the extent of the internalisation of the norm at the state 
level is identified. Empirically, this examination rests on public speeches26. The 
researcher is aware that principles affirmed in speeches may not always be systematically 
pursued by local actors. This problem of strategic communication is not easy to overcome 
(see Niemann and De Wekker 2010: 11). However, if the norms are being mentioned in 
a consistent way and in different circumstances, then it is more likely that the norms in 
question have been internalised.  In addition, the degree to which the legislation of the 
countries concerned was modified and adjusted in terms of the norms promoted is another 
indicator of internalisation (Checkel 1999: 92, Niemann & De Wekker 2009: 11). With 
particular reference to the ‘sustainable peace’ norm, such modifications are traced with 
regards to the sector of education. As will be discussed in Chapter Six, education is crucial 
in terms of inducing identity modifications and eliminating practices of ‘othering’.  
Secondly, the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm is also traced at the level of 
civil society. The role of civil society has been largely ignored in the NPE literature, 
despite it being central in socialisation processes. Tracing the EU’s normative impact on 
civil society allows the thesis to delve deeper into Cyprus and Kosovo’s social fabric. 
This is especially important for this research since conflict transformation should be 
traced beyond the level of political elites (Tocci 2007:20 and 2013:30-31).  
                                                             
26 This thesis focused on analysing primary accounts of the conflict and not interpretations of these 
accounts. As a result, media accounts were not examined by the researcher. Future research could focus 
on tracing the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm in media accounts of the conflict. 
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Thirdly, to gain an even fuller understanding of the Cypriot and Kosovan domestic 
situations, the views of the wider public were looked at through the examination of 
opinion polls. The main reason why public attitudes were taken into consideration is 
because conflict transformation approaches suggest that the internalisation of the 
‘sustainable peace’ norm should be traceable to concrete changes at the wider societal 
level. Opinion polls, therefore, allowed the researcher to juxtapose the results from the 
analysis of political elite discourse with public views in order to identify the general 
pattern that emerges in both the Cypriot and Kosovan societies. 
Partnership: For Manners (2009: 3), “partnership as an impact of the promotion of 
principles may be the result of institutionalised relationships created by the participating 
parties whether multilateral or plurilateral, international or transnational”. With regards 
to the ‘sustainable peace’ norm, if its promotion is successful, then the parties of the 
conflict will become partners for the long term (Manners, Appendix A: 36).  
In practical terms, partnership as a result of the promotion of principles can be empirically 
traced in the development of relationships between the parties of each conflict. In 
examining whether closer relations emerged, the emphasis will be placed on political state 
actors as well as on wider societal actors. This approach will enable the investigation of 
the development of relations both at the elite level and at the level of civil society, thus 
covering a wide range of relevant actors.  
Ownership: Local ownership principally refers to the idea of locals agreeing to, accepting 
and, ultimately, controlling both the design and implementation of political processes 
(Donais 2009: 120, Nathan 2007: 4). In this respect, the effective realisation of local 
ownership would ensure the sustainability of the transformed behaviour once the external 
actor’s operation comes to an end. 
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In the peacebuilding and conflict resolution literature, however, there exist quite 
divergent conceptualisations of local ownership with the main disagreement being 
between liberals and communitarians. Liberals define local ownership as the commitment 
of local actors to take ownership over a mainly pre-determined plan towards achieving 
specific ends. In other words, the liberal approach to local ownership emphasises “‘their’ 
ownership of our ‘ideas’” (Suhrke 2007: 1292). On the other hand, communitarians 
believe that any policy processes “must be designed, managed, and implemented by local 
actors rather than external actors.” (Nathan 2007: 4). 
At a second stage, it needs to be examined whether any degree of socialisation, 
partnership and ownership that has occurred was prompted by the EU. It is undeniably 
true that no organisation or specific project can take full credit for positive changes 
occurring in societies affected by conflict (Niemann and De Wekker 2010). Influential 
states like the US and other international organisations like the UN are further potential 
sources of norm change in Cyprus and Kosovo. To address this issue, this research 
conducts an in-depth analysis on a case-by-case basis in order to trace the links (Tocci et 
al. 2008: 11) between the EU’s actions and the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ 
norm. Also, where possible, the causality between EU norms/ EU actions and change in 
the domestic Cypriot and Kosovan environments is complemented by counterfactual 
reasoning (Goertz and Levy 2007: 9-47, Fearon 1991). When this reasoning is adopted, 
it entails that had an EU action not taken place, a particular outcome would not have 
occurred. The use of this reasoning leads to more accurate conclusions on the exact impact 




Acknowledging the importance of the study of norms, this chapter has been concerned 
with the normative turn in the field of European studies and the conceptualisation of the 
EU as a ‘Normative Power’. From an academic perspective, the NPE concept has 
generated significant debate. Partly, this debate has been associated with broader 
academic discussions in the field of IR about the role of international norms. The concept 
of NPE has also been the subject of much criticism around issues concerning its 
formulation and definition.  
Based on secondary literature and on an interview with Manners (Appendix A: 36), this 
chapter has also set out the three-part analytical framework which will be used in this 
thesis for the purposes of assessing the EU’s normativity. This framework perceives a 
normative actor as one that has normative goals, pursues normative policies and produces 
a normative impact. Before proceeding to the application of this framework to the 
empirical cases, however, a brief discussion on the historical background of the two 
conflicts is necessary. Chapter Three, therefore, will discuss the main historical events of 









CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
This chapter will provide a brief overview of the historical contexts of the two conflict 
cases starting from the 20th century. The term ‘historical context’ refers to the “political, 
social, environmental, and cultural decisions or events occurring over time that can be 
described and linked to the situation under study” (Schensul 2008: 392).  
This historical context is aimed at developing an understanding of inter-community 
divisions in the two cases. Secondly, the chapter outlines the efforts of international actors 
to solve the two conflicts. In so doing, the EU’s role in both conflicts will be discussed 
with the aim of identifying trends in its involvement in both cases. Thirdly, the 
comparison between the historical contexts of the two cases will highlight similarities and 
differences, thus supporting the rationale of choosing Kosovo as the more-likely and 
Cyprus as the less-likely to largely conform to the NPE expectations case.  
3.1 THE HISTORY OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT 
3.1.1 Introduction 
During the period of Ottoman rule (1571-1878), Cyprus witnessed an inflow of Muslim 
immigrants who, afterwards, “formed the Turkish Cypriot community” (Hadjipavlou-
Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 1993:343). Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots are the two 
largest ethnic groups on the island. It is important to note that the two groups speak 
different languages and have different religions.  




Cyprus was under British rule from 1878 until 1960 when the island became independent. 
As Hubert Faustmann (2008: 46) explained, Britain followed a ‘divide and rule’ policy 
in Cyprus that inflamed the situation between the two communities (see also Evaghorou 
2014: 127).  
The 1959 Zurich/ London Agreements put an end to British rule (Van Koufoudakis 2007: 
224) and in 1960 Cyprus became independent. However, as Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and 
Trigeorgis (1993: 343) argued, the 1960 founding Constitution “intensified and 
institutionalised ethnic/ identity differences” (see also Scherer 1997: 18). By 1963, 
disagreements were emerging over taxation and the formation of distinct municipalities 
in the main towns as provided for by the Constitution. President Archibishop Makarios 
proposed 13 constitutional amendments which, however, were immediately rejected by 
Turkey. As a result of the continuing disagreements, Turkish-Cypriots withdrew from the 
government and pursued a separatist policy by attempting to set up a parallel 
administration (Kyriakides 1968: 112-13, An 2015: 24-30).  
In the meantime, fighting had erupted between the two communities. During this period, 
Turkish-Cypriots moved to exclusively Turkish-Cypriot areas that shortly became 
enclaves. It was at this point that the UNSC ratified a Resolution giving permission to the 
Secretary-General to send a peacekeeping force to Cyprus (UNFICYP), a mission that is 
still in place today. UNFICYP attempted to realise the goal of peacekeeping through the 
creation of a buffer zone.   
Another important development of this period was the removal of Makarios, then 
President of Cyprus, from power after a coup d’état organised by the military government 
in Greece. This provided Turkey with a pretext to invade Cyprus . The invasion took place 
in two phases and resulted in 38% of the territory of the island being occupied. Following 
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these developments, most Greek-Cypriots that were residing in the north of the island, 
were forced to move to the south and became refugees (Kyle 1997: 19). In addition, 
around 40,000 Turkish-Cypriots moved to the north. Therefore, two distinct ethnic zones 
were formed on the island of Cyprus (Calotychos 1998: 8).  
In the ensuing years, the UN made several attempts to solve the Cyprus conflict. In 1977, 
under the auspices of the UN, Makarios, who had returned to power by the end of 1974, 
and Rauf Denktaş, then leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community, launched a round of 
discussions. The result was the four-point High-Level Agreement which provided that a 
future solution must be based on the principles of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. 
This was reconfirmed in the 1979 ten-point High-Level Agreement, signed between 
Spyros Kyprianou, who became President in 1977 after the death of Makarios, and 
Denktaş (see Hannay 2005: 8).  
In June 1983, the Legislative Assembly of the Turkish-Cypriot community adopted a 
resolution promoting self-determination (Hoffmeister 2006: 64). Subsequently, Denktaş 
declared the occupied part of the island as the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ 
(TRNC). For him, this move was necessary to exert pressure on the Greek-Cypriots 
(Denktaş 1998: 119). This move was heavily criticised by the international community. 
The UN condemned the act, stating, in Security Council Resolution 541 (1983), that 
declaring independence was a “legally invalid” move and it asked all states not to 
recognise the “TRNC”. In the same vein, the then ten EC members issued a joint 
declaration disapproving the move and asserting that “they continue to regard the 
government of President Kyprianou as the sole legitimate government of the RoC” 
(Embassy of the RoC in Washington DC 2010). In other words, “the Greek-Cypriot 
government has been accepted as the de jure government of the island as a whole, even 
though de facto since 1974 it only controls the south part of the island” (Constantinou & 
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Papadakis 2001: 128). To this day, no other state apart from Turkey recognises the 
“TRNC”. This has led the Turkish-Cypriot community to be profoundly dependent on 
Turkey financially, politically and administratively.  
The period of British rule set the basis for the entrenchment of the division and the 
emergence of hostility between Greek and Turkish-Cypriots. The violence that erupted 
between them in the 1960s led to the creation of the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves. This 
geographic separation of the two communities was further consolidated after the 1974 
invasion which resulted in the creation of two separate ethnic zones on the island. This 
geographic separation makes the transformation of the conflict for the better a difficult 
task. In addition, the declaration of independence of the “TRNC” further complicated the 
situation.  
3.1.3 1990 - 2002: The emergence of the EU as an actor in the Cyprus conflict 
The Union became more directly involved in Cyprus in 1990, when the RoC decided to 
apply for EU membership. Although economic considerations were an important factor 
behind this decision, the main incentives behind Cyprus submission were political. “With 
the application for EC membership it was clearly hoped that the Europeanisation of the 
Cyprus issue would put pressure on the least interested, or even intransigent, parties, 
namely Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots, to find a solution and also to involve another key 
international actor in the equation of resolving the Cyprus issue where the UN had in the 
past not been successful” (Agathocleous-Yiangou 2002: 31)27. 
                                                             
27 Nicosia believed that its position regarding the Cyprus conflict would be reinforced after EU 
membership. “Given the stand that Cyprus had joined as a united entity and that the TRNC was deemed 
illegal under Security Council resolutions, the EU was - legally and, at least, officially – entirely on the 
side of the Cypriot Government in terms of its attempts to repudiate the 1983 unilateral declaration of 
independence by the Turkish Cypriot leadership” (Ker-Lindsay 2010: 70-71).  
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The membership application prompted robust reactions from the Turkish-Cypriots, 
including threats of non-cooperation with the UN Secretary-General towards a solution 
to the conflict, an initiative that was supported by the EU since it aspired to reunite Cyprus 
prior to accession (see Chapter Four). The Turkish-Cypriot leadership supported its 
arguments “on the grounds that the Government of Cyprus did not represent the whole of 
the island, and that the application as such was unconstitutional” (Emiliou 1996: 10). The 
RoC government countered by emphasising the fact that it was the only recognised 
government, representing the whole island (Emiliou 1996: 10). At the time of the 
submission of its application, the RoC government called for Turkish-Cypriot 
cooperation in preparing accession negotiations (Clerides 1998a, see also Hoffmeister 
2006: 96). The Turkish-Cypriot community, however, rejected this call (Denktaş 1998).  
In 1993, the European Commission issued a positive Opinion on Cyprus’ application for 
membership (European Commission 1993). Although at the beginning a solution to the 
Cyprus conflict was seen as a prerequisite for the island’s accession to the EU, the 1994 
Corfu European Council concluded that Cyprus would be included in the next 
enlargement round whether or not a solution to the conflict had been found. Three main 
factors contributed to this outcome: a) the diplomatic achievements of Greece28 (Brewin 
1999: 151), b) the remarkable progress of Cyprus in meeting accession conditionality 
(Nugent 1997: 72) and c) “the continuous intransigence of the then Turkish Cypriot 
leadership with regard to the Cyprus problem which could hold the Greek Cypriots 
hostage in the accession process” (Kyrris 2012: 89).  
                                                             
28 Greece had secured the EU’s pledge to commence accession negotiations with Cyprus after the 
Intergovernmental Conference of 1996 in exchange for having agreed to the Custom Union between 
Turkey and the EU.   
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In December 1997, at the Luxembourg European Council, the official decision to “include 
Cyprus in the group of ‘fast track’ candidates, with whom negotiations would be opened 
the following year” (Verney 2006: 4) was taken. After the opening of accession 
negotiations in 1998, the next main milestone was the Helsinki European Council in 
December 1999 which concluded that even though a settlement would be preferred 
preceding accession, “if no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession 
negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be taken without the above being a 
precondition” (European Council 1999a: Article 8/b).  
As has been discussed, the RoC’s membership application, as well as the EU’s decision 
to accept it as a member whether or not a solution to the conflict had been found was 
heavily criticised by the Turkish-Cypriot community. Since then, as will be discussed in 
the subsequent chapters, Turkish-Cypriots have regarded the EU as an actor that is more 
sympathetic to the Greek-Cypriots, especially since the RoC is a part of this organisation. 
Also, another conclusion that can be reached is the fact that, during this period, EU 
involvement in the conflict was mainly based on the accession negotiations. Not many 
bottom-up initiatives took place. As will be discussed, this made it difficult for the EU to 
positively transform the conflict.  
3.1.4 2002- 2004: Opening of checkpoints, the Annan Plan and the RoC’s accession 
to the EU  
One important development of the conflict in this period was Denktaş’ decision to open 
up a number of checkpoints around the island (BBC 2003). After 30 years of isolation 
between the two communities, crossing became an option. This development, however, 
also created intense debates about the future implications of the crossings for Cyprus (see 
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Dikomitis 2013: 215-232). It should be noted that the Greek-Cypriot public viewed the 
crossings with suspicion (Webster and Timothy 2006: 162-181, Demetriou 2007a). 
It is not easy to determine the exact number of crossings that have taken place since 2003. 
However, it is estimated that approximately 9 million people crossed between 2003 and 
2006 alone (see Hadjipavlou 2007a). In addition, inter-community cooperation through 
civil society initiatives expanded a lot after the opening of the checkpoints (Harris 2015). 
Several inter-communal projects were initiated and funded by international organisations 
like, for example, the UN and the EU. The importance of such projects for the 
transformation of the Cyprus conflict will be discussed in the following chapters. Based 
on these facts, one could conclude that relations were developing between the two 
communities and that interaction was taking place. However, the qualitative data gathered 
for this research revealed that the reality was more complex. 
Apart from the opening of checkpoints, another important development at this time were 
negotiations about a political solution of the conflict. Talks resumed in 2002 (Asmussen 
2004: 4) and UNSG Kofi Annan attempted to develop a plan which was subsequently 
presented to both the Greek and Turkish-Cypriots as well as to the Guarantor Powers. 
The ‘Annan Plan’ provided for the establishment of the United RoC as “an independent 
state in the form of an indissoluble partnership, with a federal government and two equal 
constituent states, the Greek-Cypriot State and the Turkish-Cypriot State” (United 
Nations 2004). Both the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot sides ultimately accepted the ‘Annan 
Plan’ as the basis for negotiations. The Plan was revised five times, and in April 2004 
was put to separate, simultaneous referenda among the Greek and Turkish-Cypriots. 
Greek-Cypriots rejected the Plan, with 75.83% voting against, while Turkish-Cypriots 
accepted it, with 64.91% voting in favour (Asmussen 2004: 3).  
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The dismissal of the Annan Plan resulted in a paradoxical type of EU membership. In 
2004, the whole island of Cyprus joined the EU. However, EU legislation was only 
applied to the RoC and remains suspended in the north until a final solution to the conflict 
is reached. Also, following the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek-Cypriots, the 
EU adopted special measures and financial help packages for the Turkish-Cypriots. The 
latter included several projects aimed at promoting reconciliation that were implemented 
after 2004. The importance of such projects for the transformation of the conflict will be 
discussed in Chapter Five.  
Two main conclusions can be reached regarding this period. Firstly, some interaction 
between the Greek and Turkish-Cypriots began following the opening of the crossing 
points. This development, coupled with the civil society projects funded by the EU and 
other international organisations, created an environment that was more conducive to 
conflict transformation. However, the quite divergent results on the referenda for the 
Annan Plan suggest that the two communities still had quite divergent goals regarding 
the political solution of the conflict. 
3.1.5 2005-2015: More recent developments 
After the dismissal of the Annan Plan, the leaders of the two communities met several 
times under UN auspices. In July 2006 the meeting between Tassos Papadopoulos, the 
Greek-Cypriot leader, and Mehmet Ali Talat, the Turkish-Cypriot leader, resulted in what 
became known as the ‘July 8 Agreement’ (for further information, see Cyprus News 
Agency 2006). A new cycle of negotiations commenced in September 2008 between 
Dimitris Christofias, who was elected as President of the RoC in February 2008, and 
Talat. However, no progress was made on critical issues such as security and property. In 
April 2010, Derviş Eroğlu was elected as President of the “TRNC” and in the next month 
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he joined talks with Christofias. The two of them (Eroğlu, Christofias) met with the 
UNSG Ban Ki-moon in January 2011 and October 2011. The main aspiration was that 
these talks would pave the way for an agreement before 1st July 2012 when Cyprus would 
assume the rotating presidency of the EU. However, no concrete result was achieved.  
Turkey repeatedly threatened to boycott the Cyprus EU presidency or to freeze relations 
with the EU, or to even annex Northern Cyprus if no agreement was reached by 1st July 
2012. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Turkish Prime Minister, reportedly stated to Milliyet, 
a Turkish newspaper, that: “we will not have any discussions with the Cypriot President. 
Reports with the EU will be frozen” (EUbusiness 2011). The issue resurfaced in March 
2012 when Egemen Bağış, Turkey’s then Minister of European Union affairs, stated to a 
Turkish-Cypriot newspaper that his country would consider the annexation of Northern 
Cyprus as “one of several outcomes” if the reunification talks proved unsuccessful 
(EurActiv 2012).  
Talks began again in February 2014 with Anastasiades, who was elected as President of 
the RoC in 2013, and Eroğlu (2014) issuing a joint declaration. The talks that followed, 
however, were suspended because of a disagreement over the discovery of hydrocarbons 
off the shores of the island. The Greek-Cypriot community asserted that any sharing of 
revenues from natural resources could come only after a solution of the wider Cyprus 
conflict (Christofias 2012). Turkish-Cypriots, for their part, asserted that Greek-Cypriots 
cannot “legitimately represent the RoC as this would be contrary to the 1959-60 Cyprus 
Accords and Constitution” (Gürel et al. 2013). Following this line of reasoning, Turkish-
Cypriots do not accept any decisions of the RoC concerning the exploitation of 
hydrocarbons like, for example, the signing of exploration contracts with international 
firms as well as the authorisation of drilling operations (Özersay 2011, see also 
International Crisis Group 2012a).  
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In October 2014, the peace talks were suspended by the Greek-Cypriots in response to 
the announcement by Turkey that it would follow a separate procedure and search for gas 
and oil in an area where Cyprus had already approved the commencement of drilling 
(Reuters 2014). Negotiations recommenced in May 2015 following the election of 
Mustafa Akinci as the new leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community29.  
Apart from the aforementioned political developments, it is also worth noting that, during 
this period, the EU and other international organisations, initiated a new round of 
reconciliation projects. Between 2008 and 2012, the EU’s Civil Society in Action 
programme, the USAID peacebuilding initiative and the UNDP-ACT implemented a 
variety of projects aimed at reconciliation and conflict transformation.  
The main conclusion that can be reached regarding this 2005-15 period is that the 
positions of the Greek and Turkish-Cypriots towards the conflict remained largely 
unchanged. Both sides still had quite different interpretations and understandings of the 
conflict. However, more initiatives at the level of the civil society had been implemented. 







                                                             
29 At the time of writing, there negotiations were still ongoing.  
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3.2 THE HISTORY OF THE KOSOVO CONFLICT 
3.2.1 Introduction 
For historical reasons, both Serbs and Albanians maintain territorial claims on Kosovo. 
Kosovars30 and Kosovo-Serbs are the two main ethnic groups in Kosovo and it is 
important to note that, just like with Greek and Turkish-Cypriots, these two ethnic groups 
speak different languages and have different religions.  
3.2.2 20th century: the formation of nationalism and the entrenchment of divisions 
The contemporary history of the Kosovo conflict began in 1974 with the introduction of 
a new Yugoslav Constitution. This reallocated power among the federal units of 
Yugoslavia. Kosovo was given greater autonomy that equated to de facto self-government 
within Serbia, but not the status of a distinct constituent republic of the Yugoslav 
Federation (see Bellamy 2002: 4). Practically, this meant that, although Kosovo was 
granted a great degree of autonomy, it did not have the right to secede from Yugoslavia.  
However, Kosovars were disappointed with their status in Yugoslavia since their goal of 
independent state was not realised (Malcolm 2008: 330). As a consequence of this 
dissatisfaction, there was repeated persecution and discrimination against Serbs by 
Kosovars, resulting in high levels of Serb emigration from Kosovo (Nikolic 2003: 60-61, 
Malcolm 1998: 331).  
In 1981, as a result of the ethnic divisions and general dissatisfaction, Kosovars took to 
the streets. “The issue was primarily one of status rather than a desire for independence” 
(Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000: 36). The protests were 
                                                             




violently crushed by police forces implementing the instructions of the Yugoslav 
authorities (Daskalovski 2003: 20). 
Kosovo-Serb discontent also began to grow. On 24 September 1986, extracts from a 
memorandum prepared by 216 Serb academics were published in Večernje Novosti, a 
Serbian daily tabloid newspaper. They claimed that Kosovo-Serbs had been exposed to 
“physical, political, legal and cultural genocide” (SANU Memorandum 1986, see also 
Judah 2000: 48). Slobodan Milošević, the then leader of the Communist Party, exploited 
this anger among Kosovo-Serbs for personal political advancement (Perritt 2010: 24, see 
also Judah 2000: 53). By the end of 1987, he had become president of the Serbian League 
of Communists. In 1989, he won the Serbian presidency elections and immediately 
engaged in a strategy of ‘Serbianising’ Kosovo. In that year, Serbia took steps towards 
directly controlling Kosovo’s “security, judiciary, finance and social planning” 
(Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000: 41). These actions culminated 
in the annulment of the autonomy of Kosovo in July 1990. On 2 July 1990, three days 
before the dissolution of the Kosovo Assembly, Kosovar delegates “passed a resolution 
declaring Kosovo independent within the SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia)” (Malcolm 1998: 346). The Serbian government reacted by removing 
Kosovars from government posts. On 7 September 1990, however, the Kosovar members 
of the Kosovo Parliament proclaimed a new constitution of the ‘Republic of Kosovo’. 
The self-proclaimed ‘Republic of Kosovo’ was recognised only by Albania (Binet 2016: 
113). As a result, dual governmental structures operated between 1991-9. The goal of this 
Kosovar opposition was total independence for Kosovo. In 1991, the Democratic League 
of Kosovo asserted claims to full sovereignty and independence. In the same year, a 
referendum took place among Kosovars that resulted in a 99% vote in favour of 
independence, on a turnout of 87% (Malcolm 1998: 347). 
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The main conclusion that can be reached is that this period was important for the 
consolidation of the divisions between Kosovars and Kosovo-Serbs residing in the 
country. The two ethnic groups have developed quite divergent goals which led to 
hostilities committed by both groups. In addition, Milošević’s rule further consolidated 
ethnic divisions. His strategy of ‘Serbianising’ Kosovo resulted in a high degree of 
discrimination against Kosovars who reacted by declaring Kosovo independent within 
the SFRY.  
3.2.3 1992-1999: Intensification of violence and the NATO military intervention 
From 1989, the movement towards full independence for Kosovo was led by Ibrahim 
Rugova, a university professor who, in collaboration with other scholars, created the 
‘Democratic League of Kosovo’ (LDK) with the aim of gaining Western support for 
Kosovan independence31. The LDK refrained from any confrontation with the authorities 
but, rather, favoured other means of resistance that showed its denunciation of the 
legitimacy of rule from Belgrade (notably, refusal to participate in Yugoslav elections 
and attempts to structure parallel governmental institutions)32 (Nation 2003: 225).  
Rugova’s aim of winning Western support was not realised. Kosovo, preceding 1998, 
was a marginal issue in international discussions. The United States did use economic 
sanctions against the Yugoslav government after it declared martial law in Kosovo in 
1981. Moreover, the Clinton and Bush Senior administrations issued several warnings to  
Milošević (Janssens 2015: 60). However, these warnings “were overshadowed by the 
tendency to treat Milošević as an interlocutor whom the West could not afford to alienate 
                                                             
31 As Smyser (2003: 159) indicates, Rugova “expected some support from the West, perhaps as part of 
the general settlement of the Balkans that would follow the end of the Cold War”. 
32 Despite the use of nonviolent means, the LDK was not so benign. Judah (quoted in Chomsky 1999: 27) 
characterised the LDK as a “curious mirror image to Milošević’s SPS (Socialist Party of Serbia)”. 
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in its efforts to achieve a diplomatic settlement of the regional crisis” (House of Commons 
Foreign Affairs Committee: Paragraph 29).  
In the early 1990s, some members of the LPK33 created another group to organise armed 
revolt in Kosovo, “seeking to tie together scattered but largely ineffective pockets of 
armed resistance to Yugoslav authority in various regions of Kosovo” (Perritt 2010: 32). 
The ‘Kosovo Liberation Army’ (KLA), as it was named, announced itself to the public in 
1996 with concurrent bomb attacks on five camps accommodating Serb refugees from 
the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see Pavkovic 1997: 189). One of the main reasons for 
the rise of the KLA during this period was the exclusion of Kosovo from the Dayton 
peace talks in 1995 (Philips 1996: 824-25). After Dayton, it became evident to many 
Kosovars that, as long as peace was present in Kosovo, the international community 
would not proceed to any substantive changes (Judah 2008: 75-92, see also Pavkovic 
2013: 103).  
In 1997, with the collapse of the Albanian government, the only government that formally 
recognised the ‘Republic of Kosovo’, the situation changed significantly. The 
simultaneous collapse of the Albanian army resulted in the KLA acquiring many 
weapons34. From this time onwards, the KLA “embarked on a campaign of violence 
against the Serbian and FRY authorities and those co-operating with them” (Greenwood 
2002: 146). By February 1998, the violent acts on the part of the KLA had reached a peak 
(Chomsky 1999: 31).  
The Serbian army did not immediately respond to this intensification of violence and this 
helped the KLA, by summer 1998, to gain control of 40% of Kosovan territory. However, 
                                                             
33 The LPK was founded in 1982 with the goal of emancipating Kosovo from the control of Belgrade.  
34 As Fowkes (2002: 111) explained, in March 1997, following the dissolution of the Albanian army, 
weapons were available “for a few dollars each”. The KLA, therefore, could be easily armed.  
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a few months later, the Serb forces used disproportionate retaliation against the KLA and 
the Kosovar civilian population (Chomsky 1999: 31). As a response, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1199 (UNSC 1998, Resolution 1199) which stated its severe concerns 
over the disproportionate use of force by the Serbian security forces and the FRY army. 
Resolution 1199 also stressed the immediate need to avert a humanitarian catastrophe and 
asked both sides to implement a ceasefire.   
However, in spite of the UNSC’s efforts, the situation worsened (Greenwood 2002: 149). 
In February 1999, a peace conference took place in Rambouillet, near Paris, France. 
However, the conference did not produce any positive outcomes due to the refusal of the 
FRY/Serb delegation to sign the final agreement (Hosmer 2001: 12, see also Weller 2008: 
15-16). Consequently, on 24 March 1999, NATO commenced its aerial bombing 
campaign on the FRY. NATO’s operation lasted for 78 days, and on 10 June 1999 a 
ceasefire was signed. 
Overall, therefore, the years of the formation and consolidation of ethnic divisions 
(discussed in the previous sections of this chapter) resulted in the widespread use of 
violence, especially following the creation of the KLA. It was evident that the two groups 
had quite divergent goals. Kosovars wanted total independence for Kosovo while Serbs 
regarded Kosovo a part of Serbia’s territory. Reaching common ground seemed to be 
impossible and violent actions did not stop. As a result, NATO conducted an aerial 
bombing campaign on the FRY.  
3.2.4 1999-2008: Kosovo under international supervision 
On the same day the ceasefire was agreed, UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) 
and the NATO-led KFOR (Kosovo Force) were established. Kosovo entered an era of 
international supervision that included collaboration between international institutions 
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with the aim of achieving post-war reform and development as well as institution building 
(UN Security Council 1999, Security Council Resolution 1244). Even though the future 
status of Kosovo was still undecided, UNMIK, after 2001, assigned the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) with governing competencies (Tolksdorf 2007: 
6). Furthermore, UNMIK supervised the formation of a multinational police service in 
Kosovo. It should be noted, however, that Kosovo-Serbs did not recognise UNMIK as a 
legitimate authority. As a result, in some municipalities in northern Kosovo inhabited 
mostly by Kosovo-Serbs, parallel structures were established, funded and administered 
by Serbia (OSCE 2003). These structures have been fully operating until very recently35.  
In October 2005, the UNSG chose Martti Ahtisaari, a then UN Special Envoy, to direct 
negotiations on the status of Kosovo. Ahtisaari led talks between February and September 
2006. On 2 February 2007, he presented a ‘Comprehensive Proposal’ to Belgrade and 
Pristina. Supplementary meetings with both sides followed, after which Ahtisaari stated 
it has not been possible for the two sides to find common ground as they maintained their 
diametrically opposed positions. For Ahtisaari, therefore, since the two sides of the 
conflict did not compromise on their original positions, the “only alternative to 
independence was to maintain the status quo” (Vidmar 2009: 802). The ‘Ahtissari Plan’, 
which suggested independence supervised by the international community, received 
widespread support (NATO News: 23 April 2007, Presidency of the European Union-
Germany 2007, European Union Council 2007, European Parliament 2007). However, 
Serbia, with the support of Russia, demanded the negotiations to start anew, arguing that 
the procedures of negotiations on the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ had been severely flawed. Russia 
                                                             
35 As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the EU-brokered dialogue resulted in an agreement for 
dismantling the parallel structures operating in Northern Kosovo.  
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stated that it would veto any UNSC Resolution in favour of independence for Kosovo 
(EUobserver 2007a). Consequently, the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ was not approved by the UNSC. 
Subsequent to these developments, the troika of the EU, the US and Russia was given 
120 days to direct talks on Kosovo’s status. However, it soon became evident that 
Kosovars would not compromise and accept anything less than independence. Regardless 
of the initial EU statements against a unilateral declaration of independence, US and EU 
officials started expressing their willingness to recognise Kosovo as an independent state 
(Bilefsky and Wood 2007). Hence, Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 
2008 was not a surprise. It had become apparent that the US and the EU decided to put 
the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ into practice without a UNSC Resolution.    
Serbia reacted to the declaration of independence by asking the UN-SRSG (Special 
Representative to the Secretary-General) to declare the illegitimacy of Kosovo’s 
independence on the grounds that it did not comply with UNSC Resolution 1244 (Caruso 
2008: 20). The EU, for its part, was not able to agree on a joint recognition by all member 
states because a number of them had reservations. Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia 
and Spain feared that the case of Kosovo would set a precedent for the status of other 
separatist movements, namely Basque and Catalan movements in Spain, the Turkish-
Cypriots in Cyprus, the Hungarian minority living in Romania and the Hungarian 
minority of Slovakia (Vucheva 2008)36. The EU’s official statement was that “member 
states will decide, in accordance with national practice and international law on their 
relations with Kosovo” (Council of the EU 2008). As Weller (2008: 74) pointed out, “the 
                                                             
36 It should be noted that the five non-recognisers are not all the same in outlook. Spain has adopted the 
toughest stance against Kosovo’s independence.  
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statement only confirmed the inability of the EU to act as a unified entity in the matter of 
recognition”. 
The International Court of Justice, meanwhile, in an advisory opinion requested by the 
UN General Assembly at Serbia’s insistence37, concluded in 2010 that Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence did not breach international law38. At the time of writing this 
thesis, 112 out of the 193 UN members and 23 out of 28 EU members had recognised 
Kosovo’s statehood39.   
The main conclusion that can be reached is that, during this period, relations between 
Kosovo-Serbs and Kosovars did not markedly improve. UNMIK was not accepted by the 
former. As a result, until very recently, parallel governmental structures funded by Serbia 
have been operating in Northern Kosovo, an area inhabited mostly by Kosovo-Serbs. 
However, as will be discussed in the next section, the process of dismantling these parallel 
structures had commenced by the time research for this thesis had finished. In addition, 
the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion further complicated the conflict. The fact that so many states 
recognised Kosovo’s statehood was a source of jubilation for Kosovars. However, 
Serbia’s official position had not changed. Serbia still regarded Kosovo as a part of its 
territory. In addition, most Kosovo-Serbs residing in Kosovo supported Serbia’s position. 
3.2.5. 2008 - 2015: The EU’s involvement in the Kosovo conflict 
                                                             
37 The International Court of Justice can offer an Advisory Opinion only if such an opinion is asked by 
“the Security Council or the General Assembly, or by an organ authorised to do so by the General 
Assembly” (Ker-Lindsay 2015: 14).  
38 An intense debate has been created with regards to the Advisory Opinion. For a detailed discussion on 
several aspects of it, including the ways through which law and politics can affect each other as well as 
the broader implications of the Court’s decision, see Milanovic, M. and Wood, M. (2015) The Law and 
Politics of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
39 For more information, see http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/  
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The EU’s direct involvement in Kosovo began in 199940 with the authorisation of UNSC 
Resolution 1244 and the establishment of UNMIK. Under UNMIK’s four-pillar 
structure41, the EU was in charge of reconstruction and economic development. At the 
same time, the EU engaged in institution building in Kosovo through the SAP (Stability 
and Association Process). In 2002, it was decided that “Kosovo would be set on a separate 
route towards EU membership, given the uncertainty surrounding Kosovo’s final status 
and its unique set of challenges associated with progress towards EU accession” (FRIDE 
2007: 2). As a result, the STM (Stability and Association Process Tracking Mechanism) 
was founded in November that year.  
Negotiations over the final status of Kosovo indicated that, after a solution was found, the 
international community in general, and the EU in particular, should restructure their 
missions in Kosovo. As the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ provided, following the declaration of 
independence, UNMIK would be succeeded by an international operation led by the EU.  
In July 2006, Javier Solana, then High Representative for the CFSP, and Olli Rehn, then 
European Commissioner for Enlargement, issued a report entitled: ‘On the future EU role 
and contribution in Kosovo’. This report (see European Council and European 
Commission 2007) provided for three distinct ways through which the EU would get 
involved in Kosovo. Firstly, an EU Special Representative (EUSR), who would also lead 
the International Civilian Office (ICO)42, would supervise procedures towards a 
                                                             
40 Prior to 1999, the EU’s involvement in Kosovo was minimal. One notable development was the 
establishment of the CPN (Conflict Prevention Network) in 1997 by the European Commission which 
recommended some measures to be taken that would increase the EU’s role in Kosovo (Calic 1997). 
41 The four pillars of UNMIK were: “Humanitarian assistance led by UNHCR; Civil Administration under 
the UN; Democratization and Institution-building led by OSCE; and Reconstruction and Economic 
Development managed by the EU” (United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo). 
 
42 The ICO was established as part of the Comprehensive Status Settlement (CSS) proposed by Ahtisaari 
in 2007.Its main aim was to supervise the implementation of the CSS and coordinate the activities of 
EULEX (see Visoka and Bolton 2011: 193).  
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settlement. Secondly, another EU mission, EULEX, would support the authorities in 
Kosovo in implementing the Rule of Law and thirdly, an ECLO (European Commission 
Liaison Office) would prepare Kosovo for EU accession.  
In addition, the EU attempted to persuade Serbia to participate in EU-facilitated talks with 
Kosovo. These talks, led by CFSP High Representative Catherine Ashton, commenced in 
March 2011 (International Crisis Group 2012: 1). In its October 2011 report on Serbia’s 
EU membership perspective, the European Commission stated that Serbia would be given 
a date to start membership negotiations if it took more steps towards stabilising its 
relations with Kosovo (see European Commission 2011a: 12). Serbia was duly given the 
status of an EU membership candidate in March 2012. However, the EU set the 
improvement of relations between Belgrade and Pristina as a prerequisite for the 
beginning of accession negotiations (European Council 2011). Between October 2012 
and April 2013, several meetings, facilitated by Ashton, took place between Serbian 
Prime Minister Dacic and Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi. In April 2013, in the 
tenth round of their EU-mediated dialogue, Dacic and Thaçi “initialled a ‘First Agreement 
of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations’ between Kosovo and Serbia” 
(Woehrel 2013: 5). Kosovo’s Parliament and Serbia’s Government ratified the agreement. 
The European Commission then suggested that the EU give Serbia a date for commencing 
accession negotiations and start talks with Kosovo for enacting a SAA (Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement).     
Up until the point of writing, several important steps had been achieved by this dialogue. 
For example, the parallel structures43 operating in the Kosovo-Serb municipalities were 
in the process of being dismantled. This process was well-advanced in the fields of justice 
                                                             
43 The term ‘parallel structures’ refers to governmental structures funded by Serbia and operating in 
Northern Kosovo.  
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and police and was considered to be one of the most important achievements (European 
Commission 2014, 2015). Also, in August 2015, an agreement was reached for the 
creation of a Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo (European 
Commission 2015). 
It therefore seems that the EU’s efforts produced some positive results in the case of 
Kosovo. Although the process has not yet been concluded, this historical review has 
shown that, through the EU-brokered dialogue, several agreements were reached between 
Kosovars and Kosovo-Serbs. A more detailed discussion of the nature of EU actions and 
their impact in Kosovo will follow in the subsequent chapters. 
3.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided the necessary historical context for the subsequent core 
analysis. More specifically, it has considered two main topics: the history of the Cyprus 
and Kosovo conflicts and the involvement of international actors. Particular reference has 
been made to the role of the EU in the two conflicts. Based on the above analysis, certain 
conclusions can be reached regarding each of the main topics discussed in this chapter. 
Firstly, comparison between the two cases reveals that both are characterised by deeply 
entrenched divisions between ethnic groups. In both cases, the conflict is between groups 
that speak different languages and have different religions. Also, the two sides of both 
conflicts have developed quite divergent goals. Turkish-Cypriots and Kosovars favour a 
high degree of autonomy while Greek-Cypriots and Kosovo-Serbs consider Northern 
Cyprus and Kosovo to be part of Cyprus and Serbia respectively. In addition, the 20th 
century was important for the consolidation of existing divisions. In both cases, 
disagreement over constitutional questions led to the further amplification of divisions 
and to the use of violence. Moreover, in both cases, one of the two groups has been greatly 
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supported by another state. Turkish-Cypriots are economically dependent on Turkey 
while Kosovo-Serbs were, until recently, operating parallel governmental structures that 
were financially supported by Serbia. Lastly, in both cases, a unilateral declaration of 
independence has taken place. Turkish-Cypriots declared the “TRNC” an independent 
state in 1983 while Kosovars declared independence in 2008. This brief comparison leads 
to the conclusion that both conflicts are well-entrenched and that their transformation 
would be a challenging task for the EU.  
However, it is not the aim of this chapter to suggest that the two cases are identical. Firstly, 
in the case of Cyprus, the secessionist entity has only been recognised by Turkey. By 
contrast, Kosovo has been recognised by 108 states. Another difference of particular 
importance for this thesis is the degree of EU involvement. The historical background 
analysis revealed that the EU was much more directly involved in Kosovo than in Cyprus. 
In the case of Cyprus, the EU was mainly supporting UN efforts towards a political 
solution. After 2004, however, more reconciliatory projects and bottom-up initiatives 
were implemented by the EU as well as by other organisations. In the case of Kosovo, 
while there was not much EU involvement in the 1990s, in the 2000s the EU was in charge 
of reconstruction and economic development. Later, it has implemented its own mission 
and has been the leading actor in facilitating dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo. As 
discussed in the introductory chapter of this thesis, this was one of the reasons why 
Kosovo was selected as a case that is expected to be, to a large extent, in line with the 
NPE argument. The historical analysis presented in this chapter has confirmed this 
rationale. Therefore, if the EU cannot be characterised as a normative actor with regards 
to its role towards Kosovo, then there are significant grounds to support the argument that 
the EU cannot be a normative actor in the field of conflict transformation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: TESTING THE NORMATIVITY OF EU 
GOALS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The next three chapters will apply the NPE analytical framework (see Chapter Two) to 
critically explore the EU’s commitment to the promotion of ‘sustainable peace’ and to 
conflict transformation. This particular chapter is concerned with the goals of the EU, 
which speaks to the first dimension of the NPE framework. 
The main question that this chapter aims to discuss is the extent to which the 
internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm by local Cypriot and Kosovan actors was 
the main EU objective. The first section of this chapter discusses the evolution and 
development of the EU’s approach to conflict. The primary aim of this section is to trace 
the ‘sustainable peace’ norm in the development of the Union’s instruments and policies. 
Then, it moves on to the two cases and asks whether and why the promotion and eventual 
internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm by local Cypriot and Kosovan actors 
became an aim of EU foreign policy. The chapter then looks at the EU’s own commitment 
to the principles it seeks to promote and its adherence to general principles of international 
law. This last section is particularly important in assessing the normativity of EU goals. 
As Sjursen (2006: 245) argued, it is the EU’s practice of binding itself to international 
and fundamental rights law that makes it a distinctive normative actor in world politics. 
Therefore, the Union’s commitment to international law principles would be an indicator 





4.2 THE EU’S APPROACH TO CONFLICT 
This section will provide a comprehensive review of the development of the Union’s 
approach towards conflict. To this end, secondary literature as well as official EU 
documentation were scrutinised. 
To begin with, peace was one of the main principles that inspired the very emergence of 
the European Community (EC) (European Community 1957). The first successful move44 
towards the creation of an EC foreign policy framework occurred during The Hague 
summit of December 1969 when the EC Heads of State and Government agreed to pave 
the way for “a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world  of 
tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate with its traditions and its mission” 
(quoted in Hill and Smith 2000: 75). As a result, the EPC (European Political 
Cooperation)45 was established with the aim of enabling better collaboration between the 
European Community’s member states on foreign affairs (see Holland 1993: 118 and 
Stewart 2006: 44-45). The EPC did not initially have a treaty basis and thus functioned 
outside the official structures and legislative procedures of the EC. In addition, although 
initially the Member States insisted on the strict separation of the EPC from the EC 
(Bache at al. 2011: 510-511), progressively they began to use the European Community’s 
instruments for foreign policy purposes. One example is the imposition of sanctions on 
the USSR after the imposition of martial law on Poland in 1980 (Smith, M. 2008: 72). 
The Single European Act, signed in 1986 and implemented in 1987, gave the EPC a treaty 
base. According to Article 30, the member states should “inform and consult each other 
                                                             
44 Earlier plans for the establishment of a federal European Defence Community (EDC) in 1952 and for 
the enhancement of intergovernmental cooperation in 1962 (Fouchet Plan) were not successful (see Hill 
and Smith 2000: 47; Roy and Kanner 2006: 103).  
45 For a more detailed discussion on the development of EPC, see Smith, M (2004) Europe’s Foreign and 
Security Policy. The institutionalisation of Co-operation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Ifestos, 
P. (1987) ‘European political cooperation (EPC): Its evolution from 1970 to 1986, and the Single 
European Act’. Journal of European Integration, 11 (1), pp. 47-62 
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on any foreign policy matters of general interest so as to ensure that their combined 
influence is exercised as effectively as possible through coordination, the convergence of 
their position and implementation of joint action” (SEA 1987).  
The foreign policy aims of the EU were more clearly defined in the 1990s when the EPC 
was replaced by the CFSP with the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. In June 
1992, the foreign ministers submitted a report to the Lisbon European Council on possible 
areas for CFSP actions. It noted that “the CFSP should contribute to ensuring that the 
Union's external action is less reactive to events in the outside world, and more active in 
the creation of a more favourable international environment. This will enable the EU to 
have an improved capacity to tackle problems at their roots in order to anticipate the 
outbreak of crises” (European Council 1992). This suggests that, unlike the EPC’s 
reactive nature (Smith, M. 2004: 178, Stewart 2006: 47), the CFSP aimed at long-term 
engagements in order to address the structural causes of conflicts and not only their 
consequences. As has been discussed in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the idea 
of tackling the root causes of conflicts instead of simply treating their symptoms is of 
central importance in conflict transformation.  
The Maastricht Treaty, which came into force in 1993, put the development of democracy 
and the rule of law as well as the promotion of human rights among the EU’s main foreign 
policy aims (European Union 1992). Among the EU’s actions in this direction were the 
monitoring of elections in Russia and South Africa, the establishment of support measures 
to strengthen stability and peace in the CEECs (Central and Eastern European countries) 
and the Middle East and the provision of humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This 
points towards attempts to transform the structural features that support the perpetuation 
of conflicts.  
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The Amsterdam Treaty, implemented in 1999, expanded the scope of the EU’s tasks to 
include “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat in crisis 
management, including peacemaking” (European Union 1997: Article 17). These 
Petersberg Tasks, as they had come to be called, derived from the June 1992 Ministerial 
Council of the Western European Union (WEU) at which WEU member states decided 
to provide military units for such kinds of tasks. In December 1998, the Saint Malo 
Declaration was signed by the President of France, Jacques Chirac and the Prime Minister 
of the UK, Tony Blair. In this ‘Joint Declaration on European Defence’, they both agreed 
that the European Union “must have the capacity for autonomous action backed up by 
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order 
to respond to international crises” (Anglo French Declaration 1998). A few months after 
this Franco-British Declaration, the EU member states decided to institute the ESDP 
(European Security and Defence Policy) and to merge the WEU into the EU (European 
Council 1999a). Subsequently, the December 1999 Helsinki European Council (1999b) 
declared that the member states were committed to develop the capability to deploy 
military forces and took decisions regarding the institutional setup of the ESDP. A few 
years after this decision to establish the ESDP, the EU managed to create the necessary 
tools for the ESDP, albeit with ongoing capability deficiencies, and declared that it was 
ready to operate on the full range of the Petersberg Tasks (European Council 2003b). The 
earliest (2003) official ESDP deployments included a police mission in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (EUPM), Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (fYROM) and Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) (Smith, M. 2011: 187).  
In addition, another tool at the EU’s disposal for addressing the root causes of conflicts 
were trade and cooperation agreements (European Commission 2001a: 9). The European 
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Commission stressed that its preferred approach was to constructively engage in conflicts 
through a “long-term approach, identifying and targeting needs as far “upstream” as 
possible” (European Commission 2001a: 8-9). In this respect, it became evident that trade 
and cooperation agreements would help to foster sustainable structural change (see Tocci 
2013a: 139) which should, in turn, induce conflict transformation. Some examples 
include the South East European Cooperation Process, the Stabilisation and Association 
Process with Western Balkan countries and the European Neighbourhood Policy. Another 
example is the Stability Pact which was proposed by the EU in 1993 and aimed at 
addressing minority and border tensions between countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe46. Countries of that region were expected to resolve existing disputes before being 
allowed to enter into accession negotiations with the Union. As Tocci (2007: 13) noted, 
“although the Pact was a political and non-legally binding document, its inbuilt incentives 
promoted agreements between Slovakia and Hungary (1995) and later between Romania 
and Hungary (1996)”. 
Moreover, another important aspect of the EU’s approach towards conflict was the 
attempt to involve local NGOs. The Commission stressed that NGOs “are often present 
on the ground in situations where official state structures are absent. They can also 
function as grass roots mediators as well as reliable and neutral observers in situations 
where there is no international presence. Mediation activities of specialist NGOs have 
sometimes proved decisive in a crisis” (European Commission 2001a: 28). This 
engagement in long-term strategies and the acknowledgement of the importance of NGOs 
and grass roots mediation are essential components of conflict transformation processes 
(Lederach 1995 and 1997). Diez et al (2006: 573) referred to the EU’s PEACE 
programmes in Northern Ireland as examples of cross-community peacebuilding projects 
                                                             
46 The Stability Pact was passed to the OSCE for implementation.  
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that might contribute to a reduction of stereotyping and the alteration of inter-group 
relations for the better. However, they also noted that increased contact between conflict 
parties is not in itself enough for the transformation of a conflict. Rather, they stated that 
the establishment of cross-group social networks are necessary as they will lead to long-
term identity changes (Diez et al 2006: 573).  
Furthermore, the 2009 Lisbon Treaty specified that “preserving peace, preventing 
conflicts from erupting into violence and strengthening international security” (European 
Union 2007, Lisbon Treaty: Article 21) are significant elements of the EU’s external 
policies. More importantly, however, the Treaty, as Tocci (2011: 1) observed, recognised 
an association between the Union’s internal nature and its external projection.  It stated 
that the EU would be  
guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and 
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the 
rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and 
respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law 
(European Union 2007, Lisbon Treaty: Article 21).  
Lastly, another way of EU involvement in conflicts is through diplomacy. In other words, 
the EU has been involved in negotiations aimed at helping the conflict parties come to an 
agreement. One example is the role of the EU High Representative in facilitating 
negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina (for a more detailed discussion on the EU as 
a diplomatic actor, see Koops and Macaj 2015).  
To conclude, the EU’s approach to conflict has gradually shifted towards the 
implementation of long-term strategies that aim to address a conflict’s structural causes. 
Trade and cooperation agreements, for example, are used to foster structural changes. In 
addition, local NGOs are seen as important actors that must be involved in this process. 
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Such commitments and activities are in line with the conflict transformation approach 
and with the premises of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm.  
4.3 THE CASE OF CYPRUS: NORMATIVE EU GOALS? 
As discussed in Chapter Two, if the EU is indeed a normative actor, then the ‘sustainable 
peace’ norm should be central in its rhetoric and engagement with the two conflicts. In 
this respect, the EU’s approach towards Cyprus will be examined with the aim of 
identifying whether the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm by local Cypriot 
actors was among the main aims of the EU.  
4.3.1 Centrality of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm? 
The EU’s official statements on the Cyprus conflict have been constructed along three 
main themes. Firstly, the EU emphasised the importance of reconciliation and of bringing 
the two communities closer together. However, examination of EU documents and 
speeches of important officials revealed a differentiation between the two chronological 
periods of EU engagement in the conflict (see Chapter Three). During the 1990s and the 
beginning of the 2000s, this rested on the idea that the process towards EU membership 
would be enough to bring peace and reconciliation. After 2004, however, the Union’s 
official statements emphasised that the economic development of the area administered 
by Turkish-Cypriots and the development of civil society would help bring the two 
communities closer together. Secondly, the EU highlighted the importance of adhering to 
international law principles as a way of creating a positive political climate on the island. 
Lastly, the EU consistently expressed its support for the UN-led negotiations towards a 





The EU became involved in the Cyprus conflict following the RoC’s 1990 application for 
membership. In this first period (1990-2004), the EU emphasised the catalytic role it 
could play in reconciling the two main communities in Cyprus. Although there is not one 
widely accepted definition of reconciliation, most authors who have dealt with this term 
seem to agree that it refers to breaking down the barriers between the conflict parties and 
integrating them, thereby changing their relationship for the better (Lederach 2001, 
Chapman 2002, Kriesberg 2001) which is also one of the main objectives of conflict 
transformation. Based on a thorough examination of EU documents and speeches of EU 
officials, it seems that they offer the same reading of reconciliation. A large number of 
extracts from these sources will be provided in this section to shed light on the EU’s 
understanding of reconciliation. 
To begin with, the European Commission, in its Opinion on the RoC’s membership 
application, stressed “The Commission is convinced that the result of Cyprus's accession 
to the Community would be increased security and prosperity and that it would help bring 
the two communities on the island closer together” (European Commission 1993: 
paragraph 46). Following the opening of accession negotiations, the Luxembourg 
European Council of December 1997 concluded “the accession of Cyprus should benefit 
all communities and help to bring about civil peace and reconciliation” (European 
Council 1997: 28.). Moreover, in the Agenda 200047, issued in 1997, the European 
Commission pictured the EU as being able “to play a positive role in bringing about a just 
and lasting settlement” (European Commission 1997) of the Cyprus conflict.  
Similar intentions were also evident in speeches of leading European Commission 
officials. Hans van den Broek (1997b), then European Commissioner for External 
                                                             
47 Agenda 2000 outlined the vision of the Union's future on the threshold of the 21st century.  
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Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, for example, expressed his conviction 
that “Cyprus's accession to the Union will reduce tensions between the communities and 
transform what is at present a zero-sum game, where one side's gain is the other's loss, 
into a situation offering a brighter future for both sides”. In addition, Romano Prodi, then 
President of the European Commission, in a speech to the RoC’s House of 
Representatives, stated  
The European Union exists to put an end to the conflicts of the past and to bring 
peace, justice and well-being to our peoples. It has achieved this to a remarkable 
extent over almost half a century. Today, peace, justice and well-being are steadily 
being spread throughout Europe as preparations for enlargement go ahead. The 
European Union will bring to Cyprus a model of peace and reconciliation (Prodi 
2001).  
For Prodi, therefore, the enlargement process would be instrumental in bringing peace, 
reconciliation and justice in Cyprus (see also Prodi 2001a). Moreover, Günter Verheugen, 
as European Commissioner for Enlargement, in a speech to the European Parliament in 
2003, confirmed that the Commission “will also do all it can to support projects in Cyprus 
that will help to prevent a further deepening of differences on the island and build trust 
between the communities” (Verheugen 2003). This idea of ‘building trust’ is also central 
to conflict transformation. According to Mitchell (2002: 18), conflict transformation 
should include the passage from mistrustful relationships to trusting ones. It, therefore, 
becomes evident that during this first phase of EU involvement in Cyprus, the European 
Commission hoped that the eventual inclusion of both Greek and Turkish-Cypriots in the 
Union’s structures would be vital in reconciling the two communities and tackling the 
roots of the conflict.  
The EU’s stated preference of a unified Cyprus and of reconciliation was also evident 
after the RoC’s accession to the Union and the rejection of the Annan Plan by Greek-
Cypriots (see Chapter Three). In this second period, however, the EU tried to establish a 
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link between the economic development of the North and reconciliation. More 
specifically, for European Commission officials (Appendix B: 12, 13), the improvement 
of the economic situation of the Turkish-Cypriot community would serve to eradicate 
divisions between the two communities and to build closer relations between them. For 
example, Rehn, then European Commissioner for Enlargement, referring to the Green 
Line Regulation (GLR)48, stated that “building bridges between the Greek-Cypriot and 
Turkish-Cypriot community over the Green Line is essential for reconciliation in Cyprus 
and helpful for creating a positive political climate which would open the way for a 
comprehensive settlement on the island” (Rehn quoted in European Commission press 
release 2005). The EU’s Council of Foreign Ministers also expressed its determination to 
“put an end to the isolation of the Turkish-Cypriot community and to facilitate the 
reunification of the island by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish-
Cypriot community” (quoted in Cyprus News Agency 2004).  
In addition, the EU also stressed the importance of inter-community projects. The 
European Parliament, for example, stated that “every possible effort should be made to 
achieve the reunification of Cyprus” and called on the Commission “to strengthen inter-
community projects, thus building up the momentum for the resumption of negotiations” 
(European Parliament 2005). Štefan Füle, the European Commissioner for Enlargement 
and European Neighbourhood Policy between 2010-2014, during his first official visit to 
Cyprus and with reference to such projects, stated: “I am happy that European funds could 
contribute to bring people of both communities closer. It is an encouraging example 
underlining that where there is a will there is a way” (Füle 2010a).  
                                                             
48 The GLR aimed to facilitate trade activities between the two communities.  
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Most importantly, Füle made the commitment that “the EU will also mobilise all 
resources available to make reunification sustainable for both communities” (Füle 
2010b).  Also, for Füle, such funding “underlines the commitment and strong support of 
the European Union to make a difference in the lives of Turkish-Cypriots, to help bring 
the Turkish-Cypriot community closer to the EU and to pave the way for reconciliation 
and the reunification of Cyprus” (Füle quoted in European Commission press release 
2013a). Moreover, Johannes Hahn, as Commissioner for Regional Policy, reaffirmed that 
“the European Union is built on reconciliation, both human and political and that the roots 
of the European Union are a reconciliation project” (Hahn 2011). In the same speech he 
noted that “the EU will continue to support strongly a settlement and foster reconciliation 
and confidence building on the island” (Hahn 2011). Similarly, Herman Van Rompuy, as 
President of the European Council, in a speech to the Parliament of the RoC in 2012, 
stated that “behind words like ‘solution’ and ‘settlement’ we are ultimately talking about 
ending a civil war and establishing peace” (Van Rompuy 2012). Such statements indicate 
a commitment to sustainable reconciliation and conflict transformation.  
Moreover, as part of the FAR49, the EU repeatedly called for proposals for the 
development of Turkish-Cypriot civil society. The main objective was to promote “the 
role of civil society in the northern part of Cyprus in the development of trust, dialogue, 
cooperation and reconciliation between the Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot 
communities as an important step towards a solution of the Cyprus problem” (European 
Commission 2013a). José Manuel Barroso, then European Commission President, stated 
that it was important “to ensure the involvement of civil society” (Barroso quoted in 
European Commission Press Release 2013c). The acknowledgement of the importance 
                                                             
49 FAR is a comprehensive programme of support to the Turkish-Cypriot community. It will be discussed 
in more detail in the subsequent chapter. 
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of civil society in the promotion of reconciliation is another indicator that the EU’s goals 
were directed towards transforming of the conflict.  
Lastly, there emerged a tendency in EU official discourse to compare the reconciliation 
between the Greek and Turkish-Cypriots with Franco-German relations in the aftermath 
of WW2. Hans Van den Broek, as European Commissioner for External Relations and 
European Neighbourhood Policy, stated:  
I ask anyone who doubts the force of peace and prosperity in Europe to consider 
the remarkable reconciliation between France and Germany. Thanks to European 
integration, two historic adversaries are now, with their European partners, about 
to seal their common destiny by introducing a common currency. Membership of 
the Union is a plus. It takes nothing away from peoples’ sense of identity (and this 
goes for regional and cultural identity too) or their long standing ties with their 
neighbours. Rather it offers them opportunities to have a greater influence on 
international affairs and on their own destiny (Van den Broek 1997a). 
This comparison went as far as drawing a parallel between the role of coal and steel as a 
key factor in the reconciliation between France and Germany and the possibility of gas 
reserves found in Cypriot waters becoming a key factor in the reconciliation between 
Greek and Turkish-Cypriots. Van Rompuy, for example, stated  
now that enormous gas reserves have been discovered in Cypriot waters, could 
this not be a welcome trigger to turn around the situation? Just like France and 
Germany 60 years ago came together over coal, could in the case of Cyprus the 
avenue toward conciliation not be built on sharing and selling gas? (Van Rompuy 
2012).  
By drawing this parallel between Greek and Turkish-Cypriots and French and Germans, 
EU officials attempted to create an image of the Union as an organisation that is able to 
transform relations through the transformation of the interests of the parties in conflict.  
Overall, therefore, during the first period of its involvement in Cyprus, the EU promoted 
reconciliation through putting an emphasis on the catalytic role the accession process 
could play. After 2004, however, reconciliation was encouraged through the emphasis 
placed on inter-community projects, on the development of civil society and on the 
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economic development of the North. Lastly, reconciliation was promoted as a principle 
upon which the Union was built. By making references to its success in reconciling the 
French and Germans, the EU tried to create an image of itself as a peace project.  
International Law violations 
Another theme that emerged in the EU’s official statements was its emphasis on 
international law principles as a way to create a positive political climate and conditions 
conducive to reconciliation. This section will further expand on the specific ways through 
which the EU emphasised the importance of international law.  
The EU opposed the Turkish invasion in Cyprus as well as the unilateral declaration of 
independence by the Turkish-Cypriot community. In 1983, for example, the then ten 
members of the European Community, issued a declaration in which they opposed the 
secessionist claims of the Turkish-Cypriots and reiterated “their unconditional support for 
the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the RoC” (European 
Community 1983 cited in Hoffmeister 2006: 84).  
During the period under examination in this thesis, the EU placed much emphasis on 
international law principles that were seen as directly related to reconciliation. The 
European Parliament, for example, in a resolution adopted in October 1996, called on EU 
member states “to respond with continued firm pressure on Turkey with the aim of freeing 
the island of the presence of all Turkish troops, guaranteeing freedom of movement for 
all citizens and working for a just and peaceful solution to the current Cypriot problem, 
along the lines of relevant UN Security Council resolutions” and reiterated its “support 
for the Cypriot Government's proposal to demilitarise the island and calls on Turkey to 
withdraw the occupying forces and to comply with the UN resolutions on Cyprus” 
(European Parliament 1996).  
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After the RoC’s accession to the EU and the rejection of the Annan Plan by the majority 
of Greek-Cypriot voters in 2004, the EP continued to voice its concerns regarding the 
political situation in Cyprus and to condemn Turkey’s violations of international law. For 
example, in a resolution on Turkey’s progress towards accession to the EU adopted in 
2007, it called upon Turkey to withdraw its military forces from the island and stated that 
this “would facilitate the negotiation of a settlement” (European Parliament 2007a). 
Moreover, the EP issued many resolutions calling upon Turkey to open its seaports and 
airspace to Greek-Cypriot operators (see, for example, European Parliament 2006a). Most 
importantly, it re-confirmed its commitment to confidence-building measures and also 
asked Turkey to withdraw its military forces from Cyprus and to transfer the sealed-off 
area of Famagusta50 to the UN in accordance with UNSC resolution 550 (European 
Parliament 2010a).  
The European Commission (2008: 28, 2009a: 32) for its part, in its yearly reports on 
Turkey’s progress towards accession, asked Turkey to make progress on the Cyprus 
question by fully implementing the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Agreement which 
aimed at extending Turkey’s Association Agreement with the EU to the ten new members 
of the Union, including Cyprus. Although Turkey signed the Additional Protocol, it also 
issued a declaration stating “the signature, ratification and implementation of this 
Protocol, does not amount to any form of recognition of the RoC” (Republic of Turkey 
2005). Moreover, the European Commission repeatedly asked Turkey to lift its veto on 
Cyprus’ membership of international organisations and “remove all obstacles to the free 
movement of goods, including restrictions on direct transport links with Cyprus” 
(European Commission 2015c: 26, 2014: 19). Lastly, following the discovery of gas 
                                                             
50 During the 1974 war, Famagusta was captured by the Turkish military and was sealed-off by the 
Turkish authorities.  
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reserves in Cypriot waters, the Commission also asked Turkey to respect the sovereign 
rights of Cyprus including the right to exploit natural resources in its territorial sea 
(European Commission 2015c: 26). 
For EU officials, the condemnation of the violation of international law principles is a 
way of contributing to reconciliation between the two ethnic groups in Cyprus (Appendix 
B: 12, 13). As the EP stated, the implementation of the measures mentioned in this section 
would result in the creation of “a positive climate conducive to the successful resolution 
of the ongoing reunification negotiations” (European Parliament 2014a). The emphasis 
on international law principles, therefore, was seen by the EU as contributing to the 
transformation of the conflict. Notably, some of these measures like, for example, the 
withdrawal of Turkish military forces from the island would help build trust between the 
two communities (Appendix B: 13).  
Support for the UN’s framework for political resolution  
Apart from the discursive themes analysed in the previous sections, the EU has also 
repeatedly discussed its preferred type of political settlement. In this respect, it was often 
highlighted that the solution of the Cyprus conflict should be based on the values that 
have inspired the creation of the EU. The European Council, for example, repeatedly 
stated that “the EU is ready to accommodate a settlement in line with the principles upon 
which the EU is founded” (European Council, Presidency Conclusions 2002a, 2002b, 
2002c, 2003, 2003a, 2003c, 2004a).  
The EU, however, did not aim to create a peace process separate from the one initiated 
by the UN. Rather, it supported the UN efforts on the island as the only path towards a 
just and fair political solution. In its yearly reports on Cyprus’ progress towards accession 
to the EU, the Commission (1998a: 39, 1999:15, 2000: 96, 2001a: 23) made it clear that 
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its objective was for a political settlement to be reached in accordance with the UNSC 
resolutions. Moreover, in its reports on Turkey’s progress towards accession, the 
European Commission re-emphasised its support for the UNSG good-offices mission in 
Cyprus (1998b:21, 1999a:15). The European Parliament (1993, 2001a, 2014b), 
meanwhile, just like the European Commission and the European Council, repeatedly 
expressed its support for UN efforts towards a solution of the Cyprus conflict and its 
conviction that the status quo on the island was not acceptable.  
In line, therefore, with its support for the general UN framework, the EU also supported 
the creation of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation on the island which was the solution 
advocated by the UN. For example, in its 1993 Opinion on the RoC’s EU membership 
application, the Commission noted “the shape of a settlement, establishing a bicommunal 
and bizonal federation, is well established, and supported by the Union” (European 
Commision 1993). In 1997, the European Council (1997) declared: “The accession 
negotiations will contribute positively to the search for a political solution to the Cyprus 
problem through the talks under the aegis of the United Nations which must continue with 
a view to creating a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation”. Given the Union’s firm support 
of UN efforts and its preference for the accession of a unified Cyprus (European Council 
2002c), it is not surprising that the EU supported and promoted the UN Annan Plan, which 
was based on the principles of consociationalism and federal power sharing (Yakinthou 
2009: 25).  
The same trend of supporting the UN as the only path towards a political solution to the 
Cyprus conflict continued after 2004. For example, the Finnish EU Presidency in 2006 
stated: “The Presidency of the European Union after discussions in the Council expresses 
its full support for the ongoing efforts of the UNSG to resume the negotiations for a 
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem in line with relevant UN Security 
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Council resolutions and the principles on which the EU is founded” (EU Presidency 
2006).  
Similarly, following the joint declaration by Anastasiades and Eroğlu (see Chapter 
Three), the European Commission issued a statement noting: “As previously announced, 
the European Commission is keen to play its part in supporting the negotiations, 
conducted under UN auspices and to offer all the support the parties and the UN find most 
useful” (European Commission 2014). 
However, consociationalism and federalism have come to be very controversial topics. 
Consociational theory is based on a primordialist understanding of national identity51 and, 
hence, is an approach that favours the segregation of communities (Lijphart 1969: 216). 
More specifically, consociationalism aims to prevent further conflict between the parties 
involved by reducing contact between them (Horowitz 2000: 256, Wilford and Wilson 
2003: 11). Transformationalist approaches, in contrast, favour “a process of engaging 
with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very 
constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict” (Miall 2004: 70). 
With particular reference to the EU’s preferred and advocated institutional designs, most 
authors seem to agree that the EU usually favours consociational models. Wilkinson 
(2005: 240), for example, argued that many of the reforms encouraged by the EU in 
Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean “reflect the norms inherent in ‘consociational’ 
power sharing and emphasise ethnic proportionality, coalition governments, and cultural 
autonomy for minorities”. Tocci (2011: 3) also observed that the EU usually advocates 
federal and power-sharing solutions. However, as Lederach (1997: 26) argued, a solution 
                                                             
51 Primordialists conceive identities as something given and fixed and therefore, not amenable to change 
(Dawisha 2002, Jenkins 1996). “Primordialist approaches depict the nation as based upon a natural, 
organic community, which defines the identity of its members, who feel an innate and emotionally 
powerful attachment to it” (Brown 2000: 6).  
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cannot be "pursued by seeking innovative ways to disengage or minimise the conflicting 
groups' affiliations". According to him, "relationship is both the basis of the conflict and 
of its long term solution" (Lederach 1997: 26).  
With particular reference to the case of Cyprus, as Yakinthou (2009a: 25) noted in 
discussing the Annan Plan, consociationalism “emphasises conflict resolution by elite 
cooperation rather than societal cohesion”.  In other words, the Annan Plan, although it 
would have led to a degree of cooperation between the two ethnic groups at the elite level, 
it would also have given a certain degree of autonomy to ethnic groups, thus 
institutionalising the differences between them. However, as Manners (Appendix A: 36) 
explained to the author, “consociationalism could bring ‘stable peace’. This will not be 
accompanied by a broader sense of democracy and peace. It only works for the short term. 
However, consociationalism does not have to be the end solution. The EU aims to 
promote sustainable long-term solutions”. For Manners, therefore, achieving stable peace 
could be seen as a step towards achieving sustainable peace. Also, the type of solution 
advocated by the EU was based on the UN’s preferences and on agreements reached by 
the leaders of both communities (see Chapter Three). The EU was, in this way, 
conforming to principles advanced by the UN and to the preferences of local actors.  
Overall, in the case of Cyprus, the ‘sustainable peace’ norm was central in the EU’s 
official statements. The EU put much emphasis on reconciliation, stressed the importance 
of adhering to international law principles as a way towards the creation of a positive 
political climate on the island and supported the UN’s peace process. The Union’s 
promotion of consociationalism could be seen as its main weak spot. However, the 
establishment of consociationalism does not have to be the end point of the Union’s 
efforts at transforming the conflict. At the point of writing, however, since a 
consociational model has not been put into work in Cyprus, it is difficult to test whether 
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the EU would still be interested in promoting ‘sustainable peace’ after the successful 
promotion of ‘stable peace’.  
4.3.2 Normative EU interests in the Cyprus conflict? 
From a constructivist point of view, norms are vital in the formation of an actor’s identity 
and, hence, in the formation of an actor’s interests. As Risse and Sikkink (1999: 9) stated, 
“what I want depends to a large degree on who I am”.  Identities, therefore, determine 
what kind of interests are possible and appropriate for an actor. In this respect, if 
‘sustainable peace’ constitutes an inherent part of the EU’s identity, then the Union’s 
interests should be in line with the premises of the norm. In the opposite scenario, 
materialistic considerations will be ranked higher than the ‘sustainable peace’ norm. 
However, in-between these two extremes, lie possible combinations of normative and 
materialistic interests. This section argues that the case of Cyprus is particularly pertinent 
to promoting an understanding of the uneasy co-existence of norms and materialistic 
interests and of the ways the one can interact with the other.  
From 1990-2004, the first period of EU involvement in Cyprus, the EU emphasised the 
role the accession process could play in transforming the conflict. During this period, 
however, Member States had their own aims and preferences in relation to Cyprus. As 
one EU official stated (Appendix B: 13), the EU is not a unitary actor and its members 
have their own agendas.  For example, the Cyprus conflict did not have the same priority 
for each EU member state. To begin with, Greece has a special interest in Cyprus because 
of historical ties and because it is a guarantor power for the constitutional and territorial 
integrity of the island. In the 1990s, Greece played a decisive role in the EU’s decision to 
de-link the RoC’s accession from the political solution to the Cyprus conflict. More 
specifically, Greece agreed to lift its veto on the Turkey-EU Customs Union only if 
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Cyprus was included in the following accession negotiations round (Tocci 2004: 68-71). 
Greece, therefore, by using its veto power in the Council of Ministers, gradually managed 
to change the prerequisites for Cyprus’ accession. Towards the end of the decade, Greece 
achieved another diplomatic success by threatening to veto Turkey’s candidacy status in 
case the RoC was not granted membership (Tocci 2004: 68-71).  
Following Greece’s diplomatic successes, the EU’s main interest was for the conflict to 
be solved prior to the RoC’s accession because the EU did not want to import the conflict 
into its structures. For an EC official working in DG Enlargement, “in fact, a lot of our 
efforts were directed towards realising this goal of resolving the conflict before 2004” 
(Appendix B: 12). During this period, however, as will be discussed in the next chapter, 
the EU did not invest in bottom-up conflict transformation initiatives. Its role was limited 
to supporting the UN-initiated dialogue on a final settlement. It, therefore, did not invest 
in changing the relationship of the two communities for the better and in altering their 
identities. In this respect, the ‘sustainable peace’ norm, at least prior to RoC’s accession 
to the EU, was not prioritised. Rather, the EU’s interest of not importing a frozen conflict 
into the Union as well as some Member States’ preferences determined the EU’s approach 
towards Cyprus during this period. 
Moreover, another factor to be considered is the importance Turkey has for the EU and 
the related EU’s reluctance to compromise its relations with Turkey (Appendix A: 17, 
Appendix B: 2). This strategic importance was identified in the Commission reports on 
Turkey’s progress towards accession (notably European Commission 2014c: 1, 2013: 1, 
2012: 4-6). These reports highlighted the importance of Turkey’s economic contribution 
to the prosperity of the EU as well as the need for enhanced cooperation with Turkey on 
the issues of migration policy and energy security (European Commission 2014c, see also 
Verheugen 2013). In addition, the High Representative, in a report on the implementation 
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of the European Security Strategy, identified Turkey as a possible “transit route providing 
energy security to the Union” (European Council 2008c). In section C of the same report, 
Turkey was described as an “important player that will play an increasingly significant 
role in the region” (European Council 2008c). 
Moreover, for the Director of the Cyprus Centre of Studies (Appendix A: 4), an autono-
mous organisation that promotes multidisciplinary research, Turkey is a major force in 
the Middle East and a significant market for the EU which cannot afford to challenge 
Turkey for the sake of Cyprus. Similarly, Nugent (2000: 138) argued that the EU was 
anxious to improve its relations with Turkey for both economic and political reasons,  
The main economic reason is that Turkey is a very important EU trading partner 
– the sixth largest. The political reasons arise largely from a belief that Turkey is, 
and can continue to be, an important bridge between west and east – not least 
because it is an Islamic country with considerable influence in the Balkans, the 
Middle East, and several states of the former Soviet Union. 
What can be concluded is that Turkey is an essential partner for European security and 
economic prosperity. As a result, the need to ensure Turkey’s cooperation in several fields 
that are important to the EU has been a factor determining EU’s interest to solve the 
Cyprus conflict52 53.  
Lastly, the ramifications of the Cyprus conflict on EU-NATO relations could be 
considered as another reason54 why the EU has a major interest in finding a final 
settlement. In a resolution adopted on 19 February 2009, the EP characterised the Cyprus 
                                                             
52 As Ker-Lindsay (2014: 117) also argued, “Even if Turkey is denied membership of the European Union, 
there are still very good reasons why the European Union would want to maintain cordial and 
constructive ties with Ankara. Apart from important questions relating to European security, such as the 
flow of migrants through Turkey to the EU, Turkey’s developing international role means that it will be 
an important partner on a range of issues. Solving Cyprus would go a long way towards ensuring that 
the EU and Turkey can have a strong working relationship”.  
53 A similar argument has also been made by several interviewees (see, for example, Appendix A: 13, 
14). 
54 For some interviewees (Appendix A: 4, 17) this is the main reason why the EU is interested in solving 
the Cyprus problem. 
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problem as a major complication in EU-NATO relations, “deploring the fact that it 
continued to badly impair the development of EU-NATO co-operation” (European 
Parliament 2009). Greco-Turkish relations deteriorated following the accession of Cyprus 
to the EU. Turkey began to regularly bar Cypriot participation in formal EU-NATO 
meetings. The European Union, however, refused to take part in formal collaboration with 
NATO at ministerial level if all its members could not be present (Appendix A: 17). 
Cyprus, for its part, blocked administrative arrangements between the EDA (European 
Defence Agency), a CFSP body, and Turkey as well as a security agreement with Turkey. 
Several interviewees (Appendix A: 8, 12, 17) also stated that the EU’s involvement in 
Cyprus was guided by the desire to normalise relations with NATO and achieve a deeper 
and better cooperation between the EU and NATO. Therefore, the Cyprus conflict 
appeared to impose severe constraints on the normalisation of relations between the EU 
and NATO (see also Cebeci 2011: 99-100). 
Overall, in the case of Cyprus, the Union’s interests were not always aligned with the 
premises of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm. Rather, normative interests were closely 
intertwined with materialistic considerations and economic gains.  
4.3.3 Behaving according to norms 
Eriksen (2006: 252-253) argued that “it is only by subjecting its actions to a higher 
ranking law that an actor can assert its civilianness/normativity”. However, as will be 
discussed, the fluidity of international law principles made possible the development of 
well-grounded criticisms of the EU’s approach. Specifically, this section will argue that 
the complex nature of ethnic conflicts in view of international and fundamental rights law 
does not allow for the development of a clear-cut assessment of the EU’s self-binding 
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behaviour as the EU’s commitment to one principle could be criticised by reference to 
another.  
With particular reference to Cyprus, as has already been discussed in a previous section, 
the EU has always been supporting its territorial integrity as well as the legitimacy of the 
RoC government while rejecting the statehood of the Turkish-Cypriot administered area. 
The Accession Treaty of the RoC to the EU is evidence for this. In the course of 
negotiating the treaty, the RoC Government represented the entire island (although it was 
de facto controlling only part of it) (see European Union 2003). In addition, Protocol 10 
of the Accession Treaty provided for the suspension of the acquis “in those areas of the 
RoC in which the Government of the RoC does not exercise effective control” (European 
Union 2003). As explained to the author by a RoC official, “Protocol 10 is extremely 
significant because it mainly states that the whole soil of the island belongs to the RoC. 
Otherwise, there would be no reason to discuss about the suspension. The EU is, in this 
way, safeguarding the territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus” (Appendix B: 3).  
However, the development of closer relations between the EU and Turkish-Cypriots after 
2004 was criticised on the grounds that it implied an indirect recognition of the “TRNC”. 
For example, the European Commission, based on its Common Commercial Policy with 
non EU-members, proposed the Direct Trade Regulation (DTR) which, if successfully 
implemented, would have permitted “the duty-free import of EU goods and the duty-free 
export of goods wholly obtained or substantially produced in the North of the island” 
(Tocci et al. 2008: 62). However, for Greek-Cypriots, this regulation would amount to 
the recognition of the legitimacy of the government of a non-recognised state (Appendix 
A: 4, 8, 9, 14, Appendix B: 3). Similarly, for a former high-ranked RoC official, “the EU 
asserts that it only recognises the government of the RoC as the only legitimate 
government. However, they have an office in Northern Cyprus, they hold meetings with 
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the ministers there, they make deals. Implicitly, they do recognise them” (Appendix A: 
9). For Greek-Cypriots, therefore, the EU shows disrespect to a fundamental principle of 
international law. 
In addition, some Greek-Cypriot elites have also criticised the EU for accepting the 
Annan Plan that was seen as incompatible with EU principles and fundamental rights law. 
An analysis of the Annan Plan in light of the provisions of Community law falls beyond 
the scope of this research. It should be mentioned, however, that the Annan Plan contained 
a “request for substantial derogations from the acquis relating, inter alia, to property and 
residency rights” (quoted in Shaelou 2010: 246. For a more detailed discussion on the 
incompatibility of the Annan Plan with EU law and principles, see Tocci 2006: 337 and 
Papadopoulos 2004)55. The EU’s support for the Annan Plan, therefore, was conceived 
as a move away from the principles upon which the EU is founded. For some 
interviewees, the Act of Adaptation was an attempt to present the EU’s realpolitik as 
legitimate (Appendix A: 8, 9, 14). In addition, as a Brussels-based European Commission 
official explained, “in certain circumstances, special arrangements need to be made. The 
EU law does not contain values that are systematic and consistent everywhere and at 
every time. The uniform application of EU law and EU principles is not the case on the 
ground. Special arrangements are in place on many instances on the ground” (Appendix 
B: 12).  
Turning to the Turkish-Cypriots, one criticism of the EU’s approach related to its decision 
to accept the RoC’s membership application. For example, in 1997, Denktaş, in a joint 
statement with Süleyman Demirel, then President of Turkey, referred to the 1960 London-
                                                             
55 As Skoutaris (2011: 183) also noted, “the Draft Act of Adaptation that was included in the Annan Plan 
provides for a good example of the potential incompatibilities of a solution, based on the 
aforementioned principles, with the acquis”. 
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Zurich Agreements which explicitly provided that Cyprus cannot join any international 
organisation unless both Turkey and Greece are members (see Chapter Three). The joint 
statement went on to argue that “according to the dictates of international law and regional 
peace and stability, Cyprus can only become a full member of the EU after a settlement 
which will comprise these principles and once Turkey has become a member as well” 
(“TRNC” and Turkey 1997).  
After the RoC’s accession and the rejection of the Annan Plan by Greek-Cypriots, 
Turkish-Cypriot arguments against the EU focused on the Union’s non-adherence to basic 
human rights. For Turkish-Cypriots, there should be a differentiation between collective 
and individual rights. For them, even if the legitimacy of their state is not recognised by 
the EU, they should still be able to enjoy the fundamental, basic rights that all EU citizens 
enjoy. This is reflected in a statement by Akinci (2015), as leader of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community, who noted that “the Turkish Cypriots remained outside the international law 
for many years. We want our community to be a part and a partner of the EU. We want 
to be a part of the international law and order”.  For example, Turkish-Cypriots could not 
directly engage in trade activities because of the non-implementation of the DTR 
mentioned above. However, as a senior official of the Turkish-Cypriot MFA noted 
(Appendix A: 3), free trade and free business conduct for sustainable development are 
principles that the EU is supporting. Secondly, another set of arguments is related to the 
right to education. For example, Turkish-Cypriot students cannot participate in the EU’s 
Erasmus and Socrates exchange programmes because their universities are not 
recognised56. In the words of Çerkez, the President of the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of 
Commerce (KTTO), “as Turkish-Cypriot citizens of the EU, we cannot even benefit from 
the basic rights of Union citizenship. Our business people cannot trade freely with other 
                                                             
56 As a substitute, the European Commission has launched a Turkish-Cypriot scholarship programme.  
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European markets. Our university students cannot participate in the Erasmus project. 
What does it mean to be an EU citizen without rights?” (Çerkez quoted in KTTO 2013).  
Overall, the EU’s self-binding behaviour has been subject to criticism on numerous 
normative grounds. The complex nature of international and fundamental human rights 
law has made possible a series of well-developed arguments on the part of Cypriots to 
counter the EU’s approach. 
4.4 THE CASE OF KOSOVO: NORMATIVE EU GOALS? 
This section will discuss the EU’s approach towards Kosovo. More specifically, it will 
address the question of whether the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm by 
local Kosovan actors was among the main EU aims.  
4.4.1 Centrality of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm?  
A thorough examination of EU documents and speeches of EU officials revealed that the 
EU’s communications on Kosovo focused on four main themes. Firstly, during the 1990s, 
the EU’s official statements concentrated on the extensive use of violence and on human 
rights violations in Kosovo. After the 1998-99 war and the EU’s involvement in the 
UNMIK mission, the Union highlighted the importance of addressing the roots of the 
conflict through the creation of a multi-ethnic society and the establishment of democratic 
institutions. The term ‘multi-ethnic society’ here refers to the eradication of divisions 
between ethnic groups as opposed to the acceptance and institutionalisation of those 
divisions (Hughes 2009: 300). Thirdly, following the opening of the accession prospect 
for Kosovo, the EU has also been referring to the European destiny of Kosovans. 
Fourthly, the EU has been discussing decentralisation as the preferred type of political 
solution to the conflict.  
Concerns on the extensive use of violence in Kosovo 
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During the 1990s, violence and human rights violations in Kosovo were not ignored by 
the EU. On 11 October 1990, the European Parliament adopted its first resolution on 
Kosovo expressing its concerns “over the situation of human rights in Kosovo” (quoted 
in Wolff 2003: 77). Since then, Kosovo was regularly on the EP’s agenda. The European 
Council, for its part, adopted a similar approach focusing on violations of human rights. 
The 1992 Lisbon European Council, for example, declared that “with regards to Kosovo, 
the European Council expects the Serbian leadership to refrain from further repression 
and to engage in serious dialogue with representatives of this territory” (European 
Council 1992a).  
Given the increase of violence in 1996, the EP called on the Council “to bring immediate, 
strong pressure on the Serbian authorities to make the opening of a previously proposed 
EU information office in Kosovo possible”. It also reiterated that “the EU should involve 
itself at the organizational and financial levels in cultural events, which can break down 
walls and barriers in hearts and heads […]. If that were to happen, civil society would be 
able to make a great stride towards regional coexistence” (European Parliament 1997).  
The General Affairs Council (GAC 1999), for its part, expressed “its strong and 
continuing support for maximum pressure from the international community on President 
Milošević and his regime to stop their brutal campaign of forced deportation, torture and 
murder in Kosovo”. In addition, the 1998 Cardiff European Council “reiterated its deep 
concern at the continuing deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, and called on all parties 
concerned to exercise restraint and refrain from all acts of violence to achieve political 
goals or to suppress the legitimate democratic expression of views” (European Council 
1998). It called on the authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovar 
community to urgently begin a full and constructive dialogue. Moreover, in its 27 October 
1998 declaration on a comprehensive approach to Kosovo, the European Council 
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confirmed that “the EU will consider ways in which it can contribute, under the right 
conditions, to implementing confidence-building measures among the various 
communities in Kosovo and to further civil society building” (European Council 1998 
cited in Hill and Smith 2000: 391). This idea of building confidence, which was also 
emphasised in the case of Cyprus, points towards intentions to transform the conflict 
through the creation of trusting relations between the two communities.  
Due to the further increase of violence, NATO commenced its aerial bombing campaign 
on the FRY (see Chapter Three). Although the EU itself did not get involved in NATO’s 
operation, several member states participated in the campaign. France and Britain, as 
members of the Contact Group and of NATO, played a crucial role in the negotiations 
that preceded NATO’s aerial bombing. Italy was more constrained due to domestic 
opposition, while Germany encountered a heated internal debate about its first 
participation in such a coercive military mission since 1945. Despite such worries, the 
governments of Germany, Italy, France and Britain approved the intervention (see Meyer 
2006: 91).  
The 1999 Berlin European Council took the view that  
On the threshold of the 21st century, Europe cannot tolerate a humanitarian 
catastrophe in its midst. It cannot be permitted that, in the middle of Europe, the 
predominant population of Kosovo is collectively deprived of its rights and 
subjected to grave human rights abuses. We, the countries of the European Union, 
are under a moral obligation to ensure that indiscriminate behaviour and violence, 
which became tangible in the massacre at Racak in January 1999, are not repeated. 
We have a duty to ensure the return to their homes of the hundreds of thousands 
of refugees and displaced persons. Aggression must not be rewarded. An 
aggressor must know that he will have to pay a high price. That is the lesson to be 
learnt from the 20th century (European Council 1999).   
The involvement of some EU member states in NATO’s operation, therefore, was 
justified by the Council on moral and ethical grounds. The military action was described 
as necessary in order to guarantee fundamental European values.  
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The end of the 1999 NATO campaign can be seen as a turning point regarding the EU’s 
role in Kosovo. As discussed in Chapter Three, the EU became responsible for the 
reconstruction and economic development of Kosovo. A more detailed discussion on the 
EU’s role after the war will follow in the subsequent sub-sections.  
Promoting the creation of a democratic, multi-ethnic society 
Another theme that emerged from the examination of EU documents and speeches of EU 
officials was the EU’s concern over the status of Kosovo and a preference for a multi-
ethnic society. As early as 1992, with war having already broken out over much of the 
wider Yugoslavia, the European Council dealt with Kosovo’s status and reminded the 
Kosovars “that their legitimate quest for autonomy should be dealt with in the framework 
of the Conference on Yugoslavia” (European Council 1992a). The December 1992 
European Council more explicitly requested that “[t]he autonomy of Kosovo within 
Serbia must be restored” (European Council 1992b). In addition, shortly before the post-
Dayton weakening of inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo57, the Council called “with regard 
to the FRY [for] the granting of a large degree of autonomy within it to Kosovo” 
(European Council 1996). The need to settle “the status of Kosovo within the borders of 
the FRY” was also highlighted by the GAC (1997). In addition, during the early 1990s, 
senior EU officials had already expressed their preference for the establishment of a 
multi-ethnic society in Kosovo. Jacques Delors, for example, then President of the 
European Commission, stated that peace must be restored in former Yugoslavia while 
also praising the idea of multi-ethnicity (European Commission 1992).  
                                                             
57 The exclusion of Kosovo from the Dayton peace talks in 1995 (Philips 1996: 824-25) led to the 
widespread belief among Kosovars that, as long as there was peace on the ground, the international 
community would not proceed to any substantive changes. As a result, the use of violence seemed to be 
the most effective option in order for Kosovars to gain the attention of the West (see Chapter Three). 
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After the 1998-99 war, the EU became more involved in Kosovo. As noted on the website 
of the European Union Office in Kosovo, “the European Union has been an integral part 
of the international effort to build a new future for Kosovo since 1999” (European Union 
Office in Kosovo). More specifically, the EU took the responsibility of leading Pillar IV 
of UNMIK which was concerned with Reconstruction and Economic Development (see 
Chapter Three). The EU saw its involvement in UNMIK as a way to promote 
reconciliation through democratisation. In May 2001, for example, a declaration of the 
Swedish EU presidency stated that the Union was willing “to assist in the effort to build 
a democratic and prosperous society where violence is shunned and genuine 
reconciliation can be achieved” (European Union Presidency 2001).  
Gradually, the EU’s involvement in Kosovo deepened, especially after its involvement in 
the Vienna negotiations over the final status of a multi-ethnic Kosovo that resulted in the 
‘Ahtisaari Plan’. Article 1.1 of the Plan, for example, noted that “Kosovo shall be a multi-
ethnic society, which shall govern itself democratically, and with full respect for the rule 
of law” (UNSC 2007). The EP, in a resolution adopted on 19 March 2007, expressed its 
support for “the efforts to establish a viable framework that guarantees stability and 
protection for all the communities in Kosovo and long-term, self-sustaining economic 
and social development” (European Parliament 2007). The resolution further stated that 
the European Parliament “endorses Mr Ahtisaari's Comprehensive Proposal for a Kosovo 
Status Settlement and takes the view that sovereignty supervised by the international 
community is the best option for securing those objectives” (European Parliament 2007). 
The European Council also approved the Ahtisaari Plan (European Council 2007). The 
EU Presidency statement of 26 March 2007 stated that Ahtisaari’s proposal  
is designed to foster the building of a multi-ethnic, democratic society in Kosovo 
based on the rule of law. It contains wide-ranging provisions intended to secure 
the future of all communities in Kosovo, including notably the Kosovo-Serbs. It 
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lays the foundation for sustainable economic and political development in Kosovo 
and will enhance stability throughout the region (European Union Presidency 
2007).  
However, the Kosovar leadership was not ready to accept the Plan. Moreover, regardless 
of the initial EU statements against a unilateral declaration of independence, US and EU 
officials started expressing their willingness to recognise Kosovo as an independent state 
(Bilefsky and Wood 2007). Hence, Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 
2008 was not a surprise. However, the General Affairs and External Relations Council 
was not able to agree a common approach to this issue. EU Foreign Ministers, therefore, 
concluded that “Member States will decide, in accordance with national practice and 
international law, on their relations with Kosovo” (GAERC 2008). The EP, however, took 
a different position and firmly expressed its support for Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence. Subsequently, the EP issued numerous resolutions asking EU member 
states to recognise Kosovo (see, notably, European Parliament 2009a, 2010, 2012, 2013).  
After the unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence, EULEX was established. The 
EU objective of transforming the conflict through the creation of a multi-ethnic 
democratic Kosovo became more obvious as EULEX had as one of its main aims “to 
improve and strengthen Kosovo’s judiciary to make it fully multi-ethnic” (EULEX 
Kosovo). This is also evident in European Council documents. One example is the 
following: “In Kosovo the best way to move towards European integration is by creating 
a democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo with full respect for the rule of law, cooperating 
peacefully with its neighbours and contributing to regional and European stability” 
(European Council 2008a: 1). Similarly, a key priority of the European Partnership58 was 
to promote reconciliation and to create a multi-ethnic society (European Council 2008b). 
                                                             
58 The European Partnership is an instrument of the Stabilisation and Association Process. It aims to 
provide help and support to local authorities to realise their country’s European aspirations.  
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In addition, the European Commission, through the Instrument for Pre-Accession 
Assistance (IPA), prioritised the advancement of inter-ethnic tolerance (European 
Commission 2007a: 14). Moreover, with regards to the FICHE Programme, one of the 
IPA centralised programmes, the European Commission stated that one of its objectives 
was “to strengthen inter-ethnic confidence” and “to promote interethnic reconciliation” 
(ECLO 2009).  
Moreover, just like with Cyprus, the importance of civil society actors in the promotion 
of reconciliation between ethnic communities in Kosovo was recognised by the Union 
(see ECLO 2010). As a result, part of the EU funding in Kosovo was directed towards 
supporting CSOs. This was achieved through the IPA, the European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and through the European Commission Liaison 
Office (ECLO).  
Peter Feith, former European Union Special Representative and International Civilian 
Representative in Kosovo (for a discussion on the functions of both posts, see pp. 184-
186), also acknowledged civil society as a “significant partner in the promotion of peace 
and reconciliation” (Appendix A: 34). Such statements indicate that the EU 
acknowledged the significance of civil society actors as a very important element for 
conflict transformation. However, interviews for this thesis identified a certain degree of 
pessimism on the part of EU officials as to the role that civil society actors can actually 
play. An EULEX official, for example, stated that “civil society in Kosovo goes along 
the ethnic lines. You don’t have any mixed NGOs” (Appendix B: 8). The same problem 
of the “lack of inter-group civil society actors” (Appendix B: 7) was also identified by an 
EU official working in the European Commission office in Pristina. Both were sceptical 
regarding the role civil society can actually play in transforming the conflict.  
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From 2011, the EU engaged in renewed efforts to facilitate a dialogue between Belgrade 
and Pristina (International Crisis Group 2013: 12). The EU’s intention to transform the 
Kosovo conflict through the dialogue is evident in statements of important EU officials. 
Samuel Žbogar, the EU’s Special Representative in Kosovo, noted  
Dialogue was and is about relations normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia. It 
is about relations normalisation between Albanians and Serbs, to set the ground 
for reconciliation, but it is also about normalization of Kosovo and Serbia itself, 
to bring normality, which is the way to remove the stumbling blocks and 
normalize their roads to the EU (EU Office in Kosovo/EUSR in Kosovo 2013). 
Overall, therefore, after 1999, the EU emphasised the importance of addressing the roots 
of the conflict. To this end, the EU’s official communications focused on democratisation 
and the establishment of multi-ethnicity in Kosovo. Progressively, the Union’s 
involvement in Kosovo grew deeper. In this respect, the EU was involved in the Vienna 
negotiations that resulted in the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’. In addition, from 2011, the EU assumed 
the responsibility of facilitating a dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. Lastly, just 
like in the case of Cyprus, the EU recognised the importance of involving local NGOs in 
reconciliation processes.   
Kosovo’s European Future 
The third discursive trend that can be detected in the Union’s official statements is the 
tendency to portray Kosovo as a part of Europe. The EU is presented as an area of peace 
and reconciliation. Hence, since Kosovo is seen as belonging to Europe, the same 
principles must be extended there as well.  
The European perspective for Kosovo became a possibility since the launch of the 
Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe in 1999. Although the Stability Pact was not an 
EU instrument, the EU played a leading role (Hill and Smith 2002: 397). More than forty 
countries and organisations decided to adopt a “comprehensive and coherent approach” 
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to strengthen the countries of South Eastern Europe “in their efforts to foster peace, 
democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity in order to achieve stability 
in the whole region” (Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe 1999). This pact constituted 
an important shift in EU thinking about the region because it converted the Western 
Balkans from a proximate region into a constitutive part of Europe. This shift was evident 
in the European Council’s statement: “The European Union will draw the region closer 
to the perspective of full integration of these countries into its structures through a new 
kind of contractual relationship, taking into account the individual situation of each 
country, with a perspective of European Union membership” (European Council 1999a). 
As a Pristina-based European Commission official explained, the prospect of EU 
accession is “the best recipe for removing the causes of conflicts” (Appendix B: 7). The 
opening of an accession perspective for the Western Balkans, therefore, can be seen as 
pointing towards intentions to transform conflicts in that region by addressing their root 
causes.  
The catalytic role the EU could play in promoting peace and reconciliation was reiterated 
in the 2003 Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans where it was noted that 
“fragmentation and divisions along ethnic lines are incompatible with the European 
perspective, which should act as a catalyst for addressing problems in the region” 
(European Council 2003a). In the same vein, the Commission, in April 2005, stated “the 
creation of a stable, secure and multi-ethnic society in Kosovo is at the heart of the EU’s 
political conditionality” (European Commission 2005b). In its 2007 Communication to 
the Parliament and the Council regarding the enlargement strategy, the European 
Commission highlighted the need for “more dialogue and a greater spirit of tolerance […] 
throughout the Western Balkans not least on ethnic-related issues” while, with regards to 
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Kosovo, it stated that “relations between Albanians and Serbs remain strained” (European 
Commission 2007).   
The same trend of presenting European integration as a catalyst towards the establishment 
of peace was also evident in speeches of EU officials. Füle, for example, stated: “You 
have set Kosovo's course to join the European Union. It is this framework, a framework 
of European integration, which allows you to address your disagreements in a 
constructive, and indeed forward-looking manner. To achieve success, it is key that the 
leaders of all Kosovo's communities work together to build a shared vision and a common 
future” (Füle 2012). 
It, therefore, seems that the Union described Kosovo as a state that belongs to the EU. As 
a result, European principles and values must be extended there as well. Just like with 
Cyprus, the EU hoped that, in the case of Kosovo, the prospect of accession would help 
eliminate the conflict and foster peace.  
Decentralisation and Conflict Transformation 
As has become evident, the EU’s discourse is indicative of conflict transformation 
intentions. As the three previous sections discussed, the EU has been emphasising its 
concerns over human and minority rights in Kosovo, expressing its commitment to a 
multi-ethnic society in Kosovo through reconciliation and to the promotion of peace 
through the process of European integration.  
In addition to the aforementioned themes, the EU has also been discussing its preference 
with regards to the political solution of the conflict. More specifically, the EU favoured 
ethnic decentralisation in Kosovo which has, in fact, become “the principal strategy of 
the Kosovo government and the international community for promoting Serb integration” 
(International Crisis Group 2009: 1). Ethnic decentralisation refers to offering autonomy 
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to geographically concentrated minorities while maintaining the territorial integrity of the 
state. In other words, each ethnic community runs its own affairs while accepting the 
authority of the central state. In Kosovo, decentralisation was promoted as a way to halt 
the Serb minority’s dependence on the ‘parallel structures’ supported by Serbia 
(International Crisis Group 2009:10).  
Unsurprisingly, academic criticism on decentralisation focused on the fact that it reifies 
ethnic divisions by strengthening ethnic identities (Kymlicka 2008, Simonsen 2005). Just 
like the promotion of consociationalism in the case of Cyprus, decentralisation in Kosovo 
is based on a certain degree of communal separation. This was also acknowledged in 
several interviews. EU officials interviewed by the author seemed to be pessimistic as to 
the extent to which the conflict can be transformed through decentralisation. For example, 
a Commission official working in DG Enlargement stated that “although Serbs in the 
south are quite willing to cooperate with Albanians, Serbs in the north do not show similar 
intentions” (Appendix B: 11). The same official went on to refer to European Commission 
reports that had reached similar conclusions (see European Commission 2011: 4).  
Overall, therefore, as EU officials also acknowledged, decentralisation is not the perfect 
solution59. However, as Manners (Appendix A: 36) suggested, this should not be seen as 
the end solution but, rather, as a step towards more long-term and sustainable solutions. 
In private, though, EU officials expressed doubts as to the extent to which decentralisation 
can help transform the conflict. The case of Kosovo, just like the case of Cyprus, 
therefore, suggests that, although the ‘sustainable peace’ norm has been central in the 
EU’s statements and engagement, the concurrent promotion of decentralisation weakens 
the argument that the EU’s main aim was to promote ‘sustainable peace’.  
                                                             
59 Feith (Appendix A: 34), for example, stated that “although decentralisation is not perfect, it is the 
solution that is more possible to happen”.   
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4.4.2 Normative EU Interests in the Kosovo conflict? 
As discussed in Chapter Two, if sustainable peace is indeed a part of the Union’s identity, 
then the EU’s interests should be closely linked to the norm. In the opposite scenario, 
materialistic interests will be prioritised. However, as discussed earlier in this chapter, 
apart from these two extreme scenarios, potential combinations of normative and 
materialistic interests also exist.  
According to an EU official working in Pristina “removing the causes of the conflict is 
the main EU aim” (Appendix B: 7). However, the same EU official and other interviewees 
identified a number of attached strings and sub-aims of the EU’s policies in Kosovo.  
To begin with, conflicts in the Western Balkans, including Kosovo, cannot be treated in 
isolation because they are a source of problems for EU member states including 
instability, immigration and organised crime (Appendix B: 7, 14, 15). “There is an 
interdependence between dynamics in the Balkans and dynamics in core Europe. The EU, 
therefore, needs to solve those problems there if it does not want them to knock at its 
door” (Appendix B: 7).  
Secondly, the Kosovo conflict was seen as having the potential to spill over into Albania 
or Serbia and thereby endangering the stability of the region. As James Ker-Lindsay 
(Appendix A: 35), a senior researcher at the LSE European Institute specialising on the 
politics and international relations of South-East Europe, interviewed by the author, stated 
“the key EU objective in the case of Kosovo was, and continues to be, stability at all 
costs”. As Javier Solana (2001), when EU High Representative for the CFSP, stated “I 
make no apology for concentrating on the Balkans. They are on our doorstep. The security 
of Europe depends on stability in the Balkans”. Catherine Ashton, his successor, made a 
similar point when stating “we should step up our engagement in our neighbourhood to 
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ensure that security and prosperity for our neighbours would also benefit our own citizens 
by giving them greater security and prosperity” (Ashton 2013)60.  
Thirdly, the Western Balkans were seen as “a test-case for Europe's enhanced Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. Nowhere more than in the Balkans is the EU expected to 
deliver” (Solana 2001). In the words of the then High Representative, “the experience of 
the Balkans has been a sobering one for the European Union. But it has I believe also 
provided us with an opportunity. It is a test of our commitment to the region, to a wider 
Europe, and to a mature common foreign and security policy” (Solana 2000). Kosovo, 
therefore, was an opportunity for the EU to test the potentials of its CFSP. Kosovo was a 
challenge for the EU to demonstrate its ability to get involved in such situations. “The 
handling of our periphery is essential for our credibility in international politics. The key 
question is: can we stabilise our own neighbourhood? My answer is: we cannot afford not 
to. It is where EU foreign policy was born. And while we have been drawn into other 
regions and issues, our job in the Balkans is not yet over” (Solana 2009).  
Lastly, according to a Pristina-based Commission official, “the Dialogue in Kosovo 
represents the so-called low hanging fruits” (Appendix B: 7). For another Commission 
official working in DG Enlargement, “it is much easier for the EU to do something 
positive in Kosovo and improve the image and the standing of the High Representative 
than for example, Syria” (Appendix B: 14). Creating a positive image of the EU in general 
and of the High Representative in particular, therefore, was part of the story. The EU used 
the opportunity to show that it can be an international actor and to build its reputation.  
                                                             
60 As Bojicic-Dzelilovic et al. (2016: 4) stated, “while the EU’s approach to the Western Balkans has 
evolved over the years, its primary focus has been to maintain security and prevent reactivation of 
armed violence both within and between states”. 
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Overall, therefore, apart from addressing the underlying causes of the conflict, the EU 
also had some instrumental interests to serve in Kosovo. The promotion of these interests, 
however, does not necessarily compromise the promotion of the ‘sustainable peace’ 
norm. Unlike the case of Cyprus, where instrumental interests and Member States’ 
preferences were prioritised and compromised adherence to sustainable peace, in the case 
of Kosovo, the promotion of the norm went hand in hand with the promotion of the 
Union’s instrumental interests. In the case of Kosovo, the EU’s support for multi-ethnicity 
and for the betterment of inter-ethnic relations was in line with the premises of the 
‘sustainable peace’ norm and, at the same time, fell within the Union’s strategic interests 
which include, inter alia, stability and security in the region.  
4.4.3 Behaving according to norms 
As discussed in Chapter Two, an EU foreign policy which is systematically based on 
respect for international and fundamental rights law would indicate a sincere normative 
commitment. The discussion on Cyprus earlier in this chapter revealed that the 
complicated nature of international law enables the formulation of counter-arguments to 
the EU’s approach. This section will argue that several criticisms can also be put forward 
with regards to the EU’s approach in Kosovo. 
One of the main international law norms that the Kosovo case put into question is the 
principle of non-intervention. Strictly speaking, the 1999 NATO aerial bombing over 
Kosovo and Serbia was incompatible with international law since it was unauthorised by 
the UNSC. Several EU member states, however, took part in this war, sometimes in the 
face of very strong domestic opposition.  
In the aftermath of the war, the R2P (Responsibility to Protect) doctrine gained ground, 
challenging previous understandings of humanitarian intervention by transferring the 
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focus from the intervener to the subjects of the intervention. According to the R2P 
doctrine, when a government proves unable or unwilling to protect its own people, then 
this responsibility goes to the international community. The EU espoused the R2P 
doctrine and the ethical and moral reasoning behind it: 
The EU also strongly supports the responsibility to protect. We cannot stand by, 
as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or other gross violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights are committed. The EU will support a 
strengthened role for the regional and sub-regional organizations in the process of 
enhancing international peace and security, including their capacity to coordinate 
donor support in the area of conflict prevention (European Parliament, 
Commission and Council 2006). 
It therefore seems that, although the NATO operation was illegal since it was 
unauthorised by the UNSC, it was nonetheless conceived as legitimate because of ethical 
and moral considerations. The EU legitimised the stances of some of its member states 
by referring to moral and humanitarian considerations and to the need to stop the 
repression of the Kosovar population by the Milošević regime. However, after the end of 
NATO’s campaign, there was a series of revenge attacks against Kosovo-Serbs in Kosovo 
(see International Crisis Group 1999: 3-5, Nikolic 2003: 66). As the International Crisis 
Group (1999: 3) noted  
while it is impossible to be certain that the prime motive for attacks by ethnic 
Albanians upon non-Albanian targets is one of revenge, the level of anger and 
hatred amongst ethnic Albanians towards the Kosovo Serbs and other minority 
groups, who allegedly assisted the Yugoslav military and security forces in the 
recent conflict, cannot be overestimated.  
For Kosovo-Serbs, therefore, the international community, although it expressed its 
support for R2P, failed to protect them from revenge attacks. For them, therefore, the 
international community was on the side of the Kosovars and ignored their own legitimate 
concern (Appendix A: 21, 27).  
Moreover, as has already been discussed, another issue that sparked big debate was the 
unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. Up until the declaration, Kosovo had 
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the status of a province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its succeeding states. 
Therefore, its independence constituted a breach of the territorial integrity of Serbia. 
However, the norm of territorial integrity comes into conflict with another norm of 
international politics, namely the principle of self-determination of peoples (see Ker-
Lindsay 2011: 176-179). This principle is also included in many key documents like the 
UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act.  
The EU’s official position was expressed in the quite vague statement that “member states 
will decide, in accordance with national practice and international law on their relations 
with Kosovo” (Council of the EU 2008). The majority of member states favoured 
Kosovo’s independence over prolonged conflict and over a solution that gave Kosovo the 
highest possible degree of autonomy while remaining an integral part of Serbia. Only five 
member states disagreed (see Chapter Three).  
However, although for Kosovars independence marked the fulfilment of a national goal 
(Appendix A: 19, 22. Appendix B: 6), for Kosovo-Serbs, Kosovo is part of Serbia. For 
them, the declaration of Kosovo’s independence violated Serbia’s territorial integrity. 
Several prominent Kosovo-Serb figures were reported in local newspapers expressing 
these ideas. Miodrag Radivojevic, a professor from Zvecan, stated: “they can’t force us 
to give up Serbia – they can’t” (UNMIK Media Monitoring Unit 2012). Similarly, 
Krstimir Pantić, the Kosovo-Serb mayor of northern Mitrovica, referring to the Integrated 
Border Management deal61, stated that the deal is unacceptable because it amounts to 
official recognition of Kosovo’s statehood (see Balkan Insight 2012).  In addition, during 
the negotiations on the Brussels Agreement, protests were organised in Mitrovica under 
the slogan ‘North of Kosovo and Metohija Remains Part of Serbia’ (B92 2013).  
                                                             
61 The agreement was reached in the framework of the EU-facilitated talks and provides for Kosovo and 
Serbia to cooperate in the management of their border crossings.  
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Lastly, specific EU policies were seen by Kosovars as moves against Kosovo’s 
sovereignty. One example was the revision of the legal basis of EULEX in June 2008. 
The new EULEX mandate was substantially different from the one proposed by the 
Ahtisaari Plan. The EU, the UN and Serbia agreed that EULEX would now “perform an 
enhanced operational role in the area of rule of law under the framework of resolution 
1244 (1999) and the overall authority of the United Nations” (UNSG 2008). This meant 
that EULEX was now mandated by UNSC Resolution 1244 which supported the 
territorial integrity of Serbia. In addition, this new deal62 gave wide-ranging rights to 
Serbia to control customs, justice, border and transport in Nothern Kosovo. Kosovars, 
however, up until that point, had conceived EULEX authority as deriving from the terms 
of the Ahtisaari Plan that provided for the independence of Kosovo and for the 
termination of international administration. The new EULEX mandate, therefore, was 
interpreted as disrespecting the sovereignty and statehood of Kosovo. In the words of 
Thaçi, then Kosovo’s Prime Minister,  
EULEX will be established in Kosovo as was anticipated in the Kosovar 
Constitution and in the Ahtisaari Plan. UNMIK will have no executive role, but 
simply a facilitating role for the establishment of EULEX. Any other suggestion 
is considered to be a breach of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo and a 
violation of our national sovereignty. United Nations resolution 1244 is entirely 
irrelevant and meaningless in our sovereign state. As such, Kosovo's institutions 
have no legal obligation to give consideration to it (Thaçi 2008). 
Overall, therefore, a series of well-grounded arguments were developed against the EU’s 
approach towards Kosovo. Kosovo-Serb criticisms focused on the selective application 
of the R2P principle and respect for the principle of the territorial integrity of states. 
Kosovar criticisms focused on EU policies that were interpreted as attempts to 
compromise Kosovo’s sovereignty.  
                                                             
62 This new deal, entitled ‘Six-Point Plan’, was proposed by UNSG Ban Ki Moon and provided for 
UNMIK’s reconfiguration (Stefanova 2011: 155).  
130 
 
4.5 COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT   
This chapter was concerned with the first dimension of the NPE framework, namely the 
normativity of EU objectives. It aimed to address the questions of whether the 
‘sustainable peace’ norm was at the heart of the EU’s official communications and 
engagement in Cyprus and Kosovo and whether the norm was promoted as a principle to 
which the EU ascribed special significance. In addition, this chapter addressed the 
question of whether the EU engaged in self-binding practice, an important indicator of 
normativity (Sjursen 2006: 245).  
To begin with, in both cases, the EU put ‘sustainable peace’ at the centre of its official 
statements. In the case of Cyprus, the EU emphasised the importance of reconciliation 
and of building trust and confidence between the conflict parties and highlighted the role 
civil society can play in any endeavours to bring the communities closer together. In 
addition, the EU condemned international law violations and repeatedly asked the 
relevant actors to show commitment to international law principles as a way to create a 
climate conducive to reconciliation. In addition, as concerns Kosovo, the Union initially 
focused on human rights and condemned the use of excessive violence. After the 1999 
NATO campaign, the EU assumed the responsibility of Pillar IV of UNMIK concerned 
with economic development and reconstruction. During this period, the EU expressed its 
support for reconciliation through the establishment of a democratic, multi-ethnic society. 
Gradually, its involvement grew deeper when the EU got involved in the negotiations 
over Kosovo’s status. In addition, the EU referred to Kosovo as a country that belongs to 
Europe and that should, therefore, endorse EU principles. 
In addition, with regards to the political solution of the two conflicts, the EU favoured 
consociationalism in Cyprus and decentralisation in Kosovo. Although both these 
131 
 
approaches have been criticised in the literature because they reify ethnic divisions (see 
Cooley 2013), according to Manners (Appendix A: 36), they should not be seen as the 
end solution but, rather as a step towards more sustainable solutions. With regards to 
Cyprus, it is not possible to make an assessment as to whether the EU would attempt to 
foster more sustainable solutions following the initial establishment of consociationalism. 
However, in the case of Kosovo, decentralisation is an ongoing process. As discussed in 
the previous section, EU officials expressed doubts regarding the potential of the 
decentralisation process resulting in increased cooperation between the two communities 
and, hence, in transformed identities. 
Moreover, what also challenges the EU’s normative power is the fact that normative 
interests were, on certain instances, outranked by materialistic considerations. The NPE 
framework suggests that the EU’s normative identity lays the foundation for its normative 
interests. The EU’s main interest, therefore, should be the promotion of a principle to 
which the EU ascribes special significance. The empirical data presented above reveals 
that, in the case of Cyprus, the EU had certain strategic interests that were also at play. In 
the case of Kosovo, however, the Union’s strategic interests went hand-in-hand with the 
premises of the norm. The EU’s strong desire for stability and security in the region did 
not compromise the promotion of the norm.   
Lastly, the EU’s normative power is also challenged on grounds related to the ambiguity 
of its own commitment to the principles it seeks to promote and to general principles of 
international law. For Greek-Cypriots, the development of closer relations between the 
EU and the Turkish-Cypriots amounted to an indirect recognition of a non-legitimate 
state. In addition, the fact that the EU was willing to accept derogations from some 
fundamental freedoms like, for example, the freedom of movement, created another line 
of criticism against the EU. For Turkish-Cypriots, on the other hand, the inability of the 
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EU to implement certain regulations, like the DTR, deprived them of basic rights that 
they believed they should be able to enjoy. In the case of Kosovo, debates emerged over 
issues of state sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention as well as on the issue of the 
legitimacy of self-declared states.  
Overall, the normativity of EU goals is challenged by both the more- and the less-likely 
cases. In both cases, the EU’s commitment to ‘sustainable peace’ could be compromised 
by the concurrent promotion of consociational principles and decentralisation.  A 
difference is, however, observed, regarding EU interests. Whilst in the case of Cyprus the 
EU’s normative interest was compromised by strategic and economic considerations, in 
the case of Kosovo, the EU’s strategic interests did not necessarily undermine its 
normative interest. In other words, the ‘sustainable peace’ norm can, at the same time, 
serve the Union’s interests and be consistent with its values (Diez 2005: 625). Lastly, in 
both cases, the EU’s normative power is challenged by its own disrespect of fundamental 
international law principles. In both cases, the complex nature of international law made 









CHAPTER FIVE: TESTING THE NORMATIVITY OF EU 
MEANS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is concerned with the second part of the three-part NPE analytical 
framework, namely the EU mechanisms to promote normative goals. In other words, the 
main question that this chapter aims to answer is whether the EU takes actions that are 
aimed at changing normality and are in line with NPE expectations. 
A central assumption of the NPE literature is that a normative power works through ideas 
(Aggestam 2009: 31). This requires a unique form of engagement in world politics. 
Manners (2008: 77) and other scholars such as Forsberg (2011: 1195-1198) and 
Aggestam (2009: 31) have identified five diffusion mechanisms which are considered to 
be in line with NPE and which will be subsequently discussed in relation to the two cases. 
These five mechanisms are persuasion, norm invocation, shaping the discourse of what 
is normal, model power and attribution of prestige/shaming.  
5.2 THE CASE OF CYPRUS 
5.2.1 Persuasion  
The main aim of this section is to test whether and how the EU employed the instrument 
of persuasion in Cyprus. For analytical purposes, Manners’ definition of persuasion as a 
process that involves “constructive engagement, institutionalisation of relations and 
encouragement of multi-lateral dialogue between participants” (Manners 2009: 12) will 




Research conducted for this thesis revealed that, in the case of Cyprus, the EU’s 
constructive engagement took the form of confidence building measures and support to 
CSOs through the Financial Aid Regulation (FAR) and attempts to establish contacts 
between the two communities through the Green Line Regulation (GLR) and the Direct 
Trade Regulation (DTR). In what follows, these three regulations will be analysed in more 
detail. 
Promoting contacts between the two communities  
After the rejection of the Annan Plan by Greek-Cypriots and the subsequent accession of 
Cyprus to the EU, although EU policies remained the same on the macro level (namely, 
supporting UN efforts to resolve the conflict), measures were adopted on the micro level 
which could be seen as aiming at transforming local structures and, therefore, the conflict. 
According to Brussels-based European Commission interviewees, the main EU rationale 
was that improved contacts between the two communities would lead to reconciliation 
(Appendix B: 12, 13).  
Firstly, the EU adopted the Financial Aid Regulation (FAR) in 2006. Its overall objective 
was to “facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the development of the 
Turkish-Cypriot community, with particular emphasis on the economic integration of the 
island, on improving contacts between the two communities and with the EU, and on 
preparation of the implementation of EU law in case of a comprehensive settlement of 
the Cyprus problem” (European Council 2006). The Regulation subsequently listed all its 
specific objectives, notably reconciliation through the promotion of contacts between the 
two communities (European Council 2006). 
There are different ways through which the EU tried to promote reconciliation via the 
FAR. The first of them was its support of the Committee on Missing Persons that had 
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been established in 1981 with the mandate to establish the fate of missing persons without 
attributing any responsibility for the cause of death (European Commission 2012a). 
Through this process, the Committee attempted to help the development of a better 
understanding of the mutual concerns and to foster cooperation between the two 
communities. The European Commission, since 2006, provided financial support to the 
activities of this Committee, including in March 2015. Secondly, the FAR was also 
directed towards activities of demining the buffer zone. This second project was 
successfully completed in 2012. Thirdly, the EU employed a programme for the 
protection of the cultural heritage in Cyprus as a way to promote reconciliation. 
According to the European Commission in 2013, “Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot 
members of the Technical Committee are carrying out together cultural heritage 
preservation projects that are setting a positive example of successful collaboration 
between both communities in Cyprus” (European Commission 2013b). Lastly, the FAR 
aimed at strengthening civil society in Cyprus. The association between a thriving civil 
society and reconciliation was indicative of the EU’s commitment to use its instruments 
towards transforming the Cyprus conflict. The EU’s aim was twofold. Firstly, it wanted 
to support pro-reconciliation civil society groups (Tocci 2010: 159). Secondly, it looked 
to enhance the dialogue between the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot civil society groups as a 
way of promoting reconciliation (Appendix B: 12). The main EU scheme to pursue these 
aims was ‘Cyprus Civil Society in Action’. Its overall objective was to  
strengthen the role of civil society in the Turkish-Cypriot Community and to 
promote the development of a conducive environment for the further development 
of trust, dialogue, cooperation and closer relationship between the Turkish Cypriot 
and Greek Cypriot communities as an important step towards a solution to the 
Cyprus problem (European Commission 2013a).    
Specifically, the ways through which this scheme helped the process of reconciliation 
was through supporting NGOs that promote reconciliation and through the provision of 
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funds for civil society projects aimed at increasing the co-operation between the two 
communities. In addition, the EU Civil Society Support Team was established in 2008 to 
help the capacity building of civil society through the organisation of training sessions 
and campaigns (Civil Society Support Team 2009). The EU, therefore, encouraged the 
engagement of civil society, thus allowing for more voices to be heard and increasing the 
venues for constructive exchanges of ideas.  
Policies Aimed at Enhancing the Economic Development of the Turkish-Cypriot 
Community  
After the two simultaneous referenda of 2004 and the subsequent accession of Cyprus to 
the Union, the EU put emphasis on the economic development of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community. According to Brussels-based European Commission officials (Appendix B: 
12, 13), the rationale behind this was that the initiation of trade activities between the two 
communities would enhance contacts between them and would, hence, encourage 
reconciliation.  
The first policy in this direction was the Green Line Regulation (GLR) which was 
approved by the Council of EU Justice and Home Affairs Ministers (2004) and which 
aimed to control the movement of goods and persons and facilitate trade activities 
between the two communities. Regarding movement of persons, there were a 
considerable number of Greek and Turkish-Cypriots crossing the Green Line every day.  
However, the idea of promoting contacts between the two communities did not widely 
resonate with the target audience. Trade between the two sides remained insignificant 
(European Commission 2014:6, 2015b: 6). One probable explanation for this was that 
Greek-Cypriots had not wanted to widely engage in such activities with Turkish-Cypriots 
as this would suggest an indirect recognition of the “TRNC”. Research for this thesis 
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revealed that the main argument employed by Greek-Cypriots was that international law 
principles did not justify any moves that could imply recognition of the “TRNC” 
(Appendix A: 4, 14, 15).  From their perspective, this was the main norm to be respected 
and advanced.  It might, therefore, be the case that the GLR actually reinforced the 
conflicting interests and hence the division between the two communities instead of 
contributing to its elimination. 
Turning to the Turkish-Cypriots, certain problems were identified as concerns the GLR. 
According to a senior official of the Turkish-Cypriot MFA, “the EU has engaged the 
wrong interlocutors from the Turkish-Cypriot community in activities emerging from the 
GLR” (Appendix A:  3).  The Turkish-Cypriot community had to embark on a series of 
duties, such as monitoring trade and issuing accompanying documents for the goods 
traded. Normally, such duties would have been undertaken by ministerial authorities. 
However, given the fact that the Turkish-Cypriot administration is not recognised, the EU 
chose not to engage governmental institutions in these activities (Appendix A: 2, 15, 16). 
Instead, the European Commission delegated these tasks to the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber 
of Commerce (European Commission 2004a). For, Sözen,  
Northern Cyprus, since the acquis is suspended here, is treated as something 
outside the EU. That’s why they have custom officers right after the check points 
who do not want to call themselves custom officers. These people are the 
guardians of the GLR and are checking whether whatever passes from an EU 
border is good enough to enter the EU (Appendix A: 15).  
Secondly, the European Commission proposed the establishment of direct trade between 
the EU and Northern Cyprus. Based on its Common Commercial Policy with non EU-
members, it proposed the DTR which, if successfully implemented, would permit “the 
duty-free import of EU goods and the duty-free export of goods wholly obtained or 
substantially produced in Northern Cyprus” (Tocci et al. 2008: 62). The Commission 
recommended that certificates of origin issued by the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of 
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Commerce would be accepted on the grounds that the Chamber had been legitimately 
established under the 1960 arrangements.  
According to Commission interviewees working in DG Enlargement (Appendix B: 12, 
13), the establishment of direct trade would help the Turkish-Cypriots to develop their 
economy more easily. As explained earlier in this chapter, this would make it easier to 
solve the Cyprus conflict. However, the European Council Legal Service adopted a 
different approach and issued an opinion on this regulation which supported the Greek-
Cypriot position (see Skoutaris 2011: 147) and, as a result, the DTR was not adopted. The 
European Commission, based on the new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty requiring the 
European Parliament to act on international trade provisions, then resurrected the 
proposal on direct trade between the EU and Northern Cyprus and asked the EP to 
reconsider it. In October 2010, however, the Legal Service of the European Parliament 
agreed with the Legal Service of the Council (European Parliament Legal Service 2010).  
Although the Commission’s underlying rationale for establishing the DTR was the 
integration of the island, the main and immediate consequence would likely be the 
economic development of the Turkish-Cypriot community. This fact created conflictual 
interpretations of the DTR. Greek-Cypriots strongly opposed its implementation. The 
reasoning was explained in detail by a RoC official:  
The DTR will only help the Turkish-Cypriots to operate normally and have all the 
advantages of being in the EU without having to solve the Cyprus issue. Their 
ports and airports will operate normally. This will turn the north into a kind of 
Taiwan which exists for decades without recognition by many states but is, 
nonetheless, functioning with no problem and experiencing great economic 
development. Taiwan will never decide to reunify with China. Our goal, however, 
is a unified Cyprus and such actions, like the DTR are contrary to this goal 
(Appendix B: 3).  
For Turkish-Cypriots, however, the successful implementation of the DTR would help 
them overcome their international isolation. Interviews for this thesis indicated that the 
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fact that this Regulation was not implemented created an atmosphere of mistrust towards 
the EU among Turkish-Cypriots and fostered the view that the EU was not delivering on 
what it proposed (Appendix A: 3, 5, 13).  
Overall, therefore, the EU constructively engaged in the conflict in two main ways. 
Firstly, it tried to promote further contacts between the two communities through the FAR 
and through support for CSOs. Secondly, it tried to establish relations between the two 
communities and to augment the economic development of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community through the GLR and the DTR. However, these two regulations led to a series 
of criticisms against the EU related to the implications of indirectly recognising a self-
declared state and to the issue of the international isolation of Turkish-Cypriots. Overall, 
therefore, it seems that the EU was unable to constructively engage in the conflict in a 
way acceptable to both Greek and Turkish-Cypriots.  
Institutionalisation of relations 
In the case of Cyprus, institutional links were initially established only between the EU 
and the RoC. After 2004, however, attempts were made by the EU to establish relations 
with the Turkish-Cypriot community as well.  
Prior to 2004, the EU established closer relations with the RoC through the accession 
negotiations. At the beginning, Turkish-Cypriots did not participate in the accession 
process initiated and conducted by the RoC. However, in 1998, Clerides, then Greek-
Cypriot president, invited the Turkish-Cypriot leader, Denktaş, to participate in the talks. 
Denktaş, however, refused because the terms of participation were not specified (see 
Republic of Turkey MFA 1998). 
From 2004 onwards, the EU tried to institutionalise relations with the Turkish-Cypriot 
community. The first move came from the EP which established the High Level Contact 
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Group in 2005 with the aim of strengthening ties with the Turkish-Cypriots. Over the 
ensuing years, the Group met many times with people from Turkish-Cypriot civil society 
and with Turkish-Cypriot politicians. It supported the Turkish-Cypriots and repeatedly 
called for an end to their isolation (see, for example, Cyprus PIO 2006). The Group also 
espoused the view that “Turkish should be adopted as an official EU language and 
Turkish Cypriots should be invited to send their own representatives to the European 
Parliament” (Cyprus 44). However, there soon emerged divisions between socialist and 
right-wing members of the Group (EUobserver 2007) over several issues like, for 
example, using Turkish as an official language in the EP. As a result, when Françoise 
Grossetête (European People’s Party) became its Head in 2012, the Group changed its 
approach and was not very willing to communicate and conduct meetings with Turkish-
Cypriots. For example, during its visit to Cyprus in 2012, the Group refused to cross into 
the Turkish-Cypriot administered area (Cyprus News Agency 2012). The Group 
dissolved before the end of 2012.  
Secondly, relations with the Turkish-Cypriot community were institutionalised through 
the establishment of the European Union Programme Support Office (EUPSO) in 
Northern Cyprus that aimed at overseeing the implementation of the FAR. Although this 
office has no political jurisdiction (Beyatli 2011: 146), EUPSO officials meet regularly 
with Turkish-Cypriot authorities to discuss the distribution of the FAR financial 
assistance and the progress made through FAR projects (Appendix A: 3).  
Overall, the EU’s attempts to institutionalise relations with the Turkish-Cypriots 
produced mixed results. The High Level Contact Group, for example, although it initially 
represented a constructive forum for dialogue, changed its approach in 2012. EUSPO, on 
the other hand, although its jurisdiction was constrained, established close relations with 
Turkish-Cypriot authorities.  
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Encouragement of multilateral dialogue between participants 
A key way through which the EU tried to encourage dialogue between the two 
communities on the reunification of Cyprus was the appointment of observers and 
representatives, as well as through the Steering Group. In what follows, their role will be 
examined. 
EU involvement in the Cyprus conflict strengthened after the June 1994 European 
Council in Corfu which concluded that a final solution to the conflict should not be a 
prerequisite for the island’s accession to the Union (European Council 1994). The EU, 
however, strongly favoured reaching a solution to the conflict prior to Cyprus’ accession. 
In February 1994, therefore, the European Council appointed Serge Abou, a senior EU 
official, as observer in Cyprus. His mandate involved following closely any developments 
on the Cyprus issue and reporting on any progress. Abou submitted three reports that 
highlighted the lack of any substantial progress (see, for example, European Observer’s 
report on Cyprus 1995). 
As relations between Cyprus and the EU advanced, EU involvement in attempts to 
encourage and facilitate dialogue between the two communities became greater. A 
number of Presidencies of the EU Council appointed representatives for the conflict to 
follow the progress of the talks and to facilitate dialogue towards a solution. In January 
1996, the European Council appointed a representative from its Italian Presidency, 
Federico di Roberto, to monitor developments regarding the peace process in Cyprus. 
Following the end of the Italian Presidency six months later, he had nothing new to report. 
Irish ambassador Kester Heaslip took his place and served as the envoy of the 
Presidencies of Ireland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The UK and Austrian 
Presidencies then appointed Sir David Hannay to this position. Although the European 
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Council Presidencies appointed representatives to closely monitor developments in 
Cyprus, they did not appoint an EU Special Representative to the island. In the words of 
Heaslip,  
If the EU were to appoint a special representative for Cyprus, this would build up 
expectations in Cyprus and would suggest to both sides that the EU is taking up a 
separate initiative. Such expectations at this stage would be inevitably 
disappointing because such a representative would be expected to be able to tell 
you about concrete plans he has formed and the ideas he has put to the parties and 
their reaction and we have not reached that stage (Cyprus News Agency 1996).  
The enactment of new efforts to find a solution to the conflict in 2008 (see Chapter Three) 
prompted Barroso, then President of the European Commission, to employ a personal 
representative to the Good Offices Mission of the United Nations in Cyprus. Between 
2008 and 2015, three people held this position, namely Leopold Maurer, Jorge César das 
Neves and Pieter van Nuffel. In July 2015, Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the 
European Commission, reappointed Van Nuffel as his personal representative (European 
Commission 2015a).  Moreover, in 2009, Barroso established the Cyprus Steering Group 
as a means for the European Commission to support the settlement talks and coordinate 
positions on EU related aspects of a settlement. However, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, the EU’s role in the peace talks was quite minimal. In practice, the EU 
acknowledged that the UN is the principal actor that facilitates the negotiations. The 
Steering Group meets on a regular basis to discuss developments in the negotiation 
process and, after every meeting, it issues an official statement asking the leaders to 
support the efforts of the UN Mission (see, for example, European Commission 2014a).  
Overall, although the very fact of appointing personal representatives and establishing the 
Steering Group showed the EU’s support for the UN efforts, it is nonetheless difficult to 
conclude that these played an important role in encouraging dialogue. Although they did 
support the dialogue and participated in the process of persuading the two parties of the 
143 
 
conflict to find common ground, their role was nonetheless minimal since they only 
complemented UN efforts. 
Combining all the forms the instrument of persuasion took, two main conclusions can be 
reached. Firstly, the EU tried to employ the instrument of persuasion in Cyprus but its 
success was limited due to the RoC reactions who perceived EU policies as indirect 
recognition of the “TRNC”. Secondly, as a consequence of this, through some of the 
aforementioned measures, the EU unintentionally cemented existing divisions between 
the two communities instead of eliminating them and transforming the conflict. 
5.2.2 Invocation of norms 
In the case of Cyprus, the invocation of norms, the second of the NPE mechanisms, was 
mostly directed towards Turkey and, more specifically, at convincing Turkey to respect 
international law and fulfil its obligations towards the Cyprus conflict. When Turkey 
failed to adhere to its commitments, this mechanism was used by the EU since it raised 
Turkey’s violations of its international law obligations.  
To begin with, the RoC submitted four Interstate Applications63 against Turkey to the 
ECHR (Loucaides 2007: 250) which concluded that Turkey was guilty of continuing 
severe human rights violations and that it had failed to effectively investigate the fate of 
missing persons following the 1974 war in Cyprus. The EU mechanism of norm 
invocation took the form of EP resolutions and speeches of important EU officials. For 
example, in a resolution adopted on 9 March 2011, the EP encouraged Turkey “to 
intensify its support for the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, in particular by 
facilitating its access to military zones and archives, and to take all other appropriate 
                                                             
63 According to the ECHR (2014: 6), “most applications before the Court are individual applications 
lodged by private persons. A State may also lodge an application against another State Party to the 
Convention; this is called an inter-State application”.  
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action, in accordance with the findings of the European Court of Human Rights, on the 
humanitarian issue of missing persons” (European Parliament 2011). Moreover, the EU 
Commissioner for enlargement, Olli Rehn, called upon Turkey to fulfil its obligations 
stemming from the ECHR’s Fourth Interstate Application of Cyprus versus Turkey on 
the humanitarian issue of missing persons. “Turkey is obliged to ensure conditions for the 
effective investigation into the fate of Greek Cypriot missing persons who disappeared in 
life-threatening circumstances” (Rehn 2009). 
Another example of the EU using this mechanism were its calls on Turkey and the 
Turkish-Cypriot authorities to show respect for certain provisions of international law. 
The EP, for example, called on Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots “to address the issue of the 
settlement of Turkish citizens on the island, in accordance with the Geneva Convention 
and the principles of the International Law” (European Parliament 2011). As Hoffmeister 
explained (2006: 57) “the deliberate transfer of own population to an occupied territory 
violates Article 49 (6) of the fourth Geneva Convention which is still applicable to the 
international conflict between Cyprus and Turkey”. In addition, the EP asked Turkey to 
withdraw its military forces from Cyprus and to respect UNSC Resolution 550 (1984) 
and transfer the area of Famagusta to the UN (European Parliament 2014). 
Moreover, the EU, through EP resolutions, European Council conclusions and speeches 
of important EU officials, repeatedly urged Turkey to ensure the implementation of the 
Additional Protocol of the Association Agreement. The European Commission, in its 
2007 report on Turkey’s progress towards accession stated  
Following Turkey's non-fulfilment of its obligation of full and non-discriminatory 
implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement, in 
December 2006 the Council decided that accession negotiations will not be 
opened on eight chapters relevant to Turkey's restrictions regarding the Republic 
of Cyprus and that no chapter will be provisionally closed until the Commission 
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confirms that Turkey has fulfilled its commitments (European Commission 
2007b: 24).  
In its 2015 report, the Commission noted that Turkey had not yet fulfilled this 
commitment (European Commission 2015d: 26). Moreover, Rehn, during the EP debate 
on Turkey on 26 September 2006, stated “Turkey should remove obstacles to the free 
movement of goods, including those on means of transport, which are in breach of the 
Association Agreement. Hence, Turkey should open its ports to vessels under flag of all 
member states, including the RoC” (Rehn 2006, for another example see Barroso 2008).  
Overall, therefore, the way the norm invocation mechanism was implemented in the case 
of Cyprus points towards attempts to address certain international law violations that had 
an impact on the conflict. More specifically, Turkey’s non-compliance with international 
law principles activated this EU mechanism.  
5.2.3 Shaping the discourse of what is normal 
According to Forsberg (2011: 1197), “in contrast to persuasion, the power to shape 
discourses is an indirect, but not therefore a lesser, form of power”. The employment of 
this third NPE mechanism was reflected in EU policies aiming to alter the two parties’ 
understanding of the conflict. This means that conflict parties should ascribe to EU norms 
which will then be taken as a given. Since this thesis is focused on the norm of ‘sustainable 
peace’, it will now discuss three specific EU projects which can be seen as attempts to 
achieve structural changes and transforming the conflict by changing what is considered 
to be normal.   
The first project in this direction was the ‘New Trends in History Teaching’ project 
conducted in close collaboration with the Council of Europe. However, although the 
European Commission signed the contract in July 2007, the CoE postponed the counter-
signing because of concerns expressed by the RoC authorities. Consequently, the project 
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was cancelled (B&S EUROPE and PROMAN 2013: 108). Since the project was not 
implemented, the NPE expectation of structural changes was not met.  
Secondly, the ‘Academy of Political Studies’ project concentrated on the development of 
“a common understanding among young Cypriot leaders on key issues for the future of 
the island within an integrated Europe” (European Commission 2010a). Young leaders 
from both communities were chosen to participate in three seminars. However, although 
the project was believed to be valuable enough to initiate a project to continue the forum, 
this was not successful. The forum was a one-off initiative and was not institutionalised. 
As a result, “the project objectives have not been sustainable” (B&S EUROPE and 
PROMAN 2013: 117). 
Another project that can be considered as an example of EU attempts to shape the 
discourse of what counts as normal was the ‘Education for a Culture of Peace as a Vehicle 
for Reconciliation in Cyprus’ initiated in July 2014. This project was funded by the 
European Commission and the FES (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung), a German political NGO 
linked to the Social Democratic Party, and intended to use education as a departing point 
“to bring structural changes in society” (E4cp 2014). However, this project cannot be 
further analysed as, at the time of writing, there have been no reports outlining its specific 
activities and/or impact. 
The ‘shaping of discourse’ would ideally lead to identity modifications through changing 
the discourse of what the two sides of the conflict consider as normal. In the case of 
Cyprus, however, the projects launched towards this direction were short-lived and failed 
to create any substantial impact. It might be the case, though, that the third project 
mentioned in this section will create a more substantial impact.  
5.2.4 Model Power 
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As explained in Chapter Two, model power refers to the idea of the EU standing “as a 
model for others to follow” (Forsberg 2011: 1197).  In order to examine whether model 
power was at work in Cyprus, this chapter will now discuss whether Greek and Turkish-
Cypriots considered the EU as an example, or model, to follow and the Union’s ideas as 
worthy of emulation. 
Turkish-Cypriots 
As explained in the previous chapter, the decision of the EU to accept the RoC’s 
membership application and the subsequent decision to delink the RoC’s accession from 
a solution to the Cyprus conflict, was heavily criticised by Turkish-Cypriots. During the 
1990s, Rauf Denktaş, then leader of the Turkish-Cypriots, was deeply critical of the EU. 
He did not conceive the EU as a force for good but, rather, as a one-sided actor that 
favoured the Greek-Cypriot positions. He stated “they [the EU] seek to give to the Greek 
Cypriots the rights taken away from us and then call this peace” (BBC 2002). On another 
occasion, in a letter to the UNSG, he argued that  
the Greek Cypriot party, encouraged particularly by the European Union’s one-
sided and misplaced approach to the issue, turned its back on the concept of a bi-
zonal settlement. The Greek Cypriot side started talking about a “German-style 
federation” in which there could be no limits or regulations on the freedom of 
movement, settlement and the right to property. (Denktaş 2001). 
 However, Denktaş nationalistic approach was not supported by pro-EU and pro-
reconciliation civil society groups who saw his close relations with Turkey as the cause 
of the Turkish-Cypriot subordination (Bryant and Yakinthou 2012: 16-40). Nevertheless, 
such CSOs remained quite marginal in the “TRNC” until the EU became more involved 
in the resolution of the conflict by promising membership through reunification 
(Appendix A: 6, 15).  
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The possibility of joining the EU triggered major changes within the Turkish-Cypriot 
community. Firstly, the prospect of EU membership gave a boost to Turkish-Cypriot pro-
EU and pro-reconciliation CSOs who believed that EU accession would make Northern 
Cyprus politically and economically independent from Turkey. In July 2001, for example, 
41 groups (associations, NGOs and trade unions) organised a rally under the slogan “This 
Country is Ours!”. The protestors declared their dissatisfaction with the status quo and 
with the Turkish-Cypriot community’s dependency on Turkey. They also called for a 
change in attitudes towards the EU (see, for example, Cyprus PIO 2002).  
In addition, apart from civil society, the possibility of joining the EU led to support of 
more moderate political voices in Northern Cyprus. In the 2003 general election, for 
example, the pro-EU and pro-reconciliation CTP (Republican Turkish Party) won the 
majority of the vote while in 2005, the leader of CTP, Mehmet Ali Talat, was elected 
President of the “TRNC”.  
However, the rejection of the Annan Plan by Greek-Cypriots, the subsequent accession 
of the RoC to the EU as well as the Union’s inability to deliver on its promises (for 
example the non-implementation of the Direct Trade Regulation) created discontent 
among Turkish-Cypriots. As Talat (Appendix A: 16) explained to the author, the 
widespread belief in the immediate aftermath of the Greek-Cypriot rejection of the Annan 
Plan was that the EU’s commitment to establish closer relations with the Turkish-Cypriot 
community and to put an end to their international isolation would eventually lead to a 
recognition of the “TRNC”’s statehood. However, when this did not happen, the EU was 
criticised as being one-sided. In Talat’s words: “we do not want any mediation or political 
interference by the EU. We have not made such a demand, because the Greek Cypriot 
side and Greece are EU members and we know that the EU could not be impartial” (Talat 
2008b).   
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These factors, combined with Talat’s inability to achieve any successes in the 
negotiations on the Cyprus conflict as well as other political and economic issues, resulted 
in the nationalistic UBP and Derviş Eroğlu coming to power (see Akşit 2014: 6). Eroğlu 
was also very critical of the EU. He declared that the EU’s approach to the Cyprus 
problem was “far from being unbiased” (Eroğlu 2011d). On another occasion, he said 
And then I would like to call to the EU. Why don’t you keep your promises? What 
happened to promises to the Turkish Cypriots? [……..]The Greek Administration 
has taken over the EU term presidency. We struggle to minimise the negative 
effects of the presidency on the negotiations. However, I would like to say that a 
fair and permanent peace in Cyprus gets harder due to the EU term presidency64 
(Eroğlu 2012a) 
On other occasions, the perceived EU bias was expressed with reference to what Turkish-
Cypriots described as unjust rewards by the EU to the Greek-Cypriots. Eroğlu (2011a), 
for example, stated “It is a shame that, while the Turkish side which has always 
approached the negotiations with a positive attitude is penalised, the Greek Cypriot side 
who is trying to submit Cyprus to Greek dominion is rewarded with EU membership” . 
The EU, therefore, was not perceived by elites as a normative actor that promotes 
universal values. Rather, it was perceived as a one-sided actor in the process of promoting 
peace which severely undermined its normativity in the eyes of Turkish-Cypriots.  
In 2015, however, the moderate and pro-reconciliation Mustafa Akıncı won the 
presidential election. As Bozkurt (2015) explained, “both the UBP and the CTP-BG had 
created disappointment in many people for not standing up to the constant interventions 
of Turkey. Indeed, this was one of the main dynamics behind Akıncı’s electoral victory. 
Akıncı is well known in the Turkish Cypriot public opinion precisely for standing up to 
Turkey”.  
                                                             
64 In this quote, Eroğlu refers to the fact that the RoC assumed the EU Council Presidency between July 
and December 2012.  
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Overall, therefore, the Turkish-Cypriot community adopted a more moderate approach at 
the beginning of the 2000s largely due to instrumental reasons. Their main incentives 
were economic (overcoming isolation). For civil society and some political parties, 
however, political reasons (freedom from Turkey’s influence) were also important. Apart 
from that period though, when the EU’s policies did not result in tangible benefits and 
material gains, the community’s leadership strongly criticised the EU. The EU was, 
therefore, to a large extent, perceived in instrumental terms. This makes it difficult to 
conclude that the EU was seen as a model to follow.  
Greek-Cypriots 
Turning to the Greek-Cypriots, this section argues that, just like the Turkish-Cypriots, 
they did not regard the EU as an example to follow. Rather, EU accession was likewise 
perceived mainly in instrumental terms. More specifically, EU accession would help 
ensure that the solution to the Cyprus conflict would be in line with Greek-Cypriot 
interests. 
The RoC’s decision to apply for EU membership was inextricably linked to the Cyprus 
conflict. As George Vassiliou, the former President of the RoC who initiated the RoC’s 
EU accession process, noted 
For the Greek Cypriots the accession was undoubtedly the most important event 
since the establishment of the Republic. For the reasons explained, for the first 
time since the invasion, the prospect of a solution is a realistic option. 
Furthermore, until the solution and the reunification of the island could become a 
reality, their feeling of safety and security would be dramatically improved 
(Vassiliou 2004).  
Glafkos Clerides, RoC President between 1993-2003, expressed similar views. In 1998, 
for example, he stated: “Our accession to the big European family will be Cyprus' greatest 
achievement since the declaration of the Cyprus Republic. Beyond economic, social and 
political benefits that it will bring to the people of Cyprus, accession will give a new 
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dimension to the security of Cyprus” (Clerides 1998). In 2003, he stated: “We must 
continue to make careful steps to complete our accession to the EU. We do not have the 
luxury to experiment and make mistakes. Because mistakes could delay our European 
integration” (Clerides 2003). Overall, therefore, between 1990-2004, the RoC leadership 
perceived the EU as a path towards instrumental gains like, for example, security and 
economic benefits.  
President Papadopoulos, elected right before the referenda on the Annan Plan, adopted a 
similar line. However, since EU membership had already been secured, Papadopoulos 
also identified certain contradictions between EU law, EU practice and the Annan Plan. 
In his famous speech in which he urged the Greek-Cypriots to reject the Annan Plan, 
Papadopoulos stated that  
The Annan Plan does not lead to the reunification of the two communities but on 
the contrary promotes the permanent division with restrictions on movement, 
settlement, the right to acquire property, the exercise of political rights and other 
divisive elements…With the transformation of the divisive provisions of the Plan 
into the European Union’s primary law, even the slightest hope for the solution to 
develop and improve in the future, has vanished (Papadopoulos 2004).  
Following accession to the Union, the RoC government emphasised the importance of 
adhering to EU values and principles among others, in the negotiations for a solution of 
the conflict. For the RoC leadership, any solution to the Cyprus conflict must be in 
accordance with EU values and EU law. Christofias (2008a), for example, stated: “The 
solution must be based on the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus and be compatible 
with international and EU law as well as with international conventions on human rights. 
We demand that the solution will restore and safeguard the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of all the people of Cyprus”. 
Similarly, Anastasiades (2014) stated that his vision was “a re-united Cyprus, free from 
occupation troops, fully respecting the fundamental freedoms and human rights of all its 
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citizens and fulfilling the aspirations of all Cypriots to live and thrive within our European 
family”. On another occasion, he stated that his aim was a solution that will allow 
Cypriots “to live and thrive together in a modern and efficient EU member state that 
respects the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all its legal citizens and the 
principles upon which the EU is founded” (Anastasiades 2014a).  
Such statements could be interpreted as indicating a substantial leverage attached to EU 
law and to universal principles that are also supported by the EU. However, a more careful 
reading of the evidence suggests that Greek-Cypriots did not necessarily regard the EU 
as a model to follow. It therefore seems that the extensive references to EU law and 
principles did not indicate an acceptance of the EU as a model power but, rather, a way 
to promote the community’s interests through the EU. The Greek-Cypriot side asked for 
an upgrade of the role of the EU in the negotiation process (Anastasiades 2014a, 2014c). 
However, as the RoC is an EU member, this decision could be merely based on a cost-
benefit calculation rather than on the perception and acceptance of the EU as a normative 
actor that promotes universal values. The Greek-Cypriot leadership perceived its own 
understanding of federalism as the only one being compatible with EU principles. Hence, 
an upgrade of the EU’s role in the negotiations would help Greek-Cypriots to promote 
this understanding (Appendix A: 9, 12, 14).  
If the EU was regarded as an example to follow, then local actors should perceive its 
principles as worthy of emulation (Manners 2009a: 3; Aggestam 2009: 49). However, 
what can be observed in the case of Cyprus, is only a degree of discursive adaptation for 
instrumental reasons across both communities. As Forsberg (2011: 1198) also noted, 





5.2.5 Attribution of Prestige/Shaming 
In the case of Cyprus, before 2004, the mechanism of shaming was mostly directed by 
the EU at Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots while prestige was attributed to Greek-Cypriots. 
However, after 2004 and the rejection of the Annan Plan by Greek-Cypriots, the blame 
shifted towards the Greek-Cypriots while prestige was attributed to Turkish-Cypriots.  
Initially, the mechanism of shaming was linked to the certificates required under EC Law 
for the import of goods from Cyprus. The European Court of Justice, in July 1994, ruled 
that such certificates should be issued by the RoC. In this respect, certificates issued by 
the “TRNC” could not be accepted by EU members since the “TRNC” had not been 
recognised either by the EU or by its member states (Tocci and Kovziridze 2004: 94). 
The EU Commission informed the member states that the ECJ’s ruling was binding on 
all community organs and the member states (Appendix B: 13). Although this ruling did 
not amount to a formal imposition of an embargo, the EU’s disapproval of the “TRNC”’s 
non-alignment with international law principles was evident. This, among other things, 
also had a signalling aspect. It was a way for the EU to express dissatisfaction and 
disapproval.  
Simultaneous with the ECJ ruling, the EU accepted Cyprus’ application for membership 
of the Union thereby conferring prestige to the RoC. At the same time, speeches of EU 
officials indicated that Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership were perceived as the 
main obstacle towards a lasting solution to the Cyprus conflict. Nicole Fontaine, for 
example, then President of the European Parliament, during her first official visit to 
Cyprus, expressed the hope that Cyprus’ EU accession would be “a catalyst” for 
unblocking the path to a political settlement, but stressed that “under no circumstances” 
would the absence of a settlement prevent the accession of Cyprus. She also appealed to 
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the Turkish-Cypriots to “make some gesture” and warned that the policy of blocking a 
settlement was not in their interests (quoted in Nostos 2001). This rationale was also 
adopted by the Commission (1997) in its Agenda 2000 which noted that “if progress 
towards a settlement is not made before the negotiations are due to begin, they should be 
opened with the government of the RoC, as the only authority recognised by international 
law”. It therefore seems that Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots were seen as the main 
actors to blame and were publicly shamed through speeches of EU officials.  
However, from 2004 onwards the blame shifted to the Greek-Cypriots. After the Greek-
Cypriot disapproval of the Annan Plan, Enlargement Commissioner Gunter Verheugen 
and Pat Cox (quoted in Turkey MFA 2004), then President of the European Parliament, 
heavily criticised Greek-Cypriot President Papadopoulos for hijacking the EU accession 
process and for wanting to use EU membership to pressure the Turkish side to cave in to 
Greek-Cypriot wishes. Verheugen accused the Greek-Cypriot leadership of having 
“cheated” him and of having “taken him for a ride” when appearing willing to support 
the Annan Plan and thus to allow a united Cyprus to join the EU (Independent 2004). 
Since the main objective of shaming is to change behaviour through expressing 
disapproval of an action, this kind of criticism falls squarely into this category.   
At the same time, Verheugen called for an end to the isolation of the Turkish-Cypriots. 
As the Commission stated, “as the Turkish-Cypriot Community expressed overwhelming 
support for the UN plan to reunify Cyprus, it would be unfair, to say the least, to leave it 
out in the cold…” (European Commission 2004). This conferral of prestige to Turkish-
Cypriots through the offer of economic help was also evident in other statements. For 
example, Javier Solana, then EU High Representative for the CFSP, expressed his deep 
regrets that “Greek-Cypriots have missed the opportunity to solve the problem that has 
155 
 
been with them for too many years, and that the Turkish-Cypriots have made in contrast 
a courageous choice by voting 'yes'” (Cyprus PIO 2004).  
Conferral of prestige/ shaming aims to promote adherence to norms through exposing the 
(in)consistencies between a state’s behaviour and the EU’s values. In the case of Cyprus, 
this instrument took different forms and different directions over time. Initially, shaming 
was directed towards Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot community. However, after 2004, 
the EU started conferring prestige to the Turkish-Cypriot community and shaming the 
Greek-Cypriot community. 
5.3 THE CASE OF KOSOVO 
Following the method of structured, focused comparison, the same questions that were 
asked in the section on the Cyprus case will also be asked for Kosovo. This will make 
possible a systematic comparison of the findings on the two cases.  
5.3.1 Persuasion  
Just like in the analysis of Cyprus, the three aspects of persuasion (constructive 
engagement, institutionalisation of relations and encouragement of multilateral dialogue) 
will be discussed. 
Constructive engagement 
In the case of Kosovo, the EU’s constructive engagement took different forms over time. 
Following the 1998-9 war, the EU was mostly concerned with reconstruction. 
Progressively, however, the development of civil society and the creation of a multi-
ethnic society were included as priorities. In what follows, the ways through which the 
EU tried to constructively engage with the conflict will be further analysed.  
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During the 1990s, the EC was involved in the Western Balkans through the Phare65 and 
OBNOVA66 programmes. Receiving help through these programmes was dependent 
upon the economic and political development of a country. The European Commission 
concluded that the FRY could not benefit from Phare due to its “lack of respect for the 
fundamental principles of democracy and human rights” (European Commission 1998: 
4). The FRY, however, was eligible to receive help from OBNOVA that focused on 
economic development, development of civil society and establishment of cooperation 
among the Republics of Former Yugoslavia (European Commission 1996a).   
In the immediate aftermath of the 1998-9 war, the main issues that had to be faced 
included the re-building of houses and roads and assisting people return to, and re-
integrate in, their communities. In this respect, the EU established a Task Force (TAFKO) 
for the reconstruction of Kosovo. TAFKO was operational from July 1999 until February 
2000 when it was replaced by the EAR (European Agency for Reconstruction).  
Between 2000-6, when Kosovo was under the interim administration of UNMIK, the 
main objective of the EU towards the Western Balkans was the implementation of the 
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) (Appendix B: 11). CARDS (Community 
Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation) was the main EU financial 
instrument used. CARDS assistance was, however, conditional upon certain political and 
economic developments (European Council 2000a, European Council 2002). CARDS 
was also applied to Kosovo with programmes implemented mainly by the EAR which 
aimed to ensure the full and speedy implementation of EU aid programmes on the ground. 
Such programmes were initially concerned with emergency reconstruction. Gradually, 
                                                             
65 Phare is one of the three pre-accession instruments used by the EU to help countries of the Central 
and Eastern Europe in the process of acceding to the Union. The other two are the Instrument for 
Structural Policies for Pre-accession (ISPA) and Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (SAPARD). 
66 The OBNOVA programme provides financial aid to war-affected countries.  
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however, the EAR began to focus on economic development and on the development of 
civil society that it regarded as a key-actor in the process of establishing a democratic 
multi-ethnic society (see EAR 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008).  
Between 2007-1367, IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance) was the main EU 
instrument for providing financial assistance to candidate countries and to potential 
candidate countries like Kosovo. IPA funds in Kosovo were managed by the Commission 
Liaison Office. IPA comprised five components covering different priorities. These were 
support for transition and institution-building (TAIB), cross-border cooperation (CBC), 
regional development, human resources development and rural development. Kosovo, as 
a potential candidate country, could benefit only from the first two components. The first 
component (TAIB) aimed, among other things, to “foster stabilisation, reconstruction and 
reconciliation and promote social and economic development throughout the Western 
Balkans” (European Commission 2008b: 10). In this respect, a number of projects were 
implemented by the EU in Kosovo aiming at the creation of a stable multi-ethnic society, 
promotion of inter-ethnic tolerance, improvement of inter-ethnic trust and promotion of 
human and minority rights (Ecorys 2013). One example was a project entitled 
‘Confidence Building Measures in Kosovo’ which aimed to “assist the Kosovo Serb 
leaders in building self-confidence and to help Kosovo’s Serb and Albanian leaders to 
identify issues of mutual interest with the goal of improving the interethnic trust” (Ecorys 
2013: 92). Further examples were the ‘Rehabilitation of Cultural Heritage in Kosovo’ and 
the ‘Support to the Promotion of Cultural Diversity in Kosovo’. Both projects aimed to 
use cultural heritage as a tool towards reconciliation (see Ecorys 2013: 92). 
                                                             
67 Since 2014, IPA II became the main EU financial instrument in Kosovo.  
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In addition, during the fourth round of the EU-mediated dialogue, it was decided that a 
part of the IPA funds would be allocated for the development of Northern Kosovo 
(European Commission Press Release 2013b). However, the North Fund was criticised 
by Kosovars. Agron Demi from the Institute for Advanced Studies ‘GAP’, an impartial 
think tank established in 2007 in Kosovo, characterised this fund as unnecessary: “The 
government of Kosovo has constantly allocated funds for that part, which means that a 
special development fund is not necessary. The northern part of Kosovo is not any 
different in terms of development from the southern part, also considering the fact that 
the inhabitants of this part have benefited funds from both the budget of Kosovo and that 
of Serbia for many years” (Independent Balkan News Agency 2013).  
Moreover, a central component of EU involvement in Kosovo was its support of civil 
society as a way to promote reconciliation between the two communities (Appendix B: 
7, 8). The 2014 renewed IPA programme for Kosovo reiterated the importance placed on 
the development of civil society (European Commission 2014b). However, EU officials 
appeared sceptical in private about the role civil society can play towards reconciliation. 
The main reason for this, as an EULEX official explained to the author, is that civil 
society in Kosovo is still built along ethnic lines (Appendix B: 8). 
Overall, therefore, in the case of Kosovo, constructive engagement took the form of 
attaching development funds to certain conditions conducive to reconciliation. Removing 
causes of conflict was always part of EU assistance in Kosovo. According to Pristina-
based and Brussels-based European Commission and EULEX officials (Appendix B: 7, 
8, 13), the EU builds upon an incremental system of policies which is aimed at producing 
long term effects and sustainable transformation. In this respect, reconstruction and 
development funds were always attached to EU values. In addition, constructive 
engagement also took the form of promoting the development of Northern Kosovo. 
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However, this latter strategy was criticised by Kosovars who considered the allocation of 
these funds unnecessary.  
Institutionalisation of relations 
EU attempts to institutionalise relations with Kosovo took place after the mid-2000s. In 
2005, the European Council asked Solana and Rehn, in their roles as CFSP High 
Representative and Commissioner for Enlargement respectively, to investigate possible 
ways of more EU involvement in Kosovo. The pair issued four reports in which they 
noted that the EU could play a principal role (see, for example, Solana and Rehn 2005). 
After the EU Planning Team (EUPT), which had been sent to Kosovo in May 2006, 
provided its insights, Solana and Rehn “pointed to the imperative of the EU becoming the 
driving force behind the international presence in Kosovo” (Papadimitriou and Petrov 
2012: 755-56). They decided that the way to achieve this was through the establishment 
of a civilian mission managed by the ICR (International Civilian Representative), who 
would also take the position of the EU Special Representative. Moreover, they decided 
to establish a ESDP rule-of-law mission. The ICR and the rule-of-law mission would 
work towards the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan and would help the Kosovan state 
to uphold the rule of law. The European Commission, for its part, would “focus in 
particular on assisting the authorities to increase their capacities to govern Kosovo with 
a long-term European perspective” (European Council and European Commission 2007). 
In addition, apart from these three forms of EU presence in Kosovo, closer relations were 
established between the EP and the Kosovan Parliament. In what follows, these four ways 




As provided by the Ahtisaari Plan, the EU appointed a Special Representative (EUSR) 
who also served as the head of the ICO (International Civilian Office). The ICR 
(International Civilian Representative)/EUSR was therefore a double-hatted institution. 
In February 2008, Pieter Feith became first in post. Under his ICR hat, Feith was 
mandated to supervise and ensure the successful implementation of the Ahtisaari plan 
(see Chapter Three). With his EUSR hat on, he would follow the policy objectives of the 
EU in Kosovo (Appendix A: 34) which included 
to play a leading role in strengthening stability in the region and in implementing 
a settlement defining Kosovo's future status, with the aim of a stable, viable, 
peaceful, democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo, contributing to regional 
cooperation and stability, on the basis of good neighbourly relations (European 
Council 2008).  
In order to achieve these goals, the EUSR should give advice and support to local 
institutions, promote EU coordination, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
(Appendix A: 34). While the ICR recognised the independence of Kosovo, the EUSR was 
status-neutral because of the internal EU division on this issue. These divisions kept the 
EUSR from being a visible actor in Kosovo. The ICR, on the other hand, was far more 
visible. Although the ICO/ICR are not EU actors since their mandate derives from the 
ISG (International Steering Group), their role has been very significant since they have 
been supported by the 23 EU member states that recognise the independent statehood of 
Kosovo. The ICO was mostly focused on the implementation of the CSP (Comprehensive 
Settlement Proposal – Ahtisaari Plan). It was, therefore, concentrated on regulating and 
diminishing the tensions between the two communities and ensuring a protective 
environment for minorities. For example, under the direct control of the ICR, new Serb-
majority municipalities were established.  
Gradually, it became evident that this double-hatted arrangement was not very functional 
(Appendix A: 34). As a result, the EUSR post was split off from that of the ICR in 2012 
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(Appendix A: 34). Feith took the position of the ICR and Fernando Gentilini became the 
EUSR (Collaku 2011). In September 2012, the International Civilian Office that had been 
led by Feith was closed, since the Ahtisaari Plan was judged to have been substantially 
implemented (International Crisis Group 2012: 3). 
European Commission Liaison Office 
As a result of the five non-recognisers of Kosovo’s independence, the EU’s approach 
towards Kosovo has been based on “diversity on recognition, but unity in engagement” 
(European Commission 2009: 4). Although European Commission and EULEX officials 
(Appendix B: 7, 8, 11) stated that the issue of the five non-recognisers had not impeded 
their policies in Kosovo, the recognition issue had constrained the possibilities for EU 
engagement. For example, the EU was not able to establish a Delegation68 to Kosovo after 
the Lisbon Treaty came into effect. As an alternative, a European Commission Liaison 
Office (ECLO) was established in Kosovo, which performed only some of the tasks of 
EU Delegations in other places. Specifically, ECLO was responsible for overseeing the 
progress of Kosovo with regards to the objectives set by the Stabilisation and Association 
Dialogue and to manage the implementation of the IPA programmes (Appendix B: 7). In 
February 2012, the EUSR was amalgamated with ECLO and, as a result, an EU Office 
was established in Kosovo. This office, however, is not called a Delegation since this 
would indicate diplomatic recognition (Gross and Rotta 2011: 6).  
EULEX 
                                                             
68 According to the website of the European External Action Service, “the EU Delegations play a key role 
in presenting, explaining and implementing EU’s foreign policies. They also analyse and report on the 
policies and developments of their host countries and conduct negotiations in accordance with given 
mandates” (EEAS website).  
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In parallel, in 2008, EULEX, a rule of law mission, was established in Kosovo (see 
Chapter Three) adopting many of the functions that were previously performed by 
UNMIK. In addition, in 2010, the Commission established an ‘EU House’ in Mitrovica 
to strengthen the Union’s presence in northern Kosovo. As Füle (2010) stated, this EU 
House “is the EU's way of extending a hand to the local community”.  
EULEX aimed at assisting Kosovan institutions in establishing and preserving the rule of 
law in the fields of police, justice and customs and it tried to institutionalise relations with 
local authorities. In fact, EULEX’s work in Kosovo was based on an MMA (Monitoring-
Mentoring-Advising) approach. As the 2010 EULEX programme report noted  
In practice this has meant that the final responsibility for translating each 
recommendation into a MMA Action has rested with the relevant institutions of 
Kosovo’s rule of law. In this way, the EULEX programmatic approach is designed 
to help Kosovo’s rule of law bodies to make the changes themselves, rather than 
rely upon an international presence to do it for them (EULEX 2010: 6).   
As has become evident, central in EULEX’s attempts to realise its three-fold aim (MMA 
tasks), was its desire to establish close coordination with local authorities. In this respect, 
a joint rule of law coordination board, co-chaired by the Head of EULEX and the Kosovan 
Deputy Prime Minister, was established. The fact that this joint body met on a regular 
basis showed EULEX’s attempts to consult and engage with local authorities at the 
highest level (Appendix B: 8).  
The way EULEX operated, however, received much criticism. For example, in March 
2011, the Kosovan government openly attacked EULEX because of the arrest of a former 
member of the KLA. According to KIPRED, an independent non-governmental, non-
profit organisation, (2013: 16–17), Thaçi, then Kosovo’s Prime Minister, described 
EULEX’s action as “arresting ‘war heroes behind our backs,’ and that ‘this was not justice 
but shame’”. KIPRED (2013: 16-17) also noted that the Chair of the Kosovan Parliament, 
Jakup Krasniqi, called EULEX’s action “a massacre of justice.”  
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Criticism of EULEX also came from political researchers and analysts. For example, 
Fisnik Korenica, a researcher for the Group of Legal and Political Studies, an independent 
and non-profit organisation, stated that “although EULEX had the support from the 
people, local ownership was not encouraged. The way EULEX acted in Kosovo left the 
impression that it was not produced locally.” (Appendix A: 23). The occurrence of local 
ownership as a result of EU involvement in Kosovo is a topic that will be discussed in 
more detail in the next chapter.  
Kosovo-Serbs, for their part, were also very critical of EULEX. They accused it of 
infringing UNSC Resolution 1244 (see Chapter Three) and of sponsoring Kosovo’s 
independence by helping it build its institutions (see Vucheva 2008a). For them, 
therefore, EULEX was a one-sided actor that helped Kosovars achieve their aim of 
independent Kosovo, an aim that was contrary to Kosovo-Serb goals69. In addition, 
Kosovo-Serbs criticised EULEX for its coercive behaviour. For Radenko Nedeljković, 
the head of the Mitrovica district, for example, EULEX was forcibly trying to integrate 
Kosovo-Serbs into Kosovar institutions. He, therefore, called on the Kosovo-Serbs to “not 
respond to such provocations” (B92 2012b, see also B92 2012c).  
European Parliament-Kosovo Inter-Parliamentary Meetings 
In December 2002, the EP decided to establish informal inter-parliamentary relations with 
Kosovo (see Republic of Kosovo, Ministry for European Integration website). In 2008, 
when Kosovo declared independence, these meetings were formalised70. The first 
meeting after Kosovo’s independence took place in May 2008 with Kosovo’s flag next 
to that of the EU at the EP building in Brussels (see B92 2008). The joint statement noted 
                                                             
69 It should be noted that several interviewees (Appendix A: 27, Appendix B: 8, 16) drew a distinction 
between Serbs residing in northern Kosovo and those residing in the south part of Kosovo. Kosovo-Serb 
national goal of uniting with Serbia is much more prevalent in northern Kosovo.  
70 For a more detailed discussion on the EP’s role in Kosovo, see Redei, L. (2015).  
164 
 
that “reconciliation, respect of the rights of all Kosovo communities and their members 
and restoration of mutual trust and confidence are absolute priorities” (European 
Parliament- Kosovo Parliament 2008) 
In the subsequent meetings, several topics were discussed including, among others, the 
situation of the Serb community in Kosovo (European Parliament 2009a: 20, European 
Parliament - Kosovo Parliament 2010, European Parliament - Kosovo Parliament 2012), 
“the standards of a democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo” (European Parliament 
2009a:21) and “the boycott of parliament by the Serb members and the situation of 
minorities in Kosovo” (European Parliament 2009a: 21). In addition, after the enactment 
of the EU-brokered dialogue, these meetings focused on discussing its progress. For 
example, following the fifth meeting in March 2012, the two delegations issued a joint 
statement stressing the importance of continuing the dialogue with Belgrade and of 
implementing the agreement for improving the everyday lives of citizens on both sides 
(European Parliament-Kosovo Parliament 2012). Also, the October 2013 meeting 
welcomed the progress in the dialogue but called for more “transparency in 
communicating the outcomes” (European Parliament-Kosovo Parliament 2013).  
These meetings ended up drafting a joint statement of the EP and the Kosovo Parliament 
in which some principles that should guide Kosovo’s actions were identified and agreed 
by both parties. The respect of the rights of every community in Kosovo (European 
Parliament 2009a: 22) and the restoration of mutual trust and confidence were identified 
as the main priorities (European Parliament-Kosovo Parliament 2005). It seems that those 
meetings, although informal, gave an opportunity for dialogue between the two sides in 
order to decide and agree on what was the best way forward. Those inter-parliamentary 
meetings constituted, therefore, a forum for constructive dialogue. 
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Overall, the EU institutionalised relations with Kosovo through the EUSR/ICR, ECLO, 
EULEX and through the establishment of closer relations between the EP and the 
Kosovan Parliament. However, as the above analysis showed, institutionalisation of 
relations, a central element of NPE, was compromised by certain limitations. For 
example, the functions of the EUSR remained somewhat limited because of the five non-
recognisers. For the same reason, the functions of ECLO remained mostly technical. In 
addition, EULEX’s MMA approach rested on the involvement of local authorities. 
However, the way EULEX was deployed on the ground became a target for severe 
criticism by both Kosovars and Kosovo-Serbs. Relations with EULEX were, therefore, 
not well-established. In contrast, the development of closer relations between the EP and 
the Kosovan Parliament led to the creation of a forum for constructive dialogue. 
Encouragement of multilateral dialogue between participants 
The EU encouraged dialogue through its involvement in the troika that tried to resolve 
the problem of Kosovo’s status and through a recent EU-brokered dialogue. These two 
ways of encouraging dialogue will now be discussed in more detail.  
Firstly, in 2007, the EU was part of the troika (consisting of the EU, the US and Russia) 
that undertook the task of organising talks with Serbian and Kosovar representatives with 
the aim of getting them to agree on a solution regarding Kosovo’s status. With this in 
mind, the troika noted that “while the Ahtisaari Settlement was still on the table, we would 
be prepared to endorse any agreement the parties might be able to reach” (UNSC 2007: 
2-3). The EU representative in these talks was Wolfgang Ischinger, a German diplomat, 
who encouraged the parties to also discuss practical issues in addition to the status issue 
(Weller 2008: 1227).  Despite the fact that these talks did not produce any concrete results, 
the troika noted that the two parties agreed “on the need to promote and protect multi-
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ethnic societies and address difficult issues holding back reconciliation, particularly the 
fate of missing persons and the return of displaced persons” (UNSC 2007: 4).  
Secondly, from March 2011, the EU has been facilitating a dialogue between Belgrade 
and Pristina led by Catherine Ashton, the EU’s then High Representative71. These talks 
initially focused on technical issues, in the hope that “solving practical issues would build 
confidence and familiarity and pave the way toward a more substantial, political 
rapprochement” (International Crisis Group 2013: 1). The stated aims of this technical 
dialogue were “to remove obstacles that have a negative impact on people’s daily lives, 
to improve cooperation, and to achieve progress on the path to Europe” (European Union 
Press Statement 2011). 
Gradually, these talks began to yield results on the freedom of movement of persons and 
vehicles, on the mutual recognition of university diplomas, on customs stamps, and on 
the integrated management of the ‘border/boundary’ crossings, as well as on regional 
cooperation. Other results achieved included “the agreement on setting liaison 
arrangements and the agreement on the improvement of protection of religious and 
cultural heritage sites (creation of special/multi-ethnic police unit in Kosovo)” (European 
Commission 2013c: 6).  
Since January 2013, the meetings between the Prime Ministers of Kosovo and Serbia, 
apart from the technical issues, also focused on Northern Kosovo and on delivering 
structures which would “meet the security and justice needs of the local population in a 
way that ensures the functionality of a single institutional and administrative set up in 
Kosovo” (European Commission 2013c: 6). The discussions on Northern Kosovo and the 
Kosovo-Serb community’s concerns were concluded on 19 April 2013 with the initialling 
                                                             
71 Federica Mogherini took over this post in November 2014. 
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of a ‘First agreement of principles governing the normalisation of relations’ (see EEAS 
2013). At the time of writing, the latest development was the agreement on the creation 
of an Association of Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo (Mogherini 2015). The 2015 
European Commission report noted that both Kosovo and Serbia “have remained engaged 
in the dialogue and committed to the implementation of the April 2013 agreement and 
other agreements reached in the dialogue” (European Commission 2015: 30).  
The EU-facilitated dialogue revealed the EU’s desire to promote its principles through a 
process of persuasion. However, as interviews conducted for this research revealed, the 
dialogue was not always carried out in the most effective way. In the process of trying to 
improve relations between the two communities, there was a lot of arm-twisting. For a 
Pristina-based senior EU official, “the normative power model has to be filtered into the 
system in the long term. There are dozens of examples in this respect” (Appendix B: 7). 
For example, the agreement provided that the Serb-dominated north would be 
participating in the elections. However, as the same Commission official stated, there 
were some things that Pristina was not ready to accept like, for example, the abandonment 
of status-related symbols. However, the EU demanded they did abandon such symbols 
(Appendix B: 7). For another Commission official working in DG Enlargement “There is 
a lot of politics which sometimes is more coercive than persuasive. The ideal is to 
convince the two parties to adopt some measures but this was never an easy process” 
(Appendix B: 11).  
In addition, persuasion was also undermined by the EU’s inability to engage Kosovo-
Serbs in the dialogue. As a Pristina-based senior EU official explained to the author, 
“engaging with Kosovo-Serbs is very difficult. They do not want to hear the message we 
want to deliver. So, the EU adopted a hands-off approach towards Kosovo-Serbs and 
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conducted most discussions with Belgrade. Our role in the North is really very limited” 
(Appendix B: 7).  
Lastly, the Kosovo government’s engagement in the dialogue was, to a large extent, 
instrumental. Progress was possible only because of the EU’s promise of an SAA for 
Kosovo and the opening of accession negotiations with Serbia. According to Dempsey 
(2014), Dačić and Thaçi “immediately acknowledged that without any perspective of 
joining the EU, they would not have made the huge jump to the negotiating table in 
Brussels”. The same was stated by EU officials during interviews conducted for this 
thesis. For a Pristina-based European Commission official, “Kosovo has to make some 
concessions with regards to the dialogue which I don’t think they would have done if we 
hadn’t deliberately used the SAA agreement” (Appendix B: 7).  
Therefore, the means by which the EU tried to encourage dialogue in Kosovo was through 
its involvement in the troika that undertook the responsibility for solving the problem of 
Kosovo’s status and through the enactment of the recent EU-brokered dialogue. However, 
although persuasion was employed quite extensively in the case of Kosovo, it should be 
noted that, in some instances, it leaned towards imposition. In addition, the employment 
of persuasion was undermined by the EU’s inability to engage with the Kosovo-Serb 
community. 
5.3.2 Norm Invocation  
In the case of Kosovo, the EU tried to invoke the ‘sustainable peace’ norm by demanding 
the implementation of commitments to which Kosovo has agreed in the context of the 
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). An SAP for Kosovo was first proposed in 
1999. Its main aim was to support the country’s progress towards the EU, promote peace 
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and stability and support reconciliation and greater regional cooperation (see Bojicic-
Dzelilovic et al. 2016: 5). Kosovo participated in the SAP from 2002.  
The SAP was carried out through the European Partnership that set the “priorities for 
action in supporting efforts to move closer to the European Union while serving as a 
checklist to measure progress” (European Council 2004). In other words, in the case of 
Kosovo, this EU mechanism took the form of activating the commitments Kosovo had 
entered into by subscribing to the European Partnership. In June 2004, the EU adopted 
the first European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo. In January 
2006 and February 2008, new partnerships were adopted in order to reflect the progress 
made by Kosovo and also to identify new priorities. In all cases, Kosovan institutions had 
to formulate an Action Plan for the implementation of the European Partnerships’ 
priorities.  
Among the key priorities of the European Partnerships for Kosovo was to “create a 
climate for reconciliation, inter-ethnic tolerance and sustainable multi-ethnicity which is 
conducive to the return of displaced persons”, to “ensure the respect, security, freedom 
of movement and participation of all communities”, to “explicitly condemn all 
manifestations of anti-minority sentiment and to “vigorously prosecute all inter-ethnic 
crime” (European Council 2008b: 61). Therefore, the EU aim of promoting reconciliation 
and multi-ethnicity in Kosovo (see Chapter Four) was reflected in the European 
Partnerships and was put forward as a prerequisite for Kosovo’s future EU membership.  
With the European Partnerships, the norm of ‘sustainable peace’ was invoked through the 
Commission reports on Kosovo’s progress in several fields. For example, one problem 
identified early on was the issue of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity (European 
Commission 2005: 21-22, 2006: 15). In reference to the Serb community, it was noted 
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that they still faced harassment and discrimination. Although some progress was 
identified over time as a decrease in inter-ethnic incidents was observed, the Commission 
also stressed that inter-community tensions impeded a thorough reconciliation and 
integration process (European Commission 2010: 20).  
Secondly, the Commission noted an increase of damage to cultural and religious sites 
(European Commission 2005: 21-22, 2006: 15, European Commission 2013c). In its 2015 
report, it acknowledged that “protection of cultural heritage, including cooperation 
between the Serbian Orthodox and Kosovo authorities, remains problematic” (European 
Commission 2015: 21).  
Thirdly, regarding the return of displaced persons, the 2005 report noted there still existed 
significant obstacles with security concerns and the return of property being among them 
(European Commission 2005: 22). The 2010 report, however, acknowledged that there 
was a “sharp increase” in the number of returns although problems like delayed property 
restitution proceedings and scarcity of economic opportunities continued to exist 
(European Commission 2010: 20). The 2013 report, meanwhile, observed that “the 
sustainability of the returns process is undermined by real and perceived security threats 
(both in Albanian and Serb majority communities). It is further exacerbated by ongoing 
incidents affecting returnees and their properties, as well as religious and cultural heritage 
sites” (European Commission 2013c: 18). The 2015 report claimed that “authorities at 
local and central level did not do enough to facilitate return and reintegration of refugees 
and internally displaced persons (IDPs)” (European Commission 2015: 26). Overall, 
therefore, the European Commission, through its progress reports, sought to identify the 
areas to which Kosovan authorities needed to devote more attention with the overall aim 
of meeting the key priorities of reconciliation and sustainable multi-ethnicity. 
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Overall, therefore, the implementation of the norm invocation mechanism in the case of 
Kosovo was directly related to the country’s progress towards EU membership. The EU, 
through the Commission’s progress reports, highlighted the areas on which Kosovo 
needed to work in order to meet its commitments.   
5.3.3 Shaping the discourse of what is normal 
The ability to shape discourses of what is considered normal is another important element 
of the NPE approach (Forsberg 2011: 1197) and is directly related to identity 
modifications. The implementation of this mechanism can be reflected in projects aiming 
to induce changes to the two parties’ understanding of the conflict and, hence, to their 
identities. As with the case of Cyprus, projects related to education will be given special 
attention here.  
Firstly, it should be noted that, just like in Cyprus, there are two distinct education systems 
currently operating in Kosovo. The Kosovar education system operates in Southern 
Kosovo while the Serbian education system operates in Northern Kosovo and in the 
Serbian enclaves. As an education specialist (Appendix A: 30) explained to the author, 
the EU, up until now, did not invest in creating a unified education system in Kosovo.  
Nonetheless, one project that can be described as aiming at identity modifications was 
titled ‘Inter-culturalism and the Bologna Process’ and was funded through the IPA and 
implemented by the Council of Europe. The main aim of this project was to create the 
necessary conditions for a sustainable intercultural understanding among all communities 
in Kosovo. It focused on providing assistance in drafting education legislation and 
training of curriculum developers, textbook authors and teachers in EDC/HRE (Education 
for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education). These groups of people also 
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received training in history and multiculturalism teaching and language policies (see CoE 
and EU Joint Programmes website cited in the bibliography).  
In terms of direct output, the project resulted in more than 3500 teachers and NGO 
activists participating in the training sessions. Also, another outcome was the drafting of 
a manual titled ‘History Teaching Today-Approaches and Methods’ (CoE 2011: 7). This 
manual highlighted the importance of multiperspectivity. According to its author, “in 
order to give students an understanding of the world they live in, history teaching needs 
to be inclusive – needs to include different perspectives” (Black 2011: 15). According to 
Black (2011: 16), multiperspectivity will lead to the long-term consequence of “educating 
generations for peace, tolerance and democracy” (Black 2011: 16). This manual was 
subsequently translated and adapted for use in Kovovo’s schools (CoE 2011: 7). As the 
aforementioned education specialist confirmed (Appendix A: 30), multiperspectivity in 
history teaching in general as well as the aforementioned materials in particular, were 
being used by some schools and teachers in Kosovo.  
The ‘shaping of discourses’ mechanism, if successfully implemented, should have 
resulted in altered identities of the parties involved in a conflict by shaping their 
perceptions of what counts as normal. The main conclusion that can be drawn is that this 
mechanism resulted in more sustainable outcomes in Kosovo than in Cyprus. In Kosovo, 
the EU was able to induce some changes to the conflict, notably in relation to history 
teaching.  
5.3.4 Model Power 
In the context of EU-Kosovo relations, Kosovo’s aspiration for membership and the EU’s 
model power are interrelated. In order to examine whether model power was at work in 
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Kosovo, this section will discuss whether Kosovars and Kosovo-Serbs considered the EU 
as an example to follow.   
Kosovars 
At the state level, Kosovar officials clearly admitted the leverage they attach to the EU. 
“We need a European Kosovo, a European Serbia” (Thaçi 2014). Moreover, official 
statements revealed an admiration for EU values. Atifete Jahjaga, then President of 
Kosovo, during a speech on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Franco-German 
reconciliation, noted that:  
Not only did they [French President Charles de Gaulle and German Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer] change the future of their respective countries, but upon the 
ruins of wars and the state of perpetual insecurity, they laid the foundation of a 
united Europe. A Europe in peace and prosperity, where sovereign and 
independent states- sworn enemies until the very yesterday- would commit 
themselves to a common European vision… This reflection upon an event of such 
historic gravity becomes even more familiar today, during this period of 
developments in Balkans, when we are vigorously trying to change the course of 
history, to leave hatred behind us, together with the loss and suffering that have 
touched the lives of many of us (Jahjaga 2013a).  
Similarly, Thaçi, former Kosovar Prime Minister, stated: “Kosovo belongs to everyone 
and it is the homeland of all of its citizens. Therefore, Kosovo needs to be united in its 
diversity towards including all communities in our society and putting aside our 
differences” (Thaçi 2010). Another indicative example came from Thaçi after the signing 
of the first agreement between Kosovo and Serbia: “Both our countries need stability and 
peace. I know that both peoples have been committed in hating each other. This 
Agreement will be something new, a new momentum, a new psychology. This is a new 
era of cooperation” (European Council TV Newsroom).  
Kosovar officials, therefore, showed a quite high degree of admiration for EU values and 
a willingness to work towards their full internalisation. However, as Marc Weller (2008a: 
681, 2009), the legal adviser to the Kosovo delegation at the Vienna negotiations, 
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demonstrated, since the early days of these negotiations, Kosovar politicians understood 
that the desire for independence would only be realised by committing to EU values (i.e. 
equal rights to all communities irrespective of ethnicity) and, hence, had to publicly 
proclaim their support for these values (see also Noutcheva 2009: 1080-81). Similarly, 
two high-ranked Kosovo officials (Appendix B: 5, 6) explained to the author that 
Kosovo’s discourse needed to reflect the European values since Kosovo aspired to join 
the EU. 
Moreover, concerning the EU-facilitated dialogue, as discussed earlier in this chapter, 
progress was possible only because of the EU promise of an SAA and the opening of 
accession negotiations with Serbia. According to a senior Commission official working 
in DG Enlargement, “the priority of most Kosovar politicians is to get the country closer 
to the EU. This means that they have to abide by EU values” (Appendix B: 13). In 
addition, a Pristina-based Commission official (Appendix B: 7) explained to the author 
that it was very reluctantly that the Kosovar leadership accepted some of the EU’s 
requests (i.e. to abandon the use of status-related symbols) and that without the prospect 
of EU accession, the situation in Kosovo would be very different (see also Weller 2009). 
Similarly, a European Commission official working in the Directorate General for 
Enlargement, stated that Kosovans “would not have compromised if there was not a 
reward at the end of this. It is very clear that they want to progress on the EU path and 
that’s why they make compromises” (Appendix B: 11). It therefore becomes increasingly 
clear that Kosovar leaders viewed the EU membership as a path towards instrumental 
gains. 
In addition, a Pristina-based Commission official (Appendix B: 7) stated: “We are 
witnessing a sort of wake-up calls which are revealing that adherence to EU values is 
superficial”. This rhetorical adherence to EU values for instrumental reasons was also 
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reflected in some statements of Kosovar officials. Thaçi, for example, seemingly out of 
exasperation for the non-implementation of visa liberalisation, threatened Kosovo’s 
unification with Albania (UNMIK Media Monitoring 2013c). Therefore, the lack of any 
tangible benefits from the EU, led Kosovar officials to prioritise principles different from 
the ones promoted by the EU. In this case, Thaçi prioritised the value of ethnicity that 
was contrary to the principles of multi-ethnicity and reconciliation promoted by the EU 
(see also Narten 2010: 273).  
It, therefore, becomes evident that Kosovar officials abided by EU principles mainly 
because they wanted to progress towards EU accession. However, CSOs and think tanks 
were very sceptical towards the potential of Kosovo’s accession to the EU. For many of 
them, the membership promise held no credibility because of the five non-recognisers. 
According to the Group for Legal and Political Studies, for example, “In the past 
consensus within the EU was achieved at the cost of Kosovo’s statehood. Until there are 
guarantees that this will not be the case in the future, the trust towards Brussels will be 
limited in Pristina” (Group for Legal and Political Studies 2013: 18. For another example, 
see KIPRED 2012). According to a Kosovar researcher at the European Stability Initiative 
(ESI), “the government is doing all the work but membership is not on the table. There 
are two ways for Kosovo to join the EU. Either the five non-recognisers will recognise 
Kosovo or the Treaty of the European Union will change. None of these is going to 
happen though” (Appendix A: 32). It seems therefore that the EU has drawn negative 
attention in its dealings with the Kosovo conflict that stems from its inability to deliver 
on its promises. From this perspective, the credibility of membership is, therefore, 




Turning to the Kosovo-Serbs, this section argues that, just like the Kosovars, they did not 
regard the EU as an example to follow. To begin with, support for EU accession was very 
low among Kosovo-Serbs. The majority had a negative attitude towards Kosovo’s EU 
integration mostly due to disbelief that EU accession could benefit their community 
(KFOS 2012: 28). Also, most Kosovo-Serbs did not believe that the Brussels agreement 
had a positive impact on them (Platform for Analysis and Research 2015: 9).  
In addition, Kosovo-Serbs prioritised values different from the ones promoted by the EU. 
More specifically, they attached more value to the principles of ethnicity rather than 
multiethnicity. For example, in 2012, a referendum in Northern Kosovo rejected ethnic 
Albanian rule of the territory. According to the BBC (2012), “99.7 per cent of voters in 
the referendum said no to recognising the Kosovo government”. For Dragisa Milovic, 
then Serb mayor of the Northern Kosovan municipality of Zvecan, “We want to be part 
of Serbia - nothing more, nothing less. If the international community gave Albanians 
their own country, why should they not listen to us? It is the reality - this area is still 
Serbia” (BBC 2011)72.  
Kosovo-Serb criticisms were also directed against EULEX that was characterised as one-
sided. According to Goran Rakic, the mayor of North Mitrovica, “prosecution and the 
courts must be independent in their work and we do not want to influence their work, but 
we ask that Serbs have the same rights as other defendants who are often treated leniently 
and even forgiven when they escape from the detention facility” (UNMIK Media Moni-
toring 2014). Similarly, Dragan Jablanović, Mayor of Leposavic and member of the man-
agement team for the implementation of the Brussels Agreement, stated “The way in 
which the EULEX is functioning and the way in which it behaves towards the Serbs is 
                                                             
72 A turnout of 75.28% was reported by B92 (2012).  
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totally incomprehensible and unacceptable. It is far away from the law and justice and 
looks more like a market” (UNMIK Media Monitoring 2014a). Lastly, it should also be 
noted that several protests were organised by Kosovo-Serb citizens of North Mitrovica 
against EULEX to express their dissatisfaction towards the mission (see, for example, 
UNMIK Media Monitoring 2014b and Vucheva 2008a). 
 
Overall, therefore, it is difficult to conclude that Kosovo-Serbs regarded the EU as an 
example to follow. The fact that the EU promoted the integration of Kosovo-Serbs into 
the Kosovan state - which meant that Kosovo-Serbs could not be part of Serbia - and the 
fact that EULEX, according to them, behaved in a discriminatory and unlawful manner, 
created a very negative perception of the EU among Kosovo-Serbs. As a result, Kosovo-
Serbs held generally negative views towards anything that came from the EU (Appendix 
A: 21). Also, Kosovo-Serbs prioritised ethnicity rather than the multiethnicity promoted 
by the EU. For example, their leadership talked about integration with Serbia rather than 
with the Kosovar structures.  
To conclude, it seems that material incentives were the main driving force behind 
Kosovo’s behavioural adaptation. The EU’s power of attraction led to a degree of 
discursive and behavioural adaptation. However, the EU’s power of example was not at 
play. Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990: 290-292) suggested that “exogenous material 
inducements lead over time to the internalisation of norms once adopted for instrumental 
reasons … In the long run, admission to the EU club can have a constitutive effect on a 
state’s identity leading to shared cognitive understandings with the rest of the EU 
members”. Whilst this might prove to be true, it is still the case that, during the period 
under examination in this thesis, the Kosovars did not regard the EU as an example to 
follow but rather as a way towards material advantages. Kosovo-Serbs, for their part, did 
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not show such discursive adaptation as they tended to reject the EU mission on the ground 
as well as EU values.  
5.3.5 Attribution of Prestige/Shaming 
This mechanism took different forms over time in Kosovo. At the beginning of the 1990s, 
when tensions became evident (see Chapter Three), the EU imposed an arms embargo on 
Yugoslavia. However, from 1998 onwards, when violence increased dramatically in 
Kosovo (see Chapter Three), the EU imposed four other types of sanctions. These 
included a visa ban that forbade entry to the EU to senior FRY representatives, several 
types of financial sanctions, a commercial flight ban and a ban on the supply and sale of 
petroleum and petroleum products to the FRY. Exemptions to the oil embargo were made 
on humanitarian grounds. Another exemption was made for supplies to international 
forces within the FRY so that NATO would be able to carry on its operations (see Portela 
2010: 63).  
The importance of the aforementioned sanctions in the context of this research becomes 
more evident when considering how they were linked to the norm under question. 
Giumelli (2013: 19) highlighted the importance of the signalling aspect of sanctions 
which, according to him, highlights “the importance of a norm in international relations 
and stigmatises non-compliance with that norm”. According to the same author, travel 
ban sanctions are mostly associated with ‘naming and shaming’ as they mainly aim to 
signal dissatisfaction with particular individuals. Arms embargoes also have a strong 
signalling effect on audiences (Giumelli 2013). 
Andrighetto and Villatoro, meanwhile, made a distinction between sanctions and 
punishment. According to them (Andrighetto and Villatoro 2011: 2), punishment 
“influences the instrumental mind of the individual by shaping his material payoffs”. 
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Sanctions, however, “aim at influencing both the instrumental and the normative mind of 
the wrongdoer”. This means that the wrongdoer, in deciding on his/her future behaviour, 
will not only take into account the material costs but also the norm. In relation to the 
sanctions imposed on the Milošević regime, the EU made it clear that sanctions were 
imposed because of gross human rights violations (European Council 1999). More 
specifically, the 1999 Berlin European Council stated  
Our policy is neither directed against the Yugoslav or Serb population nor against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the Republic of Serbia. It is directed against 
the irresponsible Yugoslav leadership under President Milošević. It is directed 
against security forces cynically and brutally fighting a part of their own 
population. We want to put an end to these outrages. President Milošević must 
stop Serb aggression in Kosovo and sign the Rambouillet Accords, which include 
a NATO-led implementation force to provide stability (European Council 1999). 
The European Council concluded  
We underline that it is not our aim to keep the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 
its self-imposed isolation in Europe and the world. On the contrary, we would like 
to end the isolation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Europe. But for this 
to happen, Milošević must choose the path of peace in Kosovo and the path of 
reform and democratisation, including freedom of the media in the whole of 
Yugoslavia (European Council 1999).  
The establishment of a link between the sanctions and human rights violations does not 
point towards efforts to punish but rather towards efforts to shift attention to the violated 
norm.  
After the 1998-9 war, and after the development of a closer relationship between the EU 
and Kosovo, the EU started conferring prestige on Kosovo because of its decision to re-
engage in a dialogue with Serbia and, most importantly, because of the visible 
improvements in the relationship between the two countries. In this respect, on 28 June 
2013, the European Council authorised the opening of negotiations on a Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement with Kosovo (European Council 2013). The EU, thus, rewarded 
Kosovo for the steps it had taken to normalise relations with Serbia. In the words of Štefan 
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Füle: “You have made impressive progress in your relations with Serbia, and you have 
made substantial progress in meeting the priorities of our feasibility study. The start of 
negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union is 
your well-deserved reward” (European Commission 2013c).  
However, it should be noted that, after the 1998-99 war, shaming was also at play. In this 
period, it took the form of pinpointing individual cases that were perceived as violating 
fundamental principles of the EU which Kosovo should be respecting. For example, this 
was the case with the violence in Mitrovica during the November 2013 local elections. 
These elections were part of the EU-facilitated deal reached between Kosovo and Serbia 
and were the first elections that involved the participation of Kosovo-Serbs. They were, 
therefore, significant in terms of the reconciliation. Violence, however, occurred in a 
polling station in the city. The head of the EU’s election observation mission, Roberto 
Gualtieri, characterised it as “an attack on fundamental human rights” (Deutsche Welle 
2013). Catherine Ashton’s spokesperson was also critical “because they have disrupted 
an otherwise very orderly run electoral process in the rest of Kosovo” (Reuters 2013).  
Overall, therefore, the instrument of prestige/shaming took different forms over time. 
Firstly, shaming strategies through the imposition of sanctions were directed towards the 
Milošević regime. However, after the establishment of closer relations with Serbia, the 
EU started conferring prestige on Kosovo. However, shaming continued to be 
implemented through the condemnation of individual cases that were seen as violating 
EU principles. 
5.4 COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 
On persuasion, this comparative assessment identifies certain differences between the two 
cases. In the case of Cyprus, persuasion was implemented through certain regulations 
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aimed at creating further contacts between the two communities, support for the UN 
negotiation process and institutionalisation of relations with the Turkish-Cypriot 
community after 2004. Ideally, the aforementioned policies could have led to changed 
perceptions of normality on both sides of the conflict. However, certain policies like, for 
example, the EU’s proposed Direct Trade Regulation was strongly criticised by Greek-
Cypriots and, as a result, was not implemented. Encouragement of dialogue materialised 
through EU envoys and personal representatives in Cyprus and through the Steering 
Group. Their contribution, however, was minimal. Lastly, institutional links were 
established with the RoC through the accession process. Institutionalisation of relations 
with the Turkish-Cypriot community occurred after 2004 and was implemented through 
the establishment of the European Parliament’s High Level Contact Group and the 
European Union Programme Support Office in Northern Cyprus. However, 
institutionalised relations between the EP and the Turkish-Cypriot community came to an 
end after the change of attitude of the High Level Contact Group. In the case of Kosovo, 
constructive engagement took the form of reconstruction and development funds. 
Encouragement of dialogue materialised through the initiation of a dialogue on the 
technical issues affecting reconciliation and on the future status of Kosovo. However, 
there was a lot of arm-twisting, a lack of transparency and a failure to engage the Kosovo-
Serbs. Lastly, relations between Kosovo and the EU were institutionalised through the 
EUSR, the ECLO and EULEX. In addition, it should be noted that the EP-Kosovo 
Parliament meetings constituted a constructive forum where opinions were exchanged 
and scope for agreement identified. Overall, persuasion was employed more in Kosovo 
than in Cyprus. In Kosovo, the EU was the leading actor facilitating the dialogue between 
Kosovo and Serbia and also established its own mission on the ground. In addition, EP 
relations with the Kosovo Parliament were well established. On the contrary, in Cyprus, 
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persuasion was not so extensively employed by the EU. The EU’s efforts to encourage 
dialogue were quite minimal in comparison to Kosovo. In addition, the EU’s proposed 
DTR was not implemented due to local reactions. Lastly, formal relations between the EP 
and the Turkish-Cypriot community came to an end in 2012.  
Invoking norms is an instrument related to the activation of commitments. In the case of 
Kosovo, this mechanism took the form of invoking Kosovo’s commitments through 
successive European Partnerships. However, in the case of Cyprus, the EU did not have 
the choice to implement this tool in a similar fashion. As a result, this tool took a different 
form. It was mostly directed at convincing Turkey to show respect for international law 
and fulfil its obligations to the Cyprus conflict.  
With regards to the implementation of the ‘shaping of the discourse of what is normal’ 
mechanism, differences can be observed between the two cases. In the case of Cyprus, 
this third NPE mechanism was not implemented rigorously enough for NPE standards. 
This chapter identified and discussed three projects that could have led to changes in the 
narrative of what is normal. However, these projects did not resonate with the target 
audience. The ‘New Trends in History teaching’ project, for example, met the resistance 
of the RoC authorities. In 2014, the latter of the three projects was launched. However, 
its implementation and effectiveness cannot be analysed further due to the lack of relevant 
sources of information. In the case of Kosovo, however, this mechanism was 
implemented to a greater extent and led to certain changes in the education sector. The 
‘Interculturalism and the Bologna process’ project resulted in the drafting of a manual on 
history teaching that was used by some schools in Kosovo.  
Model power was not at play as both cases confirm that the EU was mostly seen as a path 
towards instrumental gains. In the case of Cyprus, Turkish-Cypriot adherence to EU 
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values was directly related to political and economic benefits. Greek-Cypriots, on the 
other hand, seemed willing to adhere to EU law and EU practice. However, a more careful 
reading of the evidence suggests that Greek-Cypriots also had instrumental purposes, like 
the need to get the EU’s support in the discussions for a political solution of the conflict. 
With regards to Kosovo, Kosovars showed a high degree of adherence to EU values, 
albeit for instrumental reasons since it was the only way for their country to join the EU. 
Kosovo-Serbs, however, did not adopt such discursive adaptations as they did not believe 
that the EU could help them with their situation.  
Lastly, attribution of prestige/shaming was at play in both cases. In Cyprus, shaming was 
initially directed towards Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots for their intransigent stance. 
However, after 2004 and the rejection of the Annan Plan by Greek-Cypriots, shaming 
was directed towards Greek-Cypriots who were seen as the main actors to blame for the 
non-resolution of the conflict. In the case of Kosovo, shaming the Milošević regime 
became a popular tactic through the imposition of sanctions. However, the development 
of closer relations with Serbia led the EU to start conferring prestige to Kosovo by 
initiating an SAA agreement. The EU, however, continued to use shaming strategies 
through the condemnation of specific incidents that were seen as violating EU principles. 
Overall, therefore, the comparative assessment of the two cases revealed that the EU 
attempted to promote the ‘sustainable peace’ norm mostly through persuasion, norm 
invocation and attribution of prestige/shaming. These instruments were employed more 
extensively in the case of Kosovo than in Cyprus. However, not all of them were always 
implemented in a normative fashion and in line with NPE expectations. Persuasion, for 
instance, tended to take the form of imposition (see also Noutcheva 2009: 1081). In 
addition, the shaping of discourses mechanism was not rigorously implemented in 
Cyprus. However, in the case of Kosovo, the implementation of this mechanism induced 
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some changes, especially with regards to history teaching. Lastly, model power was not 
at play in either case. This could potentially have important implications on the third 
aspect of the NPE framework, namely the EU’s normative impact. The findings of that 
section could lead to the conclusion that EU policies had limited impact on identity 
modification and, hence, on conflict transformation. However, this will be discussed in 















CHAPTER SIX: TESTING THE NORMATIVITY OF EU 
IMPACT 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The two previous chapters assessed the normativity of the EU’s objectives and policies 
towards Cyprus and Kosovo. Turning to the third stage of the tripartite analysis (see 
Chapter 2), this chapter aims to evaluate the impact of EU policies towards the two cases. 
What needs to be examined is whether any changes occurred in Cyprus and Kosovo 
towards the norm of ‘sustainable peace’ as a result of EU policies and programmes.  
Normative change, however, is not easy to measure. As Niemann and de Wekker (2009: 
10) noted, “normative change can only be approximated”. Nevertheless, according to 
Manners (2009: 3), the normative impact produced from the promotion of principles 
should include “socialisation, partnership and ownership”. Therefore, if the EU was 
successful in promoting its norms and in implementing a normative agenda, then these 
three outcomes should emerge. In what follows, this chapter will discuss the three aspects 
of normative impact in relation to the two cases of Cyprus and Kosovo. 
6.2 THE CASE OF CYPRUS 
The subsequent analysis assesses the extent to which normative change occurred in 
Cyprus as a result of EU practices. A successful promotion of the norm of ‘sustainable 
peace’ through normative means aiming at conflict transformation should produce certain 
empirically observable results at the domestic level. 
6.2.1 Socialisation 
The main aim of this section is to assess the extent to which socialisation into the 
‘sustainable peace’ norm emerged in Cyprus as a result of EU policies. As Tocci (2007: 
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20) noted, “conflict transformation calls for deep-rooted changes in public attitudes and 
positions”. In this respect, an indicator of conflict transformation and the internalisation 
of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm would be changed attitudes of a wide range of political 
and societal actors from both communities. Principled ideas held by the EU should be 
internalised by local Cypriot actors and should become “collective understandings about 
appropriate behaviour which will lead to changes in identity, interests and behaviour” 
(Risse et al. 1999: 11). As Manners (Appendix A: 36) stated, “On the one end of the 
spectrum is the fixed and given while on the other is the fluid. The EU, therefore, should 
turn notions of conflict into more fluid notions of peace. Part of conflict transformation 
is about changing the language used”. In what follows, this sub-section traces the 
internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm by examining the discourse of political 
elites, the alternative narratives offered by Cypriot civil society and public attitudes. 
Official Statements 
The importance of language and discourse in conflict settings is widely acknowledged. 
Language can encourage and maintain conflict just as it can encourage and maintain peace 
(Kelly 2012: 242, Wenden 1999: 20). Conflict is usually sustained by what Gutierrez et 
al called a ‘transcended script’ that refers to “dominant forms of knowledge generally 
valued as legitimate by both the local culture and the larger society” (1995: 448). It, 
therefore, follows that if the EU was successful in promoting the ‘sustainable peace’ 
norm, these dominant forms of knowledge should be in line with the premises of the 
norm. More specifically, if internalisation of the norm has occurred, then language 
practices should reflect reconciliation and willingness for reintegration. In the opposite 
scenario, a divisive discourse will be dominant. In this case, although alternative 
discourses might exist, these will remain largely marginalised in the wider society (see 
Bar-Tal 2007: 1435-1436). 
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With regards to the Cypriot context, the analysis of speeches by political elites revealed 
that the official account of the conflict perpetuated the division between the two 
communities.  
The starting point is that both communities developed their own narratives with regards 
to the conflict and their own normative frameworks for what they considered the ‘right’ 
solution. Having examined a large number of speeches of both Greek- and Turkish-
Cypriot officials, this chapter argues that no major changes occurred with regards to these 
narratives and frameworks. On the contrary, the conflict was perpetuated in the political 
discourse. First of all, the two sides used a different interpretation of the events that led 
to the division of the island (see also Chapter Three). In all speeches examined, Greek-
Cypriots referred to the 1974 events as a war and as an invasion by Turkey (see, for 
example, Anastasiades 2014a). Meanwhile, Turkish-Cypriots described the 1974 events 
with the term ‘peace operation’ conducted by Turkey to save Turkish-Cypriots (see, for 
example, Eroğlu 2012).  
Moreover, a common element in speeches was the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy which 
led to the presentation of ‘us’ as the victims and the ‘other’ as the main source of the 
conflict. Mehmet Ali Talat, Eroğlu’s predecessor, expressed this idea in a number of 
speeches, such as:  
Of course there are two peoples. May be, in time a single Cyprus people, speaking 
two different languages, will be formed. However, today two peoples exist, with 
different languages, religion, joy, sorrow and everything. Their area is different; 
their economy is different. When the one feels happy, the other is sad. There are 
two peoples who could have the same feelings only during an airplane accident or 
an earthquake (Talat 2008a).  
The same dichotomy was also evident in the speeches of Eroğlu. In one speech, he 
identified Greek-Cypriots as the main source of the “TRNC”’s problems: “The goal of 
our southern neighbours – the Greek-Cypriot side – is our economic downfall, or at least 
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preventing our development. Remember that the Direct Trade Charter73 promised by the 
EU after the 2004 Annan referendum could not be implemented due to Greek Cypriot 
obstruction” (Eroğlu 2011b).  
Greek-Cypriot leaders, for their part, also engaged in a blame game. However, in contrast 
to Turkish-Cypriot political elites, they mostly used positive self-presentation rather than 
negative other-presentation. However, it should be noted that, in some instances, negative 
presentations of the ‘other’ were also used by Greek-Cypriot elites. For example, 
Anastasiades, the RoC President, stated: “I want to make clear that, if there is a side that 
is interested in the earliest possible solution of the Cyprus problem, it is neither Turkey 
nor the Turkish Cypriot leadership [...] (Anastasiades 2014e. For another example, see 
Anastasiades 2014a). 
Furthermore, the words used to characterise the parties involved in the conflict are also 
important in this context. Eroğlu, for example, mostly addressed the Greek-Cypriots as 
neighbours (see, for example Eroğlu 2015 and Eroğlu 2011b). On the other hand, 
Anastasiades referred to Turkish-Cypriots as compatriots (see, for example, Anastasiades 
2014b and Christofias 2008).  
The use of such characterisations was directly related to another binary opposition related 
to the type of political solution each community envisaged. Turkish-Cypriot political 
leaders have been advocating the creation of a partnership of two constituent states. For 
example, Denktaş was favouring an independence policy for the “TRNC”. In his own 
words, “after having established the ‘republic’, it is impossible to eradicate it…” (Cyprus 
PIO 1995, see also Talat 2008, Eroğlu 2010, Eroğlu 2011). According to Eroğlu: “the 
Turkish Cypriots do not wish to end their self-governance system, bi-nationality, and the 
                                                             
73 For a more detailed discussion on the Direct Trade Regulation, see pp. 141-143.  
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actual and active guarantee of Turkey” (Eroğlu 2012a; for another example, see Eroğlu 
2011). He justified this preference by stating: “If we have not worked and succeed, we 
would not be able to live in these territories with our national and religious identity, and 
would disappear in other nation’s domination” (Eroğlu 2013).  However, this is in 
opposition to the solution preferred by Greek-Cypriots. Clerides (1999), for example, 
talked about a solution based on federation rather than on confederation that, according 
to him, was what Turkey desires. Also, both Christofias (2012) and his successor, 
Anastasiades, advocated the creation of a state with “one and single sovereignty, one and 
single international personality, one and single citizenship” (Anastasiades 2014) in which 
Greek and Turkish-Cypriots would be compatriots.  
The Turkish-Cypriot side interpreted the solution preferred by Greek-Cypriots as an 
attempt to dominate the island (see Eroğlu 2011c). Greek-Cypriots, on the other hand, 
believed that the partnership state proposed by Turkish-Cypriots would “jeopardise the 
future of the people of Cyprus, the prospect of a viable and durable settlement, the 
absolute priority of restoring the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all 
Cypriots…” (Anastasiades 2014a).  
What can be concluded from the above analysis is that the conflict became 
institutionalised in the language used by both Greek and Turkish-Cypriot political elites. 
An observable difference, however, is that while Greek-Cypriots mostly engaged in 
positive self-presentation, Turkish-Cypriots utilised positive self-presentation as well as 
negative other-presentation. Therefore, at least at the level of political elites, an 
internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm did not occur. 
In addition, as has also been discussed in the previous chapter, Cypriot political actors 
did not view the EU as a model to follow. Turkish-Cypriots perceived the EU in negative 
terms because of its inability to initiate certain regulations like, for example, the DTR. 
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On the other hand, Greek-Cypriots, already EU citizens, were asking for an upgraded role 
for the EU in the negotiations. It seems, therefore, that in accordance with the ‘logic of 
consequences’, EU principles and EU policies were evaluated by Cypriot actors largely 
in terms of cost/benefit calculations.  
Change of History Textbooks 
Directly related to the above analysis are the school textbooks on history which are 
believed to be reflecting dominant ideologies (Crawford 2003: 5), to be important in the 
formation of identities (Hutton and Mehlinger 1987: 141, Baranovic 2001: 24) and in 
conveying a particular image of the ‘other’ (Podeh 2002: 27-28). It follows that a 
significant change in history textbooks would reveal a change in perception. This is 
important in the context of this research since a change in the history textbooks towards 
sustainable peace would be an indicator and a catalyst of the internalisation of the norm.  
As the RoC’s accession date was approaching, attempts were made to change the history 
textbooks. In 2003, for example, the Ministry of Education and Culture (MOEC) 
appointed an Educational Reform Committee (ERC). Following EU guidelines, this 
committee prepared a report that proposed a revision of history teaching. The report, with 
a title of ‘Democratic and humanistic education in the Euro-Cypriot State: potential for 
reform and modernisation’ (MoEC 2004) was indicative of the value attached to the EU. 
This report mainly proposed an alteration of the education system based on the pluralist 
framework suggested by the EU. More specifically, the report proposed the elimination 
of the narrow ethnocentric elements of the Cypriot education system and its realignment 
towards inter-culturalism and multi-culturalism with specific reference made to the 
Turkish-Cypriot community. 
With regards to history education, the aforementioned report proposed the introduction 
of new history textbooks written by Greek and Turkish-Cypriot experts. Moreover, the 
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committee recommended “a more systematic teaching of history through programs and 
textbooks which are in accordance with the contemporary European standards (peaceful 
coexistence, multiculturalism, respect of difference and abolition of chauvinism, 
intolerance and interracial hatred” (Educational Reform Committee 2004: 157). 
However, the aforementioned proposal fuelled a heated debate among Greek-Cypriots. 
Political parties and public opinion were divided between those favouring a Cyprocentric 
approach and those favouring a Hellenocentric approach74 (Perikleous 2013: 47; see also 
Philippou 2009: 217). As a result of the strong opposition to the aforementioned 
proposals, attempts to introduce new history textbooks failed.  
The issue reappeared in 2008 when the MOEC stated that reconciliation and 
rapprochement would be the main learning objective for the upcoming school year 
(MOEC 2008: 1). Although the Ministry did not explicitly refer to history education, it 
argued that the past should be approached in ways which support the aims of peaceful 
coexistence, mutual recognition of each other’s past injustices and emphasis on the 
aspects of the past that unite the two communities (MoEC 2008: 2). This change, 
however, met strong public resistance because it was perceived as an attempt by the newly 
elected leftist government to politically manipulate education (Philippou 2009).  
Turning to the Turkish-Cypriots, high school history textbooks were revised in 2003–04.  
The content and presentation of historical facts in these new textbooks, in circulation from 
September 2004, were directed towards the goals of reconciliation and reunification of 
                                                             
74 According to Perikleous (2013: 45), “this was not merely a confrontation between classical and 
vocational education, but more importantly a confrontation about the orientation of Greek Cypriot 
education in relation to Greece. In a more general level, this was essentially a collision between the idea 
of Cyprus as part of Greece and the one of Cyprus as a distinct entity”. 
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the island75. For Demetriou (2008: 89), these new textbooks showed “the profound impact 
that the EU can have on border conflicts in terms of promoting a ‘change of scripts’”. 
However, in 2009, the history textbooks were again revised when the rightist UBP 
(National Unity Party) won the election. The new books moved away from EU values 
and reflected more nationalistic ideology; they were more similar to the originals rather 
than the revised ones of 2004 (Trmikliniotis and Demetriou 2011: 14). 
Overall, concerning the Greek-Cypriots, although there were some voices in favour of 
reconciliation, these originated from left-wing political parties, like AKEL, which had 
always been following this line of thought. With regards to the Turkish-Cypriots, some 
changes occurred in 2003-04 when there was still the possibility of acceding to the Union. 
For example, during that period, history textbooks were revised. However, in 2009, when 
EU accession was no longer on the table, history textbooks were changed again and 
reflected more nationalistic ideology. This suggests a lack of internalisation of the norm 
in question. Taking into account the above analysis of political elite rhetoric, it becomes 
evident that the sustainable peace norm has not been internalised either by the Greek or 
Turkish-Cypriots.   
Transformation from below: tracing the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm in 
civil society  
As discussed in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the process of transforming 
conflicts requires the involvement of a variety of local actors. Having discussed the 
official discourse of Cypriot political elites, this section will now move on to trace the 
internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm by CSOs. Such organisations convey a 
different narrative of the conflict in comparison to the one offered by political elites.  
                                                             
75 For a discussion on the main differences between the old and new textbooks, see Vural and Özuyanık 
(2008).   
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With regards to the Turkish-Cypriot community, CSOs developed an EU-framed 
narrative to promote reconciliation. For example, in 2000, the ‘This Country is Ours’ 
scheme was created by several organisations including trade unions and CSOs. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, this scheme was quite important as more than 40 groups 
got involved. The scheme strongly advocated a negotiated solution to the conflict and 
membership of the EU. Also, one of the main aims of this scheme was to promote self-
governance for the Turkish-Cypriots and to oppose Turkey’s interference in the 
“TRNC”’s administration76.  
Another initiative was the drafting of the ‘Common Vision of the Turkish-Cypriot Civil 
Society’ under the leadership of the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of Commerce in 2002. 
More than 90 organisations signed this document which highlighted the importance of 
solving the conflict prior to the RoC’s accession to the EU. The founding declaration of 
the organisation illustrated the value attached to the EU: “we need a transformation. The 
name of this transformation is solution and European Union membership” (The Common 
Vision of the Turkish Cypriot Civil Society 2002).  
Turning to the Greek-Cypriot side, civil society mobilisation was not so widespread. In 
2002, the ‘Citizens’ movement for re-unification and co-existence’ was created. The 
founding declaration noted that one of the main aims was: 
to contribute towards the development and propagation of the culture of peaceful 
co-existence between Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and the other ethnic 
groups in Cyprus. In a broader sense, to contribute towards the development and 
propagation of the culture and principles of understanding and co-existence 
between people, irrespective of their ethnic origin, religion, gender, colour and 
difference of opinion, within the context of the European Union (Citizens’ 
Movement for Cooperation and Co-existence 2002) 
                                                             
76 The scheme was created mostly as a response to the austerity measures that Turkey wanted to 
implement in Northern Cyprus in 2001 (Hoffmeister 2006: 125). 
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Also, since 2009, most bi-communal CSOs and initiatives were placed under the umbrella 
organisation ‘Bi-communal Peace Initiative - United Cyprus’. In its founding declaration, 
the organisation noted “a lasting solution and peace on our island will only be realised by 
the joining together of the communities, and through their collaboration in social, cultural, 
economic and political life. Our priority must be to fight the separatist, fascist and racist 
forces that have been instrumental in the division of our island as well as in the rise of 
chauvinism and enmity” (Bi-communal Peace Initiative - United Cyprus). 
Also, in order to have a complete picture of Greek-Cypriot civil society, it should be noted 
that, while the aforementioned organisations seemed to agree with the EU’s principles 
and accepted the Annan Plan, some organisations followed a different line of thought. 
One such example was the Greek Orthodox Church which adamantly opposed the Annan 
Plan on the grounds that it was not consistent with international law and human rights 
principles (International Crisis Group 2006; Kanol 2010: 39). It must be noted that the 
Greek Orthodox Church is the most trusted institution in the Greek-Cypriot community 
(‘Cyprus 2015 Initiative’ 2009) and, therefore, has a significant role to play in shaping 
political perceptions of the public.  
Interviews with people involved in bi-communal CSOs (Appendix A: 2, 6, 15) 
demonstrated that these organisations’ aims and agendas were compatible with the EU’s 
normative framework. Many of these organisations favoured the development of closer 
relations between Greek and Turkish-Cypriots and accepted the EU-supported federation 
model as the best political solution to the conflict. However, most of the organisations 
that joined these schemes and platforms appeared to have formed their agenda prior to 
the EU’s active involvement in sustainable peace promotion in Cyprus. The idea of EU 
membership might have been the main driver behind the formation of the aforementioned 
civil society platforms and the creation of more organisations in the period 2002-2005. 
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However, most of the pre-existing organisations that joined these platforms had already 
been advocating these principles in the 1990s, before the EU started engaging with civil 
society on the island. It is, therefore, difficult to see the promotion of the principle of 
reconciliation by these groups as a direct impact of the EU. However, what can be 
concluded is that the prospect of EU accession boosted the activities of such organisations 
and led to the creation of wider platforms like the ‘This Country is Ours’.  
Overall, therefore, civil society demonstrates a different picture in comparison to political 
elites. Turkish-Cypriot organisations were largely in favour of the EU and its ideas. 
However, the above analysis revealed that the Greek-Cypriot civil society demonstrated 
a mixed picture. Although there are some actors that support the EU’s principles, the 
Church, the most trusted institution in the community, followed a different line of 
thought.  
Public Attitudes 
This section will shift the focus to the wider public because conflict transformation 
approaches suggest that the internalisation of the sustainable peace norm should be 
observable in concrete changes at the broader societal level. In what follows, public 
attitudes will be examined by discussing some themes that emerged in interviews 
conducted by the author and by examining opinion polls on the topic of inter-communal 
relations in Cyprus. The reason why these opinion polls are important for this thesis is the 
fact that different opinion polls in different years yielded similar results. This is an 
indication that perceptions of the other community remained largely unchanged.  
First of all, a survey conducted by the University of the West of England (UWE) 
suggested that the Cyprus conflict was a major public concern in both communities (Flynn 
et al. 2012). This concurred with surveys conducted in Cyprus that showed that the 
conflict was the most important determinant of voting behaviour (Ant1 2010, Ant1 2011). 
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In addition, several opinion polls indicated that both communities shared the views of 
their political elites. For example, Greek-Cypriots describe the Cyprus conflict as 
primarily an invasion conducted by a foreign power (Turkey) while Turkish-Cypriots see 
it as the problem of co-existence between two communities (Flynn et al. 2012: 31). 
Moreover, the vast majority of both Greek and Turkish-Cypriots were discontent with the 
status quo (Tocci et al 2008: 9, ‘Cyprus 2015 Initiative’ 2009). This revealed a public 
desire for changes regarding the political situation on the island and was supported by the 
fact that both Greek and Turkish-Cypriots were in favour of a mutually acceptable 
solution being reached through the peace process (Tocci et al. 2008). However, Greek-
Cypriots’ first preference was the creation of a unitary state with a central government 
for the whole of Cyprus. Turkish-Cypriots first choice, on the other hand, was the creation 
of two separate and internationally recognised states (Tocci et al. 2008: 30-33). Interviews 
showed that Greek-Cypriots feared the possibility of the extensive involvement of Turkey 
in the affairs of Cyprus while Turkish-Cypriots were worried about a central government 
dominated by Greek-Cypriots (Appendix A: 5, 6, 8, 17, Appendix B:1) 
Also, a prominent theme in opinion polls was the lack of trust between the two 
communities. For example, one conducted by UNFICYP in 2007 revealed a continuing 
absence of trust between Greek and Turkish-Cypriots (UNFICYP 2007). Also, the 2010 
UNSG report noted that: “Polls indicate […] distrust on both sides that if a settlement 
were to be reached, the other side would have any serious intention of honouring it” 
(UNSG 2010). However, another opinion poll conducted by Georgiades (2007) in the 
same year provided different conclusions. His research demonstrated that only 20% of 
Greek-Cypriot respondents reported mistrust towards Turkish-Cypriots while even less 
were pessimistic about peaceful co-existence with them. However, 43% of respondents 
felt that Greek-Cypriots, as a community, were not yet prepared to coexist with Turkish-
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Cypriots. This discrepancy can be explained by reference to another survey. The opinion 
polls conducted for the purposes of a project launched by CEPS (Tocci et al 2008: 24) 
revealed that Greek-Cypriots trusted the Turkish-Cypriots (61%) while Turkish-Cypriots 
(72%) mistrusted Greek-Cypriots. However, Greek-Cypriots mistrusted Turkish political 
institutions like the army and the government as well as the Turkish-Cypriot political 
actors who were believed to be following the political line of Ankara (Tocci et al 2008: 
24). Taking into consideration the fact that Greek-Cypriots perceived Turkey as being the 
master of the internal affairs of the “TRNC” (Appendix A: 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 14. Appendix 
B: 1, 2), the conclusion that levels of trust between the two communities had increased 
would be mistaken. A more recent survey conducted by UWE revealed that about two-
thirds from both samples did not trust the other community. The same survey also 
revealed that both Greek and Turkish-Cypriots believed that the majority of the other side 
still distrusted them (Flynn et al. 2012: 57-58). 
Also, with regards to the relationship between the two communities, a critical juncture in 
the development of closer relations between them was the April 2003 decision to open a 
number of border crossing points. The Green Line Regulation introduced in 2003 
provided a legal framework for the free movement of Cypriots. The opening of those 
crossing points seemed to have been helpful in the process of internalising the ‘sustainable 
peace’ norm. Before 2003, the de facto separation and the lack of any communication had 
created conditions conducive to negative stereotyping and social categorisation. 
However, the opening of the crossings, as interviews with experts on the issue (Appendix 
A: 1, 14, 15, 35) revealed, served to demystify the ‘other’ and to challenge taboos. As 
Sitas et al (2007) also demonstrated, both communities’ impressions of the ‘other side’ in 
2007, four years after the opening of the crossing points, were generally positive (48.1% 
of Greek-Cypriots, 30.5% of Turkish-Cypriots). As Sözen also argued, “a level of civility 
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and safety has been created” (Appendix A: 15). This, however, does not necessarily 
indicate identity modifications. Given the lack of trust between the two communities 
discussed in the previous paragraph, it is difficult to conclude that development of a more 
positive impression of the ‘other side’, indicated internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ 
norm. 
Moreover, the preparedness to develop closer relations was addressed in a survey 
conducted by the Cyprus 2015 initiative that focused on the willingness of the two 
communities to share the same neighbourhood and to work together. The polling data 
revealed that Greek-Cypriots were more open than Turkish-Cypriots to live in mixed 
neighbourhoods. However, a significant percentage (33%) of Greek-Cypriots opposed 
this idea while 15% were neutral. Turning to the Turkish-Cypriots, 34% of the 
participants would agree to live in the same neighbourhood with Greek-Cypriots, 35% of 
them would not while 28% were neutral (‘Cyprus 2015 Initiative’ 2011). Also, the UWE 
survey (Flynn et al 2012: 59-60) revealed that majorities in the Greek-Cypriot (59.7%) 
and Turkish-Cypriot (63.8%) communities found it unacceptable to be working under the 
leadership of a person from the other community.  
In addition, the UWE survey also revealed that both communities believed that they are 
qualitatively different from each other (Flynn et al 2012). These findings were supported 
by the Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) index results. The SCORE Index, 
developed by the UNDP Action for Cooperation and Trust (UNDP-ACT), the Centre of 
Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD) and USAID, is a tool to measure 
peace in multi-ethnic post-conflict societies. In Cyprus, SCORE was implemented in 
2013, 2014 and 2015. The main findings indicated that Greek and Turkish-Cypriots were 
growing further apart. For example, as noted in the report summarising the results, 
Turkish-Cypriots demonstrated decreased propensity for reconciliation while for Greek-
199 
 
Cypriots, cultural distance between the two communities became greater. More 
significantly, both communities perceived that “they are in fact culturally different” 
(SCORE 2014).  
The empirical data presented above demonstrates that the attitudes of the two 
communities towards each other did not show significant changes over time. Although, 
some interaction did indeed take place as a result of the crossings, opinion polls revealed 
a lack of trust between Greek and Turkish-Cypriots as well as a lack of willingness to 
intensify contacts thereby hindering progress towards an eventual internalisation of the 
‘sustainable peace’ norm. Comparing the results from opinion polls with the rhetoric of 
political elites, it seems that the same fears and arguments presented by each side’s 
political elites were espoused by the public and constitute the foundation of their attitudes. 
Overall, therefore, in the case of Cyprus, the EU was not successful in inducing the 
internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm by local actors.  
6.2.2 Partnership 
Partnership as a result of the promotion of principles can be empirically traced in the 
development of relationships between two parties, in this case between Greek and 
Turkish-Cypriots. In what follows, the development of partnership bonds will be 
examined at the level of the elites as well as the level of civil society.  
Also, what needs to be examined is the extent to which partnerships occurred as a result 
of EU policies, of the policies of other organisations such as the UN or of the changing 
internal dynamics. Process tracing will, therefore, be used to determine if and how X (EU 
initiatives promoting cooperation between the two communities) led to Y (effectiveness 
of such programmes). Effectiveness, in the context of this research, refers to building 
sustainable relationships between two parties. In what follows, it will be examined if “(1) 
a specific event or process took place, (2) a different event or process occurred after the 
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initial event or process, and (3) the former was a cause of the latter” (Mahoney 2012: 
571).  
Partnership as a result of specific EU projects 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the EU attempted to create further contacts between 
the two communities through the FAR regulation. This section will discuss whether the 
projects implemented under these regulations were effective in creating partnership 
bonds. Following Diez et al (2006), an indicator for the transformation of the conflict 
would be not only the increased contact between the conflict parties but also the 
establishment of cross-group social networks.  
With particular reference to the role of the EU77 in creating partnership bonds between 
Greek and Turkish-Cypriots, the ‘Partnership for the Future’ (PFF) needs to be discussed.  
PFF was funded by the EU through the FAR (see pp.138-140) and implemented by the 
UNDP. The UNDP-PFF website stated that the “PFF aims at contributing to the peace-
building process in Cyprus through different levels of intervention ranging from urban 
infrastructure rehabilitation to assistance to small and medium-sized enterprises as well 
as the de-mining of the Buffer Zone” (UNDP-PFF). The effectiveness of the projects 
implemented under UNDP-PFF towards promoting partnership will now be analysed. 
One project considered successful by the UND was the ‘New Nicosia Waste Water 
Treatment Plant’. The project stood as an example of cooperation as the new bi-
communal treatment plant was to be jointly managed by the two communities of Nicosia. 
                                                             
77 A large number of bi-communal activities were initiated, funded or implemented by other 
organisations like the UNDP or the US Embassy. One such programme was ENGAGE which was included 
in UNESCO’s list of the best projects in the area of reconciliation in 2010 (UNDP-ACT, News). The 




In the context of the project, therefore, technical cooperation emerged between the 
Municipality of Nicosia [north] and Sewage Board of Nicosia [south] (UNDP 2011:40). 
Another significant project was the opening of more crossing points. The Limnitis-Kato 
Pyrgos road improvement project was implemented between January and October 2010. 
This specific road had not been used since 1974 and was in poor condition. Improvement 
of the road was urgent because of a decision by the leaders of the two communities to 
open a crossing point there. The UNDP-PFF “contracted a joint venture, comprising 
Greek and Turkish-Cypriot companies, to prepare the designs, which were finalised in 
January 2010” (UNDP-PFF 2011: 30). A joint venture was also contracted “to supervise 
the works. This included an Italian company, a Greek-Cypriot company and a Turkish-
Cypriot company. The UNDP-PFF undertook intensive facilitation and mediation 
throughout the project in order to ensure that the crossing point could be opened on time” 
(UNDP 2011: 39).  
In addition, as discussed in the previous chapter, cultural heritage activities are considered 
important by the European Council for confidence building, since, in the past, “the two 
sides criticised each other for misusing and, often, even destroying, each other’s cultural 
heritage” (European Council cited in Ackermann 2012: 19). In 2008, following a call 
from the EP, the European Commission carried out a study on the conditions of the 
cultural heritage in the northern part of Cyprus (European Commission 2013). A 
Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage was established in 2008. In 2009, both Cypriot 
communities agreed to establish an ‘Advisory Board for the Preservation, Physical 
Protection and Restoration of the Immovable Cultural Heritage of Cyprus’ (PIO, RoC). 
According to the UNDP-PFF evaluation report, this produced “much impact in terms of 
reconciliation” (UNDP 2011: 41) as this was one of the few UNDP-PFF projects that 
involved both sides working together towards achieving a common goal. At the time of 
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writing, this board is still operational and works on the preservation of several cultural 
heritage sites. A senior member of this committee confirmed that cooperation between 
Greek and Turkish-Cypriots had been effective (Appendix A: 18).  
Partnership at the level of civil society 
Following the 1974 invasion, civil society in Cyprus was de facto separated and divided 
by the Green Line. This led to the development of two distinct civil societies and created 
a physical obstacle to the development of a unified movement for peace. Nevertheless, 
over the years, and especially after the opening of the crossing points, there had been 
relative freedom of movement between the two parts of the island leading to cooperation 
between CSOs and NGOs across the two sides (Appendix A: 6, 15). In what follows, this 
section will attempt to trace the extent to which this cooperation emerged as a result of 
EU policies. 
The 1990s saw the founding of some bi-communal groups that placed particular emphasis 
on the benefits of EU membership. For example, the All Cyprus Union Forum was created 
in January 1995 with the aim of addressing trade and labour issues in relation to peace 
and the prospect of EU membership. In 1997, it organised a conference to discuss how 
the future accession of Cyprus to the European Union could benefit the working class. At 
the end of the conference, the participant organisations signed a declaration reaffirming 
their belief that EU accession “will benefit both the economy, the workers and the people 
of Cyprus as a whole” while they also declared their willingness to “broaden the content 
of their future contacts and enlarge their cooperation to include the exchange of 
information on social and labour matters in Europe and to consider ways and means to 
enter joint activities with the aim of preparing to meet the challenges of being part of the 
European Union” (All Cyprus Trade Union Forum 1997). The European Commission 
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expressed its support to these Greek and Turkish-Cypriot trade unionists (van den Broek 
1997).  
Another example is the Bi-communal Business Forum that was facilitated by Richard 
Holbrook, then an envoy for US President Clinton. In their meetings, businessmen and 
women identified some problems and obstacles to the emergence of mutual benefits. 
More specifically, during that period, the Bi-communal Business Forum was particularly 
worried about security issues and the lack of stability needed for joint business projects. 
It also perceived the Turkish-Cypriot leadership’s opposition to the RoC’s accession to 
the EU as an obstacle to moving forward (Hadjipavlou 2007). Thirdly, the EU Federation 
study group of 1995-6 focused on discussing advantages and disadvantages of possible 
membership of the EU, and it also examined different models of federation (Wolleh 
2000). 
Between 1999-2004, with the prospect of entering the EU and with the Annan Plan on 
the table, a particular kind of citizen-led bi-communal activity was established. Especially 
in the period 2003-2004, between the opening of the Ledra Palace crossing point in April 
2003 and the referendum on the Annan Plan in April 2004 (see Chapter Three), the island 
experienced an unparalleled emergence of civil society efforts to promote reconciliation. 
Such activities involved cooperation across the divide, but focused on politically ‘safe’ 
thematic interests (notably the environment and public health) rather than peacebuilding 
per se (Appendix A: 2, 6, 15).  This was also the main characteristic of EU-induced 
activities on the island. The EU’s effectiveness in inducing partnership bonds between 
CSOs on relatively uncontested issues can be best exemplified with regards to CYINDEP, 
a platform established in 2009 after the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Greek-Cypriot NGDO Platform ‘The Development’ and the Turkish-Cypriot 
Platform Cyprus NGO Network. It was an umbrella organisation of several NGOs from 
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both communities and received EU funding for several projects related to issues of 
international development and global citizenship. 
Overall, therefore, the most sustainable social networks were established at the level of 
civil society. During the 1990s, the prospect of EU membership led to the creation of bi-
communal groups with particular interest in EU benefits. From 2000 onwards, more 
social networks were established involving CSOs from both communities. These 
networks were directly supported by the EU through the receipt of funding for several 
projects. In addition, partnership emerged as a result of the projects implemented by the 
UNDP-PFF. The project on the preservation of cultural heritage, for example, resulted in 
the establishment of a bi-communal advisory committee.  
6.2.3 Local Ownership  
Local ownership is increasingly being seen as instrumental in peace processes (Reich 
2006, Nathan 2007a). According to existing scholarship (Richmond 2011, Nathan 2007a), 
the views of locals should not only be taken into account by external actors but should 
become the key drivers of the peace process. From an NPE point of view, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, a successful implementation of the EU’s normative agenda should lead to 
local actors designing and implementing policy processes that are in line with the 
premises of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm.  
Firstly, the negotiation processes that took place in Cyprus were traditionally led by a 
small number of elites from both communities who justified this elite-centred negotiating 
approach on the grounds that it allowed them to be more flexible and open to compromise 
(Appendix A: 3, 6, 12, 14. See also Kaymak et al. 2008:3). However, for any peace 
process to be locally owned, a variety of political and social actors need to be involved. 
There is a gradually increasing demand on the part of the wider public for more inclusion 
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in the peace process. This is evidenced in the results of a survey conducted by the UNDP 
in 2012 which revealed that the vast majority of both Greek and Turkish-Cypriots 
believed that their leaders took no notice of their opinion regarding the negotiation 
processes despite their desire to be consulted (UNDP 2012).  
With regards to civil society, several projects (see Chapter 5) were initiated to “strengthen 
the role of civil society in the Turkish-Cypriot Community and to promote the 
development of a conducive environment for the further development of trust, dialogue, 
cooperation and closer relationship between the Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot 
communities as an important step towards a solution to the Cyprus problem” (European 
Commission 2013b). Especially after 2004, civil society initiatives involving both 
communities considerably increased due to direct EU involvement and due to the 
activities of other actors like the UNDP and USAID. Through the creation of a space for 
communication, the EU aimed to involve local CSOs in the peace process. However, at 
the time of writing, there has still been no coordination between Track I activities and 
civil society that reveals a lack of engagement with the local population in the peace 
process. 
However, civil society in Cyprus was rather weak in terms of promoting reconciliation. 
Bi-communal cooperation, as well as citizen participation in bi-communal events, was 
very limited (Intrac 2011). The main reason was because bi-communal projects, 
organised and implemented either by the EU or the UN, were taking place among the 
usual suspects (Appendix A: 6, 15). In other words, the actors who participate in such bi-
communal events are the same NGOs that have always been taking part in such activities. 
The idea of reconciliation did not spread outside of these spheres (Appendix A: 6, 15).  
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Overall, therefore, the EU managed to create a space for the voices of CSOs to be heard 
and for their involvement in bi-communal initiatives and in building trust between the 
two communities. However, CSOs were not very effective in promoting reconciliation 
because their activities took place among the usual suspects. This means that the wider 
public was still not involved in such processes. In addition, there was still not any 
coordination between negotiations at the elite level with CSO initiatives revealing a lack 
of engagement with the population. 
6.3 THE CASE OF KOSOVO 
Since this thesis follows the method of structured, focused comparison, the same 
questions that were asked in the section on Cyprus will also be asked for Kosovo.  This 
will allow a systematic comparison of the findings of the two cases and reveal whether 
the EU has produced a normative impact. 
6.3.1 Socialisation 
This section will address the question of whether the sustainable peace norm was 
internalised by local actors in Kosovo as a result of EU policies. Just as with Cyprus, the 
statements of political elites, CSOs as well as public attitudes will be examined to allow 
for conclusions to be drawn on Kosovan society as a whole.  
Official Statements 
The norms projected by the EU were extensively referred to in the Kosovar political 
statements. Kosovar elites, at least in their rhetoric, showed signs of internalisation of the 
‘sustainable peace’ norm by favouring all-inclusiveness and emphasising the need for 
leaving the past behind.  
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President Rugova, for example, in a speech to the Kosovo Parliament in 2004, stated he 
would protect the people’s unity and work for the well-being of all citizens (Rugova 
2004). Fatmir Sejdiu, President of Kosovo between 2006 and 2010, engaged in a narrative 
even more indicative of the internalisation of the sustainable peace norm. He consistently 
referred to the creation of a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Kosovo. For example, in a 
2010 lecture at Harvard University, he talked about the importance of civic equality 
(Sejdiu 2010). Also, at the UNSC, he stated that “it is the overwhelming wish of Kosovo’s 
people to build a multi-ethnic society with a representative government. The desire to 
establish institutions, laws and norms which build, protect and maintain a multi-ethnic 
society is the heart of the government’s work” (Sejdiu 2006).  
In addition, Atifete Jahjaga, President of Kosovo between 2011 and 2016, engaged in a 
similar kind of narrative. Analysing her speeches in different contexts, it becomes evident 
that she showed a commitment to the maintenance and promotion of a multi-ethnic 
Kosovo. More specifically, she consistently referred to the principles of all-inclusiveness, 
democratic multi-ethnic society and reconciliation. She particularly emphasised the need 
for integration of Kosovo-Serbs into the Kosovar structures. The progress on the EU-
brokered dialogue was also much welcomed. 
In practice our vision of inclusiveness means non-favoring of any ethnic group 
against any other group. On the contrary, clear and strong legal dispositions are 
foreseen in protection of the communities […] Although reconciliation is a long 
process, we seek integration and full participation of communities in the 
institutional life of central and local level (Jahjaga 2011) 
Jahjaga also put emphasis on the need to leave the past behind. One example is the 
following statement:  
Our countries have gone through a painful history, with difficult consequences for 
all. Drawing lessons from the past, we support the principle that all the countries 
and all the peoples are equal. Regardless of their size or territory, we all make a 
contribution in the preservation of peace and stability, leaving forever behind the 
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politics of hegemony, of threats of use of violence and of historical revisions and 
ideologies of hate (Jahjaga 2011a, for another example see Jahjaga 2014). 
However, the vision of a multi-ethnic Kosovo, as well as progress on the EU-induced 
dialogue, were often associated with other concrete benefits. For example, sometimes it 
was explicitly stated that these reforms were taking place because they would lead to EU 
membership that would bring economic prosperity. 
Good neighbourly relations is one of the key conditions for membership into the 
European Union and the support for the dialogue was based on the principle that 
the solutions that come out of it must be European solutions. These solutions must 
be based on the best practices of the EU countries, without which we can neither 
begin nor conclude the process of membership into the European Union (Jahjaga 
2011b) 
In addition, as was discussed in Chapter Five, Kosovar officials tended to prioritise and 
put forward the value of ethnicity when they did not receive any concrete benefits from 
the EU such as visa liberalisation. This did not reflect a complete internalisation of the 
‘sustainable peace’ norm but, rather, an adherence to EU values for instrumental reasons.  
Turning to Kosovo-Serbs, through the examination of official statements accessed 
through the UNMIK Media Monitoring Unit, it became evident that they followed a 
different direction. Firstly, as discussed in Chapter Four, following the end of the NATO 
intervention, Kosovo-Serbs accused Kosovars of attempting ethnic cleansing and the 
international community for not helping them. As a result, Kosovo-Serbs were negative 
towards the international community in general (Appendix A: 21, 27). 
Kosovo-Serb elite discourse focused on the need for greater political rights and for a 
better quality of life for their community. As Milovanovic, a Mitrovica-based activist, 
and a Belgrade-based researcher (Appendix A: 27, Appendix B: 4) explained to the 
author, Kosovo-Serbs saw Serbia as the guardian that would guarantee their safety and 
the survival of their ethnic identity, both of which were seen to be threatened by Kosovar 
domination. This was also evidenced in quotes of political elites. For example, 
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Nedeljković stated “the Serbian community in the north does not want integration. We 
believe that integration means lower standards and loss of jobs and it was proven south 
of the Ibar River. The citizens cannot accept the loss of their identity” (B92 2012b)78. In 
addition, with regards to the creation of the Serb municipalities, the Executive Director 
of the municipal administration in North Mitrovica, Adriana Hozić, stated that “the aim 
of the formation of the A/CSM is the creation of a body that will defend the national 
interests of the Serbian community in Kosovo” (UNMIK Media Monitoring 2016). 
Similarly, Nebojša Jović (quoted in Aliu 2011), President of the Serbian National Council 
for Northern Kosovo, stated: “There are two options. The first is that we are allowed to 
live inside Serbia, separated from independent Kosovo. The second is that someone 
expels us from here, which believe me, is hard to achieve”.  
To conclude, the analysis of the political statements of elites from both communities 
showed that Kosovar elite statements were in line with EU principles and values. 
However, it seems that, to a large extent, the rhetorical abiding to EU ideas was perceived 
as the only way to further Kosovo’s interests. Kosovo-Serb politicians, on the other hand, 
were highly critical of the EU and its ideas. For them, the idea of integration with the rest 
of Kosovo stood in contradiction with their goal of joining Serbia and safeguarding their 
survival and identity as an ethnic community. This indicates that the EU’s principled idea 
of multi-ethnicity was not espoused by Kosovo-Serbs who continued to place emphasis 
on safeguarding their own ethnic identity.  
Education 
Just like in the case study on Cyprus, history education will be discussed here as an 
indicator of dominant ideologies and perceptions. Different perceptions of past events are 
                                                             
78 Similar arguments have been put forward by Krstimir Pantić. See B92, 2011. 
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one of the major obstacles to conflict transformation and sustainable peace. In Kosovo, 
these different perceptions were sustained and sometimes exacerbated by the fact that 
Kosovar and Kosovo-Serb children were taught in separate education systems as a result 
of the parallel structures in Northern Kosovo (see OSCE 2015: 17). Kosovar children 
were taught the Kosovo curriculum while Kosovo-Serb children were taught the Serbian 
curriculum in schools managed by the Serbian state (Appendix A: 30).  
In 2009, the OSCE published a report entitled ‘Kosovo non-majority communities within 
the primary and secondary educational systems’ (OSCE 2009). This report stressed that 
the existence of two separate school systems was not conducive “to the creation of a 
system of inter-cultural education where the identity of each group is preserved, the 
identity of other groups is learned and acknowledged, and mutual understanding, 
acceptance and tolerance is promoted” (OSCE 2009: 18). Moreover, the report stated that 
the textbooks used by both Kosovars and Kosovo-Serbs “tend to present a slanted and 
one-sided view of histor” (OSCE 2009: 18).  
In April 2010, the government of Kosovo published the second draft of the ‘Curriculum 
for pre-school, primary, secondary and post-secondary education’ that appeared to be 
more aligned with the norms promoted by the EU. Specifically, one of the main aims of 
education, according to this report, was to educate young people on democratic 
citizenship  
with specific attention to the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural character of Kosovo 
society, so as to enable students to deal constructively and positively with issues 
of diversity and differences; and to cultivate and respect their own rights and the 
rights of others, regardless of their ethnicity, language, culture, religion, gender, 
age, social and educational background and economic situation (Ministry of 
Education, Science and Technology 2010).  
Following this report, an Independent Commission for the Review of Serbian Language 
Teaching Materials was appointed by the MEST - following consultation with the ICR - 
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to review the materials in the Serbian language and to identify any content that was not 
in line with the constitution of Kosovo. In its comprehensive report, the Commission 
stated that the main problematic issues in the books used by schools in Kosovo following 
the Serbian curriculum were “maps indicating Kosovo being still part of Serbia”  
(Independent Commission for the review of Serbian Language Teaching Materials 2010: 
17). It went on to propose that “considering that it is not feasible to address textbook 
producers in Serbia to publish revised versions of the existing books, the MEST (Ministry 
of Education, Science and Technology) distributes and instructs schools to visibly place 
maps of Kosovo in all schools and classrooms where students are taught with Serbian 
curriculum and textbooks brought in from Serbia” (Independent Commission for the 
review of Serbian Language Teaching Materials 2010: 17). 
Regarding history textbooks, the Commission’s main finding was that “textbooks 
developed by the Republic of Serbia describe a history of the Serbian people, rather than 
a history of the territory of modern day Serbia and Kosovo” (Independent Commission 
for the review of Serbian language teaching materials 2010: 16). The Commission 
continued by highlighting the importance of peaceful relations being developed among 
the communities living in Kosovo and the importance of the development of a history 
curriculum reflecting the cultural diversity of Kosovo. To this end, the Commission 
proposed that MEST develop a complete Serb-language curriculum and textbooks that 
treated historical topics in a manner that is in line with Kosovo’s constitution and the 
Kosovo Curriculum Framework (Independent Commission for the review of Serbian 
language teaching materials 2010: 16-17). 
MEST’s comprehensive education plan for 2011-2016 was evidence that some of the 
Commission’s proposals had been espoused. One of the main goals was “to promote 
social inclusion as an overarching concept which encompasses the full participation by 
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all people, irrespective of their social differences (such as gender, ethnicity, social class 
and disability), in economic, social and cultural life” (Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology 2011). With the support of the OSCE High-Commissioner for National 
Minorities (HCNM), a textbook was developed and published in 2011 for the learning of 
Albanian as a second language by students of non-Albanian communities. However, at 
the time of writing, similar intentions and plans for the Serbian language have not been 
announced by MEST. However, the November 2015 OSCE report noted that “the 
existence of two school systems with separate textbooks and curricula, including 
conflicting historical representations, continues to hamper the development of a multi-
ethnic society and requires commitment and action by both Prishtinë/Priština and 
Belgrade institutions” (OSCE 2015: 19-20). 
Overall, therefore, although the MEST included the principle of reconciliation in its 
educational plans, the different education systems and the different interpretations of 
history taught in schools exacerbated the divisions and were not conducive to the eventual 
internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm.  
Transformation from below: tracing the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm in 
civil society  
Having analysed the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm by political elites, this 
section will move on to trace the norm with regards to civil society. This will enable a 
more complete picture of Kosovan society relating to the question at hand.  
Firstly, it should be noted that the majority of Kosovar CSOs and think tanks were largely 
in favour of EU integration. Senior staff of several Pristina-based organisations 
(Appendix A: 20, 23, 24, 28, 31. Appendix B: 10) interviewed by the author identified 
EU integration as the most important goal for Kosovo, the realisation of which would 
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greatly enhance the country’s political and economic situation. Although all of them did 
identify certain limitations and drawbacks to the EU’s approach, they nonetheless 
strongly supported Kosovo’s European orientation.  
However, there were sources of alternative discourses. The most important one was 
Vetëvendosje (Movement for Self-Determination) created in June 2005. According to 
Kelmendi (2012: 47), “Vetëvendosje has been, by far, the most successful Kosovan CSO 
in mobilizing activism, organizing protests, and pressuring authorities in Kosovo”. 
Vetëvendosje’s rhetoric emphasised Albanian nationalism as opposed to Kosovo’s multi-
ethnic character. Characteristically, Vetëvendosje argued for a referendum for Kosovo to 
join Albania79 (Kosova Press 2010). In addition, Vetëvendosje rejected the multi-ethnic 
symbols of the Kosovan state. As noted in the organisation’s political programme, 
“Vetëvendosje is committed to the constitutional definition of Kosova as a state of 
Albanians and all citizens of Kosova. Vetëvendosje is also committed to returning the 
national Albanian symbols to the state of Kosova” (Vetëvendosje 2013). It also promoted 
certain exclusionary practices towards minorities. In stark contrast with the Kosovan 
government’s declared aim of all-inclusiveness, Vetëvendosje held the view that seats in 
the parliament for minorities should be eliminated (Vetëvendosje newsletter 2013). 
Moreover, the movement was very critical of the EU.  It argued, for example, that the EU 
was biased in favour of Kosovo-Serbs who had been “transformed into a super-minority 
[…] They are less than 5% of the population, and are gradually strengthening their control 
in about 20% of the territory […] This contrast, this asymmetry, is intolerable. Super-
minorities and sub-minorities are concepts that challenge equality and reciprocity” 
                                                             
79 For Vetëvendosje, the will of Kosovars should be respected as they constitute the majority within 
Kosovo. In this respect, the movement rejects positive discrimination (Kurti 2011: 96).  
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(Vetevendosje 2015). Overall, Vetëvendosje advocated principles that were contrary to 
the ones promoted by the EU.  
In the case of Kosovo, such alternative discourses became quite popular. Vetëvendosje 
became a political party in 2010 and participated in elections ever since. In the 2010 
parliamentary elections, it won 12.69% of the vote while in 2014 it won 13.59% (Election 
Guide website). Vetëvendosje became, in 2010, the third political party in Kosovo. 
Therefore, a considerable percentage of the Kosovar population seemed to attach value 
on principles different from the ones the EU was promoting.  
Turning to the Kosovo-Serb community, as already discussed, political elites held largely 
negative views of the EU and its principles. The main question here is whether the 
‘sustainable peace’ norm was internalised by civil society. As a 2010 USAID report 
noted, leaders of CSOs in Northern Kosovo  
are perceived as not advocating for the good of the people and as tools of the 
international community. Their image within their communities is poor, and their 
activities are mostly focused on community work and issues of general concern 
for their areas. On several occasions, civil society leaders from the Kosovo 
Serbian community have been subjected to threats and intimidation, and there 
have even been attempts on their lives (USAID 2010: 2).  
Kosovo-Serb interviewees involved in CSOs confirmed that their image within their 
community was not very positive (Appendix A: 21, 27). 
Nonetheless, there were some NGOs whose mission and activities seemed to be in line 
with the premises of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm. One example was the CBM 
(Community Building Mitrovica), a local grass roots organisation aiming,  inter alia, to 
advance inter-ethnic dialogue. CBM completed several projects in Mitrovica, including a 
project called ‘Bridging the Divide’ which aimed to overcome ethnic divisions, several 
youth projects that brought together people from different ethnic backgrounds, multi-
ethnic programmes for women as well as a pilot project entitled ‘Human Rights School’ 
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which aimed to provide training on human rights issues (Istrifi and Indezi 2012: 64-75). 
According to Valdete Idrizi, a strategic advisor at CBM and Remzije Istrefi, a lecturer at 
the Universty of Pristina and project manager at CBM, “Through its activities, CBM 
managed not only to reconstruct human relationships between different ethnic 
communities of Mitrovica but also to bring communities closer to respective authorities 
in order to be heard and to change the policies towards solutions aiming at bringing 
normality in this part of Kosovo” (Istrifi and Indezi 2012: 77).  
Another example is NGO-Aktiv, an organisation founded in 2009 in Mitrovica, which 
aimed to promote inter-ethnic and inter-community cooperation. More specifically, as 
noted on their website, “We strive to bring about the multilateral interdependence of 
communities in Kosovo resulting in stable, respectful and non-discriminatory interethnic 
relations, and foresee inter-ethnic cooperation as being a crucial step in this direction” 
(NGOAktiv 2009).   
To conclude, with regards to Kosovar civil society, although the majority of CSOs 
favoured European integration and EU values, Vetëvendosje, an organisation that 
attracted considerable support, was advocating principles and practices contrary to the 
ones promoted by the EU and advocated by the Kosovan government. Kosovo-Serb civil 
society also advocated principles opposite to the ones promoted by Kosovo-Serb elites. 
Some movements like CBM, for example, were advocating inter-ethnic dialogue and 
reconciliation.  
Public Attitudes 
Just like in the case study on Cyprus, this section will trace “deep-rooted changes in 
publics’ attitudes and positions” (Tocci 2007: 20). Several opinion polls drawn from the 
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UNDP and USAID’s Early Warning Reports and Public Pulse reports, and from local 
Kosovar sources are used to offer insights into public attitudes and perceptions.  
With regards to transitional justice, opinion polls revealed a notable consensus in both 
communities to establish the truth about missing persons regardless of their nationality 
and about war crimes committed in the past, while they also linked this to prospects for 
reconciliation (UNDP 2007, 2012, 2014). However, both the 2007 and the 2012 polls 
showed that Kosovars believed that their community had not committed war crimes.  In 
contrast, regarding Kosovo-Serbs, in 2007 the majority believed that they had committed 
war crimes. However, in 2012 the majority reported that they had not. The 2014 survey 
(USAID/UNDP 2014) also showed that neither the Kosovars nor the Kosovo-Serbs 
believed that they had committed war crimes. It, therefore, seems that both communities’ 
willingness to proceed with war crimes investigations was mostly related to their belief 
that their community would not be found guilty.  
Moreover, the 2012 UNDP survey in Mitrovica revealed there existed considerable 
‘ethnic distance’ (the extent of understanding and familiarity between members of 
different ethnic groups) in the city since the non-interaction between the two communities 
was persisting. An overwhelming majority of Kosovar respondents (73.6%) reported to 
not have had any contact with people of non-Albanian ethnic background. This applied 
for the Kosovo-Serb respondents, too, though to a lesser degree (41.9%) (UNDP 2012: 
15) 
In addition, several surveys addressed the issue of the development of closer relations 
between the two communities. Unsurprisingly, a comparison of the results of the Public 
Pulse surveys conducted in Kosovo since 2005 showed no major changes through the 
years. Since September 2007, the percentage of Kosovo-Serbs willing to live in the same 
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town with Kosovars was between 30-40% while the percentage of those willing to live in 
the same street with Kosovars was much lower (approximately 20% since 2007). The 
percentage of Kosovo-Serbs willing to work with Kosovars ranged from 30% to 48% 
since 2007. Lastly, Kosovo-Serbs showed no willingness to engage in marital relations 
with Kosovars who, for their part, showed the same unwillingness towards Kosovo-Serbs. 
However, Kosovars were more open towards living in the same town and /or street and 
working together with Kosovo-Serbs (35% and 28,5% respectively in April 2013).  
Combining the responses of Kosovo-Serbs and Kosovars outlined above, social 
acceptance measures were calculated by USAID and UNDP (2013) for both ethnic 
groups. These measures indicated that there was an increase of Kosovar social acceptance 
towards the Kosovo-Serb community between October 2012 and April 2013. On the other 
hand, for the same period, Kosovo-Serb social acceptance of Kosovars decreased 
(USAID and UNDP 2013). Lastly, a survey conducted by the Platform for Analysis and 
Research in Northern Kosovo between May and July 2015 confirmed that the ethnic gap 
between the two communities was not closing (Platform for Analysis and Research 2015: 
10).  
Overall, therefore, Kosovar perceptions of the ‘other’ became slightly more positive. 
However, the same is not true for the Kosovo-Serb community that showed less signs of 
perception modifications. However, it is difficult to conclude that sustainable peace had 
been internalised by the public. The discussion in this section shows that willingness to 
develop further interethnic relations was very limited.  
6.3.2 Partnership 
This section aims to trace the development of partnerships between Kosovo-Serbs and 
Kosovars as a result of the promotion of principles by the EU. To this end, it will firstly 
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focus on the development of relations between elite actors. Then, it will trace the 
development of partnership bonds as a result of some IPA projects. Lastly, this section 
will assess the extent to which partnership emerged in civil society. Just like the section 
on partnership development in Cyprus, the method of process tracing will be employed. 
Partnership between elite actors 
The main way through which the EU tried to create partnership bonds between political 
actors was the EU-brokered dialogue that resulted in the agreement between Kosovo and 
Serbia. In what follows, the main provisions of this agreement aiming to promote 
cooperation between Kosovo-Serbs and Kosovars will be briefly analysed.  
According to reports (see Republic of Kosovo 2014 and 2015) submitted by the Kosovan 
government to the European External Action Service, the implementation of the 
provisions of the Brussels Agreement aiming to integrate Kosovo-Serbs into the Kosovar 
structures had produced mixed results. This agreement required, for example, that police 
in Serb-populated Northern Kosovo should be integrated into the Pristina institutions. The 
2014 European Commission report on Kosovo noted that some progress had been made 
on dismantling the Serb police structures. It was noted that integration had been 
completed as concerns police officers (European Commission 2014, Government of the 
Republic of Kosovo 2015). 
According to Pristina and Brussels-based Commission officials as well as EULEX 
officials (Appendix B: 7, 8, 14, 15), the Kosovan police force was generally considered a 
success story since the Serb minority was relatively well represented. More precisely, by 
the end of 2013, around 11.49% of the Kosovan police staff were Serb, including both 
uniformed and civilian staff (Emini, 2013: 15). However, the situation in the north 
continued to constitute a big challenge. Although the integration of police stations might 
219 
 
have been completed in principle, in reality, many problems continued. Police stations in 
the north were mainly staffed with Kosovo-Serbs and had very limited communication 
with headquarters in Pristina (Appendix B: 6, Appendix A: 25, Group for legal and 
political studies 2013).  
Secondly, in February 2015, the Prime Ministers of Kosovo and Serbia signed an 
agreement on the judiciary (Hajdani and Andric 2015). The 2015 report on the 
implementation of the Brussels agreement noted that during the first implementation 
phase (May-September 2013) an agreement was reached on the termination of parallel 
Serb structures of justice in Kosovo. In the second phase (December 2013 to February 
2015), there was agreement on the establishment of Kosovo’s legal structures in the 
northern part as well as the integration of Serb individuals (judges and prosecutors) in the 
Kosovan justice institutions. At the time of writing, the process of establishing a unitary 
justice system is underway (Republic of Kosovo 2015: 14-15).   
However, a substantial number of agreements faced several impediments in the 
implementation phase. For example, this was observed with the issue of customs because 
Serbia had not yet abolished its parallel customs structures in Northern Kosovo. In 
addition, at the time of writing, the energy, telecom and recognition of university 
diplomas agreements have not yet been implemented. Lastly, the implementation of the 
Association of Serb majority municipalities agreement has not yet started (European 
Commission 2015). Moreover, another provision of the agreement was the removal of the 
barricade from Mitrovica Bridge as a way to facilitate freedom of movement. At the time 
of writing, the restoration of the Mitrovica Bridge had not yet started (Republic of Kosovo 
2015: 15).  
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Overall, therefore, a degree of cooperation between Kosovars and Kosovo-Serbs could 
be observed in some areas like, for example, the police. However, the non-dismantling of 
the parallel Serb structures in Northern Kosovo (Republic of Kosovo 2015: 11-12) had 
become the main obstacle for the development of further partnership bonds between the 
two communities at the elite level.  
Partnership as a result of IPA Projects 
Since 2007, Kosovo was receiving IPA funds from the EU. In what follows, two of the 
projects implemented by the IPA will be analysed in order to assess their effectiveness 
towards the establishment of partnership bonds between Kosovars and Kosovo-Serbs.  
One of the IPA projects was concerned with ‘Cultural Heritage’. Its main aim was to 
provide support for the reconstruction of damaged or destroyed cultural heritage sites. 
The project was implemented by the RIC (Reconstruction Implementation Commission), 
an ad hoc management mechanism involving Kosovan and Serb institutions. The RIC 
was successful in reconstructing the most damaged cultural heritage sites (mainly Serb 
Orthodox churches) (ECORYS 2013). It seems, therefore, that some partnership bonds 
did emerge in the process of the implementation of this project.  
Secondly, a small IPA project implemented by the NGO ‘Project in Ethnic Relations’ 
(PER) focused on “improving confidence of local Serbian leaders and improving 
Albanian-Serbian relations” (ECORYS 2013: 30). The project succeeded in initiating a 
Kosovar-Serbian dialogue through the organisation of several round-table meetings 
where approximately 200 Serbs and Kosovars participated. However, the project did not 
manage to establish a permanent Forum for Dialogue as it had initially desired (ECORYS 
2013). 
Partnership at the level of civil society 
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In the years prior to the 1998-9 war, civil society was divided and constructed along ethnic 
lines (KIPRED 2005: 5). Under the Milošević regime, and confronted with the possibility 
of total marginalisation and non-inclusion in the political, social and economic life, 
Kosovars developed a parallel socio-economic system. This system was largely 
coordinated by a government in exile. Its organisation, however, was carried out by a 
small number of civil society actors (Sterland 2006: 12-14). A prominent role was played 
by the Mother Teresa Society (MTS), a humanitarian NGO. Although the vast majority 
of the Kosovar CSOs were focused on service-provision, “they were strongly politicised 
and nationally oriented as they embodied the goals of the Kosovar nationalist struggle 
and were a means of peaceful resistance to the Serbian regime” (Sterland 2006: 13). 
Turning to the Serbian civil society in Kosovo, it was relatively inactive and only 
represented by small numbers of traditional government-sponsored community and 
interest groups (Civicus 2011, Fagan 2006, Fagan 2011).  
In the aftermath of the 1998-9 war, relief efforts, although they were coordinated by the 
UNHCR, were undertaken by a large number of international organisations and INGOs 
(see Kastrati 2015: 10-11). Aiming to access local communities, and also to strengthen 
civil society, these international organisations gave large amounts of donor funds to 
Kosovar local organisations for undertaking short-term, localised projects. This approach 
encouraged the mushrooming of a large number of NGOs and CSOs, “with the number 
of locally registered organisations rising from 45 to 400 in the first twelve months alone 
after the end of hostilities” (Sterland 2006: 18). The origins of a majority of Kosovar 
CSOs that emerged in the 2000s can thus be traced to direct INGO intervention (Sterland 
2006: 20, KCSF 2011) 
However, interviews conducted for this thesis revealed that civil society in Kosovo was 
still largely constructed along ethnic lines. As senior staff working in different CSOs 
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argued (Appendix A: 21, 23, 28. Appendix B: 10), given the social and territorial division 
of Kosovo’s society along ethnic lines, Kosovan CSOs were mainly ethnically exclusive. 
The same was exemplified in the European Commission’s “Kosovo* Civil Society 
Facility 2014-2015” report which noted that active CSOs in Kosovo were mainly 
ethnically exclusive and that there was very little cooperation between ethnically divided 
NGOs (European Commission 2015). The same conclusion was also reached by some 
reports prepared by Kosovar CSOs. Specifically, a report published by KIPRED (2012) 
noted that most CSOs were mono-ethnic and only a very small number of them had 
members from different communities.  
However, as Milovanovic (Appendix A: 27) explained to the author, some cooperation 
between Kosovar and Kosovo-Serb CSOs had emerged, albeit to a quite limited extent. 
Such cooperation emerged between organisations that shared similar goals (Appendix A: 
27). Examples included the ‘Kosovo Women Network’ and ‘Democracy in Action’, two 
networks comprising local CSOs from different communities (see KCSF 2011: 22).  
Overall, at the level of elites, some partnership bonds were created as a result of the 
implementation of several agreements reached in the framework of the EU-brokered 
dialogue. However, the existence of Serbian parallel structures in Northern Kosovo was 
the main obstacle towards the creation of closer partnerships. Moreover, some degree of 
collaboration emerged as a result of IPA projects, albeit to a limited extent. Lastly, 
although civil society was constructed along ethnic lines, some partnership bonds 
emerged between organisations that shared similar values and goals.   
6.3.3 Local Ownership 
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As with Cyprus, this section will evaluate the EU’s impact with reference to the extent to 
which it was successful in encouraging local involvement in the peace process. Specific 
reference will be made to EULEX and to the EU-brokered dialogue.  
Concerning EULEX, in most of its documents and communications, the mission 
emphasised the importance of local ownership. Yves de Kermabon, the first head of 
EULEX, for example, stressed that the whole reform process belongs to Kosovans. 
Specifically, he pledged that “Kosovo authorities will be in the driver’s seat” (quoted in 
EU Institute for Security Studies 2008). As discussed in the previous chapter, the central 
aim of the mission was to assist and support the Kosovan authorities in the rule of law 
area through an MMA (monitoring, mentoring and advising) approach whilst retaining 
some executive responsibilities in specific areas of competence, such as war crimes, 
organised crime and high-level corruption, as well as property and privatisation cases 
(European Union External Action 2014).   
However, according to several interviewees (Appendix A: 20, 21, 23, 26, 28. Appendix 
B: 10), the agenda-setting process was a top-down one, since it had been EULEX-driven 
rather than based on priorities that were set and planned locally. This idea was evident in 
a speech given by Sejdiu, President of Kosovo between 2008-2010, on the process 
towards Kosovo’s independence. In this speech, Sejdiu stated that everything will be 
decided by the UN, the EU and NATO in high-level diplomatic meetings (Sejdiu quoted 
in UNMIK Media Monitoring Unit 2008). The same was also confirmed by an EULEX 
official interviewed by the author who stated that EULEX tries to consult with local 
institutions and local CSOs as much as possible. But, in the end, it is “us who make the 
decisions” (Appendix B: 8) (see also Keukeleire et al. 2011a: 193). 
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With particular reference to civil society, EULEX has, from the beginning of its 
involvement, considered it as an important actor (Appendix B: 8). As Steve Smith (quoted 
in EULEX 2009), the Deputy Head of EULEX’s Programme Office, stated in a speech to 
civil society representatives “We need your views, your input and your perspective on the 
rule of law situation in Kosovo. It is only with your involvement that we can build a 
comprehensive picture”. However, Kosovan CSOs believed that EULEX was not living 
up to its declared objective to include them in its decision-making process and activities. 
For them, EULEX was only trying to advertise itself and did not take their insights into 
consideration (Appendix A: 20, 23. Appendix B: 10). Also, as an EULEX official 
(Appendix B: 8) explained to the author, “in the past, we used to communicate more with 
CSOs. But now, many of them do not want to cooperate with us. So, we only cooperate 
with the ones that are more positive towards EULEX”.  
Secondly, with regards to the EU-brokered dialogue, interviews (Appendix A: 21, 23, 24. 
Appendix B: 10), revealed that it was not very transparent and, as a result, did not have 
popular backing. “The idea of normalisation of relations was perceived as something 
people were instructed to do.” (Appendix B: 10). Closely related is the issue of the 
involvement of the Kosovo-Serb community. For local ownership to emerge, all minority 
groups in a given country must be involved in the process of decision-making. For any 
progress on the ground to be locally owned, it must be inclusive. In the case of Kosovo, 
however, Kosovo-Serbs were not included in such processes. This relates specifically to 
the Kosovo-Serbs living in Northern Kosovo who refused to participate within Kosovo’s 
judicial and administrative institutional framework (Appendix A: 21, 27). European 
Commission officials interviewed by the author, stated that the EU found it a very difficult 
task to engage Kosovo-Serbs. So, in the words of a Pristina-based Commission official, 
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they “adopted a hands-off approach to Kosovo-Serbs and conducted all communication 
with Belgrade” (Appendix B: 7).  
To conclude, local ownership did not widely emerge in Kosovo. EULEX was functioning 
in a top-down way that did not engage in consultations with local authorities and CSOs. 
In addition, the EU-brokered dialogue was also implemented in a top-down way while 
Kosovo-Serbs were not included in the process.  
6.4 COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 
In this third part of the NPE framework, the main aim was to identify and evaluate the 
normativity of the impact that emerged from EU policies towards the two cases under 
examination. The main focus of this chapter, therefore, was the ability/inability of the EU 
to induce change in situations of conflict and to diminish the structural obstacles to the 
internalisation of the sustainable peace norm.  
Firstly, socialisation emerged to a greater degree in Kosovo than in Cyprus. The analysis 
of the data presented above revealed that the internalisation of the sustainable peace norm 
emerged only to a very limited degree in the case of Cyprus. The discourse of the elites 
showed that fears and concerns were quite prevalent. Although some alternative 
discourses did exist, these remain marginalised and are internalised mainly by left-wing 
CSOs. The fact that the Orthodox Church, which is among the most trusted organisations 
in Cyprus, followed a discourse of separation was indicative of the marginalisation of 
alternative discourses. With particular reference to the Turkish-Cypriot community, 
revisions of the Turkish-Cypriot history textbooks revealed that when EU membership 
was on the table, some changes towards sustainable peace occurred. However, things took 
a step backwards after the RoC’s accession to the EU. Moreover, interviews conducted 
for this thesis revealed that some positive changes occurred in terms of social 
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categorisation. However, at the level of the public, mistrust and un-willingness for further 
contacts still existed between the two communities. 
Turning to the case of Kosovo, socialisation emerged to a greater degree compared to 
Cyprus. However, although the elite discourse was in line with EU values and principles, 
in certain instances, adherence to EU values was presented as the only way towards 
achieving EU membership. In addition, the political discourse of the Kosovo-Serbs 
followed a different direction and was not aligned with EU principles. As a second step 
towards tracing the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm, this chapter looked at 
the level of civil society. It found that, in the case of Kosovars, the most important civil 
society groups advanced principles different from the ones promoted by the EU and 
adopted by the Kosovan government. In the case of Kosovo-Serbs, however, CSOs, like, 
for example, the CBM, were advocating reconciliation. Lastly, public attitudes did not 
reveal any concrete changes over the years.  
With regards to the EU’s (in)ability to create partnership bonds between the conflict 
parties, an important difference was observed between the two cases. In Cyprus, 
partnership emerged mostly at the civil society level. In the case of Kosovo, civil society 
continued to be constructed along ethnic lines. Some cooperation, however, emerged on 
such issues like women rights and democracy. Partnership in the case of Kosovo emerged 
mostly at the level of elites as a result of the agreements reached during the EU-facilitated 
dialogue.  
Lastly, the comparison between Cyprus and Kosovo revealed that local ownership did not 
emerge in either case. In Cyprus, CSOs had not yet participated in any official negotiation 
process. For Kosovo, the top-down approach adopted by the EU did not create an 
environment conducive to local ownership. EULEX was perceived by Kosovars as 
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employing a top-down approach. Moreover, with regards to the EU-brokered dialogue, 
interviews revealed that the EU followed a top-down approach and failed to engage the 
Kosovo-Serb community.  
To conclude, the comparative assessment between the two cases demonstrated that the 
EU was slightly more successful in creating a normative impact in Kosovo than in Cyprus. 
In particular, socialisation into the ‘sustainable peace’ norm emerged more in Kosovo 
than in Cyprus. However, the examination of elite discourses leads to the conclusion that 
cost/benefit calculations might have been the main driver behind this. In addition, 
partnership bonds were created in both cases. However, in the case of Kosovo, partnership 
emerged mostly at the elite level as a result of the EU-brokered dialogue while in Cyprus 
it emerged mostly at the level of civil society. Lastly, in both cases, the EU was not able 
to encourage local ownership of the peace process, mostly as a result of the top-down 










CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The concept of ‘Normative Power Europe’ has attracted much attention in academic 
research. However, as the literature review in Chapter One illustrated, EU efforts to 
promote sustainable peace, one of the core EU norms, as Manners (2008: 135) pointed 
out, have been largely neglected in the resultant literature. Diez and Pace (2011) did, 
admittedly, examine the normative power of the EU in the field of conflict transformation. 
However, their main focus was on how the EU’s normative self-construction was 
conceived by the main actors involved in a conflict. What has not been done, however, is 
a systematic application of the NPE three-part framework to conflict cases and an 
assessment of whether the EU is indeed able to transform conflicts and change 
perceptions of normality with regards to sustainable peace. 
In addressing the aforementioned gap, this thesis makes a twofold contribution. Firstly, it 
applies the NPE framework to the cases of Cyprus and Kosovo, offering a comprehensive 
view on the EU’s role in transforming those conflicts. Secondly, it provides some 
theoretical and methodological insights into the applicability of the NPE framework in 
the field of conflict transformation more generally.  
These aims have been realised by a thorough analysis and comparison of two cases that 
have been selected on the basis of the extent to which they are expected to conform to the 
NPE expectations (see Chapter One). This concluding chapter will discuss the 
contributions of this research to the literature by summarising the main findings on the 




7.2 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Chapter One set out the main research question that guided this thesis as follows: Is the 
EU a normative power in the field of conflict transformation? This main question was 
then divided into three sub-questions that correspond to the three parts of the NPE 
framework: 1) Has ‘sustainable peace’ been an EU objective for Cyprus and Kosovo? 2) 
Has the EU engaged in these conflicts through persuasion, norm invocation, shaping the 
discourse of what is normal, attribution of prestige/shaming and/or through model power? 
3) Have the EU policies towards Cyprus and Kosovo produced socialisation, partnership 
and local ownership? In other words, has the EU been able to shape conceptions of what 
counts as normal? 
To address these questions, this research, based on secondary literature, developed an 
analytical framework with the aim to apply it to the cases of Cyprus and Kosovo. Through 
this analytical tool, the EU’s role in the field of conflict transformation was 
conceptualised, analysed and judged. However, this framework is not specific to the 
conflict transformation field. Rather, it can also be used for the purposes of analysing the 
EU’s normativity in other fields like, for example, human rights and environmental 
policies80.  
In addition, this thesis also contributes to the literature by applying this framework to two 
empirical cases. As several authors noted (Manners 2011: 244, Martin-Mazé 2015: 1285), 
the NPE concept remains empirically underexplored. This thesis sought to address this 
research gap and put ‘sustainable peace’, the main norm that the EU should be promoting 
(Manners 2008: 135), at the centre of the analysis. The application of the NPE framework 
                                                             
80 For example, a similar framework associating intent, process and impact has been used by Niemann 
and De Wekker (2010) to analyse the EU’s promotion of democracy and good governance in Moldova.  
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to the cases of Cyprus and Kosovo has led to important empirical insights, both for the 
EU and with regards to the two case studies. 
To begin with, the first question that this thesis sought to address was the extent to which 
the EU’s main goal was the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm by local 
Cypriot and Kosovan actors. As Chapter Four demonstrated, this ‘sustainable peace’ 
norm was central in the EU’s official statements in both cases. EU institutions and 
officials repeatedly emphasised the importance of reconciliation, multi-ethnicity and the 
establishment of trust between the conflict parties. In addition, the EU’s preferences for 
the political solution of the two conflicts could be seen as a step towards ‘sustainable 
peace’ rather than as a way to institutionalise the conflicts. However, this is still subject 
to confirmation as a political solution has not yet been implemented in Cyprus. Also, with 
regards to Kosovo, interviews revealed that Commission officials have reservations about 
the possibility of decentralisation leading to the betterment of inter-ethnic relations.  
In addition, important conclusions were drawn on the EU’s interests. Here, a 
differentiation was observed between the two cases. The findings on the more-likely case 
of Kosovo confirmed Diez’s (2005: 625) argument that commitment to a norm can, at the 
same time, serve the Union’s interests and be consistent with its values. However, this 
argument was not confirmed by the case of Cyprus where the Union’s interests were not 
always in line with the premises of the sustainable peace norm. The less-likely case of 
Cyprus therefore confirmed Merlingen’s (2007: 437) argument that materialistic 
considerations are often prioritised over the EU’s normative agenda (see Chapter Two).  
Thirdly, in both cases, the EU’s normative power and commitment to international law 
and to the principle of sustainable peace has also been criticised with reference to self-
determination and ethnic minority rights. In both cases, the complex nature of 
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international law has made possible the development of well-grounded criticisms of the 
EU’s approach. In the case of Cyprus, the development of closer relations between the 
EU and the Turkish-Cypriots was strongly criticised by Greek-Cypriots as a move that 
indicated indirect recognition of a self-proclaimed state. For Turkish-Cypriots, on the 
other hand, the inability of the EU to implement such regulations, like the Direct Trade 
Regulation, deprived them of basic rights that they believed they should be able to enjoy. 
Turning to the case of Kosovo, Kosovo-Serb criticisms focused on the selective 
application of the R2P principle and respect for the principle of the territorial integrity of 
states. Kosovar criticisms concentrated on EU policies that were interpreted as attempts 
to compromise Kosovo’s sovereignty. 
Regarding the second sub-question, this research contributes to the literature by 
discussing five NPE mechanisms (see Chapter Two) in relation to the two case studies. 
The comparative assessment of the two cases revealed that the EU attempted to promote 
the ‘sustainable peace’ norm mostly through persuasion, norm invocation and shaming. 
These mechanisms were implemented more extensively in the case of Kosovo, the more-
likely case, than in Cyprus, the less-likely case. However, not all of them were always 
implemented in a normative fashion and in line with NPE expectations. For example, the 
empirical investigation of the EU’s role in Kosovo demonstrated that its policies, instead 
of being persuasive, tended to shift towards imposition. In addition, important 
conclusions have been drawn with regards to the ‘shaping the discourse of what is normal’ 
mechanism and model power. In the case of Cyprus, most EU projects that aimed to 
induce such discursive changes were not effectively and efficiently implemented. In the 
case of Kosovo, some tangible results can be observed. However, these were quite 
minimal. Lastly, model power was not at play as both cases confirmed that the EU was 
mostly seen as a path towards instrumental gains. In the case of Cyprus, Turkish-Cypriots 
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adopted a more moderate approach at the beginning of the 2000s mostly for economic 
and political reasons while Greek-Cypriots tried to promote their interests through the EU 
instead of internalising the EU values because they perceived them as worthy of 
emulation. As for Kosovo, Kosovars showed a high degree of adherence to EU values, 
albeit for the instrumental reason that doing so would lead to EU accession. Kosovo-
Serbs, however, did not proceed to such discursive adaptations as they do not believe that 
the EU could help them with their situation.  
Concerning the third sub-question, another contribution of this research to existing 
scholarship is the examination of the EU’s ability to shape conceptions of normality. The 
sixth chapter of the thesis shifted the focus from the agency of the EU to local conditions 
on the ground. The comparative assessment between the two cases revealed that the EU 
has been largely unable to induce identity modifications and shape conceptions of 
normality in the field of conflict transformation. In the case of Cyprus, no tangible 
changes have been observed over the years as a result of EU policies and actions. In the 
case of Kosovo, some changes (political rhetoric and policy practices) were observed. 
However, these took place mostly due to the prospect of EU accession and to the expected 
economic gains that would come as a result. Deep-rooted identity modifications had not 
taken place in either case. As the previous chapters demonstrated, one of the main reasons 
why the EU was unable to shape normality was because Cypriot and Kosovan actors 
viewed the EU largely in instrumental terms. In this respect, EU values and principles 
were not necessarily internalised by local actors. Rather, they were being used by them 
as a way towards materialistic gains. In other words, the instrumental reasoning and 
behaviour of Cypriot and Kosovan actors during the chronological period under 




In addition, another aim of the analysis of the normativity of EU impact was to trace the 
partnership bonds created between opposing sides in both cases. In the case of Kosovo, 
partnership emerged mostly at the elite level as a result of the EU-brokered dialogue. For 
example, progress has been noted with regards to the integration of the police force 
operating in Northern Kosovo with the one based in Pristina. In the case of Cyprus, 
partnership emerged mostly at the level of civil society as a result of specific projects or 
as a result of the value attached to EU principles. However, a similar pattern was not 
observed concerning the leadership of the two communities. 
Lastly, as discussed in Chapter Two which sets out the theoretical framework of the 
thesis, the participation of local actors in the peace process is considered an important 
normative outcome as it leads to a sense of ownership and responsibility. However, 
although the EU has attempted to create channels for local participation in both Cyprus 
and Kosovo, these were not always effective enough in encouraging local ownership 
because the EU tended to follow a top-down approach. In the case of Kosovo, for 
example, EULEX followed, in principle, an MMA approach (see Chapter Six). It 
established close collaboration with the Kosovan government as well as with the civil 
society. However, in reality, civil society did not have much agency in initiating any 
changes as its inputs were not always being taken into consideration. The same has also 
been observed with regards to the Kosovo-Serb community which was not represented in 
the EU-brokered dialogue. In Cyprus, on the other hand, as explained in Chapter Five, 
the EU had a much less direct involvement. This means that there existed less 
opportunities for local participation in EU-related peace initiatives and, hence, less 
opportunities for the emergence of local ownership.  
Overall, it becomes evident that the applicability of the NPE framework to conflict 
transformation is challenged on several grounds in all three stages of analysis. Taking 
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into consideration the selection of the two cases along the more- and less-likely to be in 
line with the NPE expectations spectrum, certain cross-case conclusions can be drawn. 
Regarding the NPE objectives, the empirical findings confirmed that the ‘sustainable 
peace’ norm was central to the EU’s rhetoric and engagement in both cases. However, 
the EU’s commitment to the norm was compromised in the less-likely case of Cyprus due 
to the prioritisation of other strategic interests. In addition, the EU’s self-binding practice 
has been criticised in both cases from a variety of different angles. This can be understood 
by reference to the fluidity in defining such terms like ‘justice’ as well as to the ambiguous 
nature of international law that made possible the development of such criticisms. 
Concerning EU mechanisms, empirical findings suggest that these were more rigorously 
implemented in Kosovo, the more-likely case. However, even in this more-likely case, 
EU actions tended to become coercive, thus moving away from NPE expectations. Lastly, 
regarding EU impact, the instrumental behaviour of Cypriot and Kosovan actors as well 
as the fact that, as Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:897) noted, “norms do not occur in an 
ideological vacuum”, posed limitations to the complete internalisation of the ‘sustainable 
peace’ norm in both cases. Cypriot (e.g political elites) and Kosovan (e.g Kosovo-Serb 
elites) actors continued to attach more value on principles different to the ones promoted 
by the EU like, for example, ethnicity.  
To conclude, as explained in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the two cases were 
selected based on the extent to which they were expected to conform to the NPE 
expectations. This research design was chosen as it would facilitate the generalisability 
of the research results. This thesis concluded that the EU’s normative power is challenged 
by both the more- and the less-likely cases. As a result, the empirical findings presented 
in this research do not support the argument that the EU is a normative power in the field 
of conflict transformation. 
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7.3 THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS 
The main empirical findings presented in the previous section bring into focus some of 
the main NPE criticisms outlined in Chapter Two. When discussing the cases of Cyprus 
and Kosovo, these criticisms were considered in the sections where empirical findings 
did not conform to the NPE propositions. This section will focus on the criticisms that 
were relevant in supporting the main argument of this thesis, namely that the EU cannot 
be characterised as a normative power in the field of conflict transformation.  
With regards to the first stage of analysis, namely EU goals, the main criticism in the 
literature concerns the motives of the EU behind the promotion of particular norms. For 
several authors (Merlingen 2007, Wood 2009), the EU promotes certain norms in order 
to advance its own strategic and economic interests. In the case of Cyprus, for example, 
strategic considerations (such as the ramifications of the Cyprus conflict on EU-NATO 
relations) were closely intertwined with the EU’s normative interests. In addition, as 
Hyde-Price (2006: 226-227) argued, the EU is often used by its member states who want 
to shape its foreign policy in a way that is favourable to them. This argument becomes 
relevant in the case of Cyprus where, in certain instances, member state preferences were 
prioritised over the ‘sustainable peace’ norm. This conclusion, however, was not 
supported by the case of Kosovo. This research showed that, here, the EU efforts towards 
the betterment of interethnic relations were in line with the premises of the ‘sustainable 
peace’ norm and, at the same time, fell within the Union’s strategic interests. This 
conclusion supports Youngs’ (2004: 419-420) argument that normative concerns and 
strategic interests go together in the EU’s external relations.   
As concerns the second stage of the empirical analysis, namely EU means, the NPE 
approach puts much emphasis on the importance of dialogue and constructive 
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engagement. As Keukeleire et al. (2009: 152), whose writings on structural diplomacy81 
become relevant in this context, argued 
the ‘stronger’ part of diplomacy needs to be accompanied by a dimension of 
dialogue. This dialogue has to precede and support negotiations, as this is crucial 
for understanding the endogenous processes and preferences of the target country, 
society or region and to understand how the structures promoted through 
structural diplomacy can take these into account (Keukeleire et al. 2009: 152).  
However, several authors (Zielonka 2008: 471, see also Jørgensen 2006: 39-40) criticised 
the EU for the use of coercive means and hard power tools. Some of the empirical findings 
presented in this research support this criticism. As Chapter Five showed, in several 
instances, persuasion tended to shift towards imposition. This became more evident in the 
case of Kosovo where the EU’s involvement was more substantial in comparison to 
Cyprus. One example was the request, on the part of the EU, for the abandonment of 
status-related symbols in Kosovo elections (see section 5.2.1).  
Lastly, the third stage of the analysis was concerned with the normativity of EU impact 
which should include socialisation, partnership and local ownership. As Keukeleire 
(2009: 147) stated, the main purpose of dialogue and constructive engagement “is not 
simply to shape or influence structures, but to shape or influence structures in such a way 
that these structures obtain an enduring character and become relatively permanent”. In 
this third stage of the analysis, the main criticism related to the deficiency of normative 
impact (Noutcheva 2009: 1081). The empirical findings of this research support this 
argument since, as Chapter Six demonstrated, the EU has been largely unable to induce 
identity modifications and to create extensive partnership bonds between opposing sides 
in both cases. The main reason for this is the instrumental behaviour of local actors and 
                                                             
81 The concept of structural diplomacy “refers to the process of dialogue and negotiation by which actors 
in the international system seek to influence or shape sustainable external political, legal, economic, social 
and security structures at different relevant levels in a given geographic space (from the level of the 
individual and society, to the state, regional and global levels)” (Keukeleire et al. 2009: 143) 
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the fact that divisions in both cases are deeply entrenched. In addition, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, an important aspect of a normative power’s impact is local ownership. The 
emergence of local ownership would ensure the sustainability of the transformed 
behaviour once the external actor’s operation come to an end. The empirical findings 
presented in Chapter Six, however, demonstrate that local ownership did not emerge as a 
result of EU policies in either of the cases. This can be explained by reference to the top-
down approach followed by the EU in Kosovo and to the fact that the EU did not 
extensively engage with a variety of local actors in Cyprus.  
Overall, therefore, some of the criticisms of the NPE argument become relevant in 
supporting the main argument of this thesis and in explaining why the EU cannot be 
characterised as a normative power in the field of conflict transformation. In all three 
stages of analysis, critiques of the EU, as these were put forward in the literature, were 
used in order to further facilitate an understanding of why NPE works or does not work.  
7.4 METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 
A central element of this research is the extent to which the EU can shape conceptions of 
normality in cases of conflict. To apply this analytical dimension of NPE to the conflict 
transformation field, specific questions were posed which have been answered through 
empirical analysis. In the process, this research made some theoretical and 
methodological contributions to the state of the art in the field.  
Firstly, with regards to the normativity of EU objectives, a challenge arose when 
attempting to understand whether it was norms or instrumental interests that drove the 
EU’s behaviour. Manners (Appendix A: 36) referred to the difficulty of distinguishing 
norms from interests. This thesis, in line with the constructivist understanding, attempted 
to see norms as constitutive of interests. In implementing this in the empirical analysis, 
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the researcher was, therefore, guided by the question of whether EU interests and 
principles can co-exist or whether one refutes the other. If, for example, a norm could not 
co-exist with the Union’s interests and the EU followed its interests rather than promoting 
the norm, then this is a strong indicator that the EU is prioritising instrumental interests 
over values. Also, this research showed that ‘behaving according to norms’ as an indicator 
of normativity can become largely irrelevant when applying the NPE framework to the 
field of conflict transformation. As the empirical analysis showed, the contested nature 
of international law as well as the existence of conflicting, yet equally valid-principles 
(e.g self-determination versus territorial integrity of states), led to the development of 
well-grounded criticisms against the EU’s approach by all relevant actors. This is not to 
suggest that this indicator should be discarded but, rather, that its applicability in ethnic 
conflict transformation is problematic. ‘Sustainable peace’ is not so clear-cut as a norm 
and, especially in cases of ethnic conflict, it is often associated with a number of 
international law principles and debates. As a result, the assessment of the EU’s self-
binding behaviour depends on the viewpoint of each of the relevant actors and how these 
actors understand ‘justice’, ‘fairness’ and ‘peace’.  
Secondly, another methodological contribution of this research has been the 
operationalisation of the five NPE mechanisms in relation to conflict transformation. In 
the case of some of these mechanisms, this presented several challenges. For example, 
norm invocation was particularly difficult as regards the case of Cyprus. In the case of 
Kosovo, this mechanism was applied through the European Partnerships that required for 
specific measures to be taken in related fields such as combating ethnic discrimination. 
In the case of Cyprus, however, the EU did not directly link the island’s accession with 
conflict transformation. As a result, norm invocation could not be easily detected in 
enlargement-related activities and policies. A careful reading of empirical evidence, 
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however, revealed that this mechanism took a different form in Cyprus. Specifically, it 
was translated into the EU pressing Turkey to show respect for international law. In 
addition, a methodological contribution was made through the operationalisation of the 
‘shaping the discourse of what is normal’ and ‘model power’ mechanisms. A review of 
the literature has shown that education is important in conflict situations with regards to 
changing perceptions of ‘the other’. Therefore, the ‘shaping the discourse of what is 
normal’ mechanism was translated into education-related projects designed to induce 
long-term identity modifications. Also, model power was translated into local actors’ 
perception of the EU’s ideas and practices as worthy of emulation. In different contexts, 
model power could be translated into governments ratifying agreements or changing 
legislation based on EU practices. As concerns conflict transformation though, an 
approach that advocates identity changes, model power requires a deeper investigation 
and is better captured by looking at the value attached by local actors to the principles of 
reconciliation and multi-ethnicity and at their willingness to modify their behaviour and 
align it with these values.  
Lastly, some methodological problems occurred in attempting to measure the normativity 
of EU impact. First of all, it has been difficult to determine whether domestic 
developments emanated from EU policies or from the changing internal environment. 
Secondly, both Cyprus and Kosovo also engaged with other actors in dialogues and 
programmes aimed at conflict transformation. Thus, there occurred a methodological 
problem when attempting to distinguish the EU’s normative impact from that of other 
actors. Where possible, this research made use of counterfactual reasoning to overcome 
this problem82.  
                                                             
82 For a more detailed discussion on the idea of many causes leading to the same outcome, see George 
and Bennet 2005: 10.  
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7.5 AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Four possible avenues for future research look particularly promising. Firstly, the NPE 
theoretical framework developed in Chapter Two was applied to the cases of Cyprus and 
Kosovo which were chosen based on the extent to which they were expected to conform 
to the NPE expectations. However, the application of this framework to other cases of 
ethnic conflict would greatly enhance the conclusions drawn in this research. It could, for 
example, be applied to the cases of Israel-Palestine and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Secondly, it may also be useful to consider cases of conflicts that are not ethnic, so as to 
explore whether results would differ. The EU’s role in the conflicts that emerged in the 
Middle East and North Africa in the context of the ‘Arab Spring’ could provide insights 
in this regard. 
Thirdly, another possible avenue for future research is to delve deeper into some of the 
aspects of the NPE theoretical framework. For example, empirical analysis could 
concentrate on the main factors that inhibited the emergence of local ownership in both 
Cyprus and Kosovo. This research could also highlight differences and similarities 
between state actors and civil society actors in both cases.  
Lastly, although the NPE theoretical framework was specifically developed with the EU 
in mind, it could also be used to assess the normativity of other actors. For example, a 
comparison of the normativity of different actors in a case study (e.g comparison of the 
normativity of the EU and the UN in the cases of Cyprus and Kosovo) could lead to the 
development of interesting conclusions and insights.  
Overall, a key task for the NPE research agenda is the systematic operationalisation of 
key concepts and the conduct of more comparative empirical analysis. This research has 
made an important contribution by operationalising key indicators of normativity and by 
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providing a comparative analysis of two cases using the NPE framework. In this way, this 
thesis has prepared the ground for further research on ‘Normative Power Europe’ in 
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